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When traveling through the dense oil palm plantations around the village of 
Bungku to the “forest of hope” (Harapan Rainforest, Indonesian: Hutan Hara-
pan)1 in southeastern Jambi on the Indonesian island of Sumatra in 2012, the 
people I met were troubled and rebellious. For almost 30 years, they have been 
fighting against the violent appropriation of community land by a transna-
tional oil palm company. More recently, a new conflict has emerged to affect 
their lives – after the conservation company PT Restorasi Ekosistem Indone-
sia (REKI), founded by a transnational NGO (nongovernmental organization) 
consortium and financed by the German and Danish governments, had received 
a conservation concession from the Ministry of Forestry.2 The new concession 
further reduces the land available for the peasants and indigenous communities 
of Bungku and neighboring villages. The village of Bungku, which the inhabit-
ants, after years of conflict, describe as the “village of 1001 problems”, is now 
effectively a village without land, stuck between the dark green of corporate oil 
palm plantations and PT REKI’s new Harapan Rainforest conservancy.
Yet, there are signs of resistance along the road. Signs and boundary stones 
placed by villagers demarcate land claims. Banners and wooden portals wel-
come visitors to the territory of the indigenous Batin Sembilan group and to 
officially inexistent peasant settlements in the “forest of hope”. When talking 
to peasants, you rapidly realize that it is not their “forest of hope” but a forest 
charged with stories of conflict and resistance. Some villagers allege that the 
Prince of Wales, who visited the area in 2008, now owns the forest. Others 
explain that they cannot use their rice swiddens anymore since the govern-
ment declared the forest “as the lung of the earth”. Some of those living in 
the Harapan Rainforest tell you that “the rich countries bought the oxygen in 
the forest”, while others complain that their “home is not the carbon toilet for 
the rich countries”, asking why Germany and Denmark are not reducing their 
greenhouse gas emissions at home instead of protecting forests in Indonesia.
Many peasants explained that their presence within the conservation con-
cession was not accepted by the conservation company. They told me about 
clashes with the army, “black” private security agents and the riot police, about 
houses that had been burned supposedly by private security and forest police, 
and about brave women organizing sit-ins in front of bulldozers and heavily 
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armed policemen. When entering the Harapan Rainforest, the tensions were 
visible. Visitors had to pass security checkpoints, the main camp was fortified, 
and the riot police, “BRIMOB”, had established a temporary base close to 
an ancient airfield within the conservation concession. PT REKI’s staff found 
themselves in an emergency situation after staff had been kidnapped by peasant 
activists to use as bargaining chips in negotiations for the release of peasants 
who were arrested by private security and the police. Both parties accused each 
other of being responsible for the violent escalation of the conflict and the 
anarchic conditions.
Protest and resistance in and against the Harapan Rainforest conservancy 
took many different forms and involved various actors. Some peasants received 
support from peasant organizations and organized, for instance, a march to the 
Ministry of Forestry in Jakarta. Village governments ignored the borders of the 
concession and issued land titles for plots located within it, while others rather 
engaged in hidden activities, such as logging. However, not all peasants were 
engaged in protest against PT REKI. Some members of the indigenous Batin 
Sembilan consider the conservation company to be an important ally against 
the expansion of agro-industrial oil palm estates. They explained that their for-
est gardens and swiddens had been destroyed by oil palm companies. They 
hope that the conservation project will help them to reestablish their traditional 
livelihoods.
This book focuses on these new stories from the Harapan Rainforest and 
many others from other places on Sumatra, such as the Berbak Carbon Initia-
tive. The stories center on the socio-spatial consequences of a recent inven-
tion by economists and conservationists in the context of international climate 
policy: the REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation) mechanism. They stand for a new kind of conservation conflict 
linking different places and actors, such as developed countries and corporate 
actors interested in carbon offsetting, conservationists interested in financing 
protected areas by selling carbon credits, and peasant farmers and indigenous 
groups in the Global South interested in maintaining or expanding access to 
agricultural land. The conflicts over Sumatra’s remaining forests are sympto-
matic for the contradictions and ambiguities caused by attempts to maintain the 
current fossil-fuel based accumulation regime and by attempts to export cli-
mate change mitigation to supposedly low-cost locations in the Global South.
In Indonesia, a large highly biodiverse archipelago with the third largest 
extent of tropical forest cover, the situation is notably conflictive. On the one 
hand, Indonesia claims to be a global leader in REDD+; on the other hand, 
local realities such as land tenure conflicts and the rampant forest fires of 2015 
stand in sharp contrast to Indonesia’s announcements concerning forest govern-
ance reforms (Finlayson, 2014; Hein et al., 2016: 380; Toumbourou, 2015). In 
particular, Indonesia’s last remaining frontier areas are heavily contested spaces 
that are still witnessing violent conflicts about access and control of forest land 
(Hein et al., 2016; Tsing, 2005). Caused by historically contingent structural 
inequality, land conflicts “became chronic” (Rachman, 2013: 3) in Indonesia. 
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Colonial and post-colonial governments appropriated vast forest areas for 
resource exploitation and conservation. Today, indigenous communities and 
peasant organizations consider the occupation of corporate and state-owned 
plantation estates and conservation areas as a legitimate response to the dispos-
sessions of the colonial and post-colonial state (Hein et al., 2016; Lukas, 2014; 
Peluso et al., 2008).
Indonesia has 252 million inhabitants and the fourth-largest population in 
the world, the third-largest extent of tropical forest cover and one of the highest 
rates of land-based greenhouse gas emissions, mainly caused by forest fires and 
deforestation. In this context, the Indonesian government, supported by Nor-
way’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI), selected a number 
of Indonesian provinces for piloting REDD+ policies. The province of Jambi, 
located on the island of Sumatra, became one of these provinces in 2013.
This book shows that REDD+ policies are seldom conflict free, especially 
when local communities have to cope with the simultaneous expansion of agro- 
industrial estates. The book focuses on two different but interrelated forms of 
peasant resistance and agrarian conflict. The first refers to land occupations that 
occurred before REDD+ implementation and that were organized by village 
governments, indigenous leaders and peasants, and facilitated by sub-national 
branches of the state. The second refers to resistance and attempts to defend 
land rights during the implementation of REDD+. Taking a political ecology 
perspective, the aim is to unravel the causes and the scalar dimension of land 
conflicts and peasant resistance by asking questions, such as: Which actors are 
involved in land tenure conflicts in REDD+ target areas? What are the his-
torical root causes of conflictive property rights? Which role does power play? 
What are the explanations for conflict? What are the climate justice implica-
tions of transnational forest conservation initiatives such as REDD+?
Introducing the politics of REDD+ and  
peasant resistance
When the idea of reducing emissions from deforestation entered the UN cli-
mate negotiations in 2005, this was also the result of lobbying by an interesting 
transnational actor coalition. This transnational coalition consisted of a number 
of tropical forest countries represented by the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, 
large environmental NGOs and a number of large transnational companies 
interested in the cost-efficient offsetting of greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. Hein 
and Garrelts, 2014; Jodoin and Mason-Case, 2016; Stephan et al., 2014). Influ-
ential reports such as the Stern Review on the “Economics of Climate Change” 
(Stern, 2007) and Johan Eliasch’s (2008) review “Climate Change: Financing 
Global Forests” identified forest conservation as the most cost-efficient way to 
mitigate climate change. In addition, the third assessment report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published in 2007 pointed 
out that 17 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions are caused by defor-
estation and forest degradation. These key publications supported the growing 
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momentum for the inclusion of forest conservation in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agenda (Jodoin and 
Mason-Case, 2016).
The basic idea behind REDD+ was taken from dominant market-oriented 
conservation concepts, such as payments for ecosystem services and carbon 
trade. Payments to forest owners or tropical forest countries channeled through 
carbon markets, global funds or national payment for ecosystem services 
schemes would halt deforestation almost automatically. Supporting forest con-
servation in the Global South was framed as a “win-win” solution that would 
contribute to biodiversity conservation, rural development and climate change 
mitigation (Angelsen et al., 2012; Pagiola, 2011; Virgilio et al., 2010; Visseren-
Hamakers et al., 2012). Thus, the idea rapidly gained political traction and also 
received support from previously skeptical actors, such as the European Union.
In 2007, REDD+ became part of the Bali Roadmap towards a post-2012 
binding climate agreement. In contrast to previous market mechanisms and 
climate finance mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Mechanisms and 
the Adaptation Fund of the Kyoto Protocol, REDD+ is not governed by a 
central management or financing body. No final agreement has yet been made 
on how REDD+ will be financed, and whether emission reductions from 
REDD+ activities should be considered as voluntary contributions from devel-
oping countries supported by the developed countries, or whether REDD+ 
should be eligible for offsetting (Angelsen et al., 2014; Horstmann and Hein, 
2017; Jodoin and Mason-Case, 2016). In fact, today’s REDD+ governance is 
highly fragmented (Zelli et al., 2014). This fragmentation is also reflected at the 
national and local scales (ibid.). The UNFCCC is only one of many institutions 
governing REDD+. Most REDD+ country programs and local projects are 
funded by bilateral donors, such as Norway, the United Kingdom and  Germany, 
by multilateral donor agencies such as the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
(FCPF) administered by the World Bank, and through voluntary carbon mar-
kets. All these actors have developed their own specific ideas on the recognition 
of community rights, on how to reduce deforestation, on rules for financ-
ing forest conservation, and on achieving supposed win-win outcomes. Some 
projects aim to produce emission reduction certificates for voluntary carbon 
markets (as the Berbak Carbon Initiative discussed in this book). Indonesia, 
Colombia, Guyana and Brazil, for instance, have negotiated result-based pay-
ment agreements with donors, meaning that they receive payments if they suc-
cessfully reduce deforestation. Other donor-financed REDD+ projects aim to 
“improve” national forest governance or to make countries “ready” for carbon 
markets. In some cases, conservation NGOs and national conservation authori-
ties strategically link their existing conservation efforts to REDD+ to gain 
access to donor finance.
Consequently, REDD+ can be many different things at different scales and 
for different actor coalitions and their respective storylines and discourses. In 
particular, because of its fuzziness, REDD+ still is and was very popular as an 
idea. For some actors, REDD+ is a cost-efficient offsetting mechanism, for 
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others rather a development aid mechanism to support transformation towards 
rural low carbon economies, for environmental NGOs and often underfunded 
national conservation authorities it is rather a mechanism to finance protected 
areas. Indigenous communities across the globe use REDD+ to access devel-
opment aid and to argue for land rights, while peasant associations consider 
REDD+ as enabling land grabs for the purpose of forest carbon offsetting (La 
Via Campesina, 2015). For those that Hiraldo and Tanner (2011) describe as 
“institutionalists”, REDD+ is an attempt to establish a global scale of “good” 
forest and land tenure governance to support climate change mitigation, biodi-
versity conservation, sustainable development, and the rights of local and indig-
enous communities (Gupta, 2012: 622; Hiraldo and Tanner, 2011: 46).
From a global environmental and climate justice perspective, REDD+ raises 
a number of additional concerns. REDD+ focuses on developing countries 
and especially on the peripheral forest margins. Forest conservation and the 
transfer of financial resources could help to promote more sustainable land 
use, but it also transfers responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 
those who have emitted much less than citizens in the Global North. Further-
more, as a recent study of Irfany and Klasen (2015) shows, Indonesian citizens 
living in urban areas emit twice as much as those living in rural areas. From 
the perspective of an urban citizen either from Indonesia or from the Global 
North, REDD+ is attractive because it transfers obligations either to the global 
periphery or to the national periphery, avoiding hard emission cuts that would 
affect their own lifestyles. The expansion of protected areas and reforestation 
efforts rather affect the rural population. Consequently, the factual or putative 
lower-opportunity costs of forest conservation are not politically neutral.
Indigenous groups and peasants in many parts of the world criticize the 
“global gaze” (Fogel, 2004) of the REDD+ mechanism and the framing of 
forests as empty carbon stocks, highlighting that many indigenous groups and 
peasants live within and close to forests and have maintained the carbon storage 
capacity of forests for generations. REDD+ and green enclosures affect actors 
differently, reflecting power imbalances at the forest margins but also between 
the North and South, and between urban centers and rural areas in the South 
(Eilenberg, 2015; Hein et al., 2018a; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Lohmann, 2008; 
McAfee, 2012b). Following this argument, REDD+ can be considered as a 
mechanism that stabilizes the current fossil fuel-based accumulation regime 
(Hein et al., 2018a) and the “imperial mode of living” (Brand and Wissen, 2012, 
2017) characterized by high-emission lifestyles and consumerism in global 
centers. The imperial mode of living is based on a disproportionate claim to 
global sinks, including to the world’s tropical forests, to offset the externalities 
of high emission lifestyles (ibid.).
In this context, where land and nature are becoming increasingly valuable 
as carbon sinks, as ecosystem service providers and as fertile grounds for the 
expanding agro-industry, “[. . .] the basic questions of the agrarian political 
economy are as relevant as ever: Who owns what? Who does what? Who gets 
what?” (Fairhead et al., 2012: 241). Land is at the heart of the agrarian question. 
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It is one of the most important means of production in the agrarian political 
economy. Providing and legitimizing access to land is an important source of 
political authority (Lund, 2016). In many target countries of REDD+, it is 
exactly this political and economic resource that is highly contested (Eilenberg, 
2015; Hein et al., 2016, Kunz et al., 2016; Larson et al., 2013; To et al., 2017). 
Two important reasons for this contestation are as follows. First, especially in 
Indonesia but also in South American countries like Colombia, the central 
state has appropriated large parts of the countries’ forests, often ignoring the 
presence of indigenous and customary communities. The formation of the state 
forest estate (kawasan hutan) in Indonesia and the forest reserve (reserva forestal) 
in Colombia were state territorialization projects aimed at claiming land and 
stabilizing the national territory by allocating land in frontier areas to citizens 
and companies, challenging pre-existing authority and property relations (Hein 
et al., 2016; Ortiz, 1984: 210). In both countries, this process was notably vio-
lent and was characterized by multiple periods of primitive accumulation (Del 
Cairo et al., 2014; Escobar, 2003; Gómez et al., 2015; Hein et al., 2016; Peluso, 
1995; Peluso et al., 2008). In Indonesia, after the fall of former Indonesian presi-
dent Suharto at the end of the 1990s, power constellations changed the scalar 
structure of the state, and this state territorialization project came under seri-
ous pressure driven by protests from customary communities, peasant move-
ments and local governments (Barr et al., 2006; Hein et al., 2016; Peluso et al., 
2008). Rescaling widened the agency of local political authorities, creating the 
momentum to exercise de facto control over parts of the state forest territory. 
Second, land is often very unequally distributed. In the Indonesian village of 
Bungku, for instance, located at the margins of the Harapan Rainforest, two-
thirds of the village land has been allocated to oil palm, timber and conservation 
companies, leaving only a few hectares available for peasant farming (Polsek 
Sungai Bahar, 2011; Zainuddin, 2013).
Protest and resistance from peasants and indigenous communities against 
REDD+ and other conservation initiatives on the island of Sumatra and 
beyond revolve mainly around the basic questions of the agrarian political 
economy, as raised by Fairhead and colleagues (2012), and in particular around 
access to land, land rights and land-use restrictions. However, a particularity 
of peasant resistance against REDD+ on Sumatra is the explicit reference to 
global climate justice issues, as illustrated by the slogan introduced above: “Our 
forest is not the carbon toilet of the rich countries”. The basic idea of offset-
ting emissions at low-cost locations not only links emitters in the North with 
project implementers and land users in the South, but offsetting also links local 
struggles on access and control of forest and land resources to transnational 
activists’ networks that provide peasants with the opportunity to resist the land 
claims of private or public conservation agencies (Chatterton et al., 2013; Hein 
and Faust, 2014; Hein et al., 2016).
Peasant resistance and indigenous struggle for recognition and rights have 
been widely discussed by scholars, in particular by James C. Scott (1985). Scott 
analyzed hidden peasant resistance strategies, arguing that hidden and everyday 
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forms of peasant resistance do not openly challenge hegemony. Rather, they 
occur silently as the hidden encroachment strategies of peasants entering the 
forest of hope. But when the political context permits, for example after the 
fall of Suharto, hidden resistance can turn into open forms of resistance, such as 
the public invasion of property (Peluso, Afif and Rachman, 2008; Scott, 1989: 5; 
Turner and Caouette, 2009: 11). The cases discussed in this book fall between 
the two categories. They include open and organized forms of land occupation, 
the formation of counter territories and open protest at climate summits, but 
also hidden encroachment and sabotage. Furthermore, they include resistance 
against historically rooted and contingent structural inequality and unequal 
land distribution prior to conservation interventions, and resistance and conflict 
in the context of ongoing REDD+ and conservation interventions. Whereas 
peasant resistance can be considered as class struggle (e.g., Scott, 1989), indige-
nous groups’ struggle mainly strives for the acknowledgement of full citizenship 
rights (especially in Indonesia) and the obtaining of specific minority rights in 
compensation for being historically disadvantaged, exploited and marginalized 
by European colonizers and post-colonial governments.
Recently, the social struggles of peasants and of indigenous groups have 
become more and more transnational. Transnational peasant organizations such 
as La Via Campesina and the Asian Peasant Coalition emerged out of pro-
test against market liberalism in the 1990s (Borras, 2008). Transnational peas-
ant protest has become a common feature of international trade conferences 
and, more recently, of climate change conferences. La Via Campesina, as the 
largest peasant organization, and large indigenous rights organizations, such 
as AMAN (Alliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara) from Indonesia and COICA 
(Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica) from 
the Amazon basin countries, have become key actors of the global climate jus-
tice movement (Claeys and Delgado-Pugley, 2017). COICA and AMAN use 
the REDD+ momentum to lobby for indigenous rights. They initiated, for 
example, the “no rights, no REDD+” campaign, they suggested a number of 
indigenous approaches towards REDD+ (e.g., REDD+ Indigena of COICA), 
and strategically use their supposed role as forest stewards to strengthen indig-
enous rights to land. Peasant associations such as La Via Campesina, in contrast, 
strictly oppose REDD+ but they also use the additional agency provided by 
the REDD+ momentum to lobby for peasant rights and food sovereignty and 
against offsetting and carbon markets (Buckley, 2018; Claeys and Delgado-Pug-
ley, 2017; La Via Campesina, 2015). Both peasant and indigenous movements 
have strategically used the additional agency provided by global climate gov-
ernance for transnational campaigns. Both have heavily criticized market-based 
and state-led strategies to mitigate climate change (Claeys and Delgado-Pugley, 
2017: 325).
However, peasants and indigenous communities organized in social move-
ments are not the only type of resistance against REDD+ occurring in Suma-
tra’s forests. The ongoing conflicts also take place within the state. There is 
competition between the conservation and development-oriented apparatuses 
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of the state, reflecting the different concerns of competing groups within soci-
ety but also those of supra-national planning institutions (Hein et al., 2018a). 
In some cases, peasants and indigenous groups have formed alliances with local 
state authorities and local NGOs in order to regain access to land officially con-
trolled by other state actors and private companies. Especially after the politi-
cal turmoil of the late 1990s and early 2000s, district heads (Bupati), village 
heads (Kepala Desa) and customary leaders took advantage of the confusion, 
interpreting the decentralization reforms to their advantage and asserting far-
reaching administrative authority over forests (Barr et al., 2006). In contrast, 
local conservation authorities used the REDD+ momentum after the climate 
conference in Bali in 2007 to form alliances with public donors and transna-
tional conservation organizations to gain support for their chronically under-
funded protected area system (Hein et al., 2018a).
This book argues that conflict in the context of forest carbon offsetting and 
REDD+ is a new empirical phenomenon calling for an innovative concep-
tual framework. The concepts of power, territory and scale provide important 
explanations for contemporary agrarian conflicts in the context of conserva-
tion interventions. REDD+ and broader processes of state transformation have 
induced significant rescaling processes, transforming the governance of land 
and forests and producing new forms of territoriality (Castree, 2008; Cohen 
and McCarthy, 2014; Peluso and Lund, 2011; Reed and Bruyneel, 2010). Inves-
tigating the politics of scales sheds important light on “[. . .] who will have 
access to what kind of nature [. . .]” (Swyngedouw, 2010). Political scales can 
be considered as spatial delimitations of power relations (Meadowcroft, 2002). 
Investigating territorialization processes helps to unravel discursive strategies, 
the construction of social identities, conservation logics and power relations 
inscribed in landscapes (Peluso and Lund, 2011). Power relations in this vein 
are important constitutive elements of the social production of space, scale and 
territory.
REDD+ and access to land are both issues that are negotiated and regulated 
on different scales, for example at the village scale by the village head, by the 
district head or (in the case of forest land) by the Ministry of Forestry in Jakarta, 
or (in the case of REDD+) at UNFCCC conferences and in the headquarters 
of donor agencies. Consequently, this books builds on multi-sited qualitative 
research inspired by “deterritorialized” (Merry, 2000: 130) and “multi-sited eth-
nography” (Marcus, 1995: 80). The main sites of the empirical investigation of 
this book are villages located at the margins of and within the Harapan Rain-
forest and the Berbak Carbon Initiative on the island of Sumatra, Indonesia 
(Figure 2.1). Both projects are located in the province of Jambi. The Harapan 
Rainforest is located in the southeastern part of Jambi’s lowlands, whereas the 
Berbak Carbon Initiative is located at the coast of the South China Sea. In both 
projects, transnational NGOs and donors play an important role. In addition, 
the book is based on qualitative research conducted along the lines of different 
networks of interaction linked to project implementation and resistance across 
field sites, namely the provincial capital of Jambi, the national capital Jakarta, 
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the city of Bogor as an important hub for academia and conservation NGOs, 
UNFCCC climate change conferences and the headquarters of donor agencies 
in Germany.
A guide through the book
The outline of this book is as follows. Chapter 2 provides an analytical and 
methodological framework for investigating new agrarian conflicts. Conflict 
in the context of forest carbon offsetting and REDD+ is a new empirical 
phenomenon calling for an innovative conceptual framework. Based on the 
politics of scale literature, political ecology and theories of power, the book 
aims to advance our theoretical understanding of the new agrarian conflicts 
emerging in the context of REDD+. It is argued that the ability to alter 
political scales and consequently the ability to access land and define “nature” 
is linked to questions of power.
Chapter 3 investigates the politics of the scale of forest and land tenure 
governance as the dynamic context of REDD+ implementation and agrar-
ian conflicts in Indonesia. The chapter shows how different political regimes, 
recentralization and decentralization have facilitated the construction of some-
times competing and contradictory political scales governing access to land and 
forests. Recently, village governments supported by customary authorities have 
been able to establish village scales of land and forest tenure regulation and to 
expand village and customary territories, overlapping with the state forest ter-
ritory and with national scales of regulations. Allied with customary authori-
ties, village governments control land, challenge the integrity of the state forest 
territory and are able to resist centralized control of forest and land resources.
Chapter 4 focuses on the privatization and transnationalization of conserva-
tion in Indonesia. Private companies and donor governments from the Global 
North consider forest conservation in the South a cost-efficient option to 
mitigate climate change. Environmental organizations and public conservation 
agencies in the South are mainly looking for new options to finance tropical 
forest conservation. The Indonesian government has initiated a number of gov-
ernance reforms and established REDD+ pilot provinces in order to be “ready” 
for foreign investments in carbon conservation.
Chapter 5 focuses on the transnational dimensions of agrarian conflicts and 
peasant resistance. It investigates the different territorialization strategies of 
peasants, indigenous groups, conservation NGOs and apparatuses of the state. 
It shows successful examples of peasant resistance that challenge the commodi-
fication of forest carbon, and disentangles conflicts between development- and 
conservation-oriented apparatuses of the state.
In Chapter 6, the book concludes that apparently local land conflicts about 
access and control of forests and agricultural land become transnationalized in 
the context of REDD+ and forest carbon offsetting. REDD+ pilot projects in 
Jambi financed by private and public donors changed the dialectical relation-
ships between structure and agency. They reduced the ability to access land for 
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some actors, provided additional opportunities for others, and provided entry 
points for the transnational resistance campaigns of peasant movements and 
climate justice organizations. Successful peasant resistance, as the struggles dis-
cussed in this book show, has relied on scale jumping and on transnational sup-
port networks. Peasant movements and indigenous peoples have gained agency 
in the course of recent attempts to establish a global scale of forest govern-
ance. Finally, transnational conservation initiatives and market-based conser-
vation instruments such as REDD+ are not acting in a social and political 
vacuum. Understanding the specific history of landscapes is of key importance 
for understanding land conflicts triggered by conservation interventions.
Notes
 1 The official names are Harapan Rainforest and Hutan Harapan. In this book Harapan 
Rainforest and “forest of hope” as an English translation will be used interchangeably.
 2 In 2015, the former Ministry of Forestry (Kementerian Kehutanan) and the Ministry for the 
Environment (Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup) were merged. When I refer to the Ministry 
of Forestry (MOF), I always refer to the institution prior to the merger, when I refer to 
the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Kementerian Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup dan 
Kehutanan Republik Indonesia), I refer to the ministry in its current form.
2  Conceptual, theoretical 
and methodological 
underpinning for a political 
ecology of transnational 
agrarian conflicts
Conflict in the context of forest carbon offsetting and REDD+ is a new  empirical 
phenomenon calling for an innovative conceptual framework and methodolog-
ical approach. This book aims to advance our theoretical  understanding of new 
agrarian conflicts emerging in the context of REDD+. Building on Edward 
Soja (1989: 60), I suggest that any analysis of specific geographies of capital-
ism is necessarily an “eclectic exercise”. Especially research on new empirical 
phenomena that links actors across scales and spaces in a very specific and novel 
way – such as REDD+ – has to be flexible and creative and should avoid too 
rigid categorical thinking (ibid. 73). REDD+ and agrarian conflicts are negoti-
ated and regulated on various scales, e.g. at the village scale by the village head, 
by the district head or – in the case of forest land – by the Ministry of Forestry 
in Jakarta, or – in the case of REDD+ – at UNFCCC conferences and in the 
headquarters of donor agencies. Consequently, the empirical research for this 
book was “multi-sited” and inspired by “deterritorialized” (Merry, 2000: 130) 
and “multi-sited ethnography” (Marcus, 1995: 80).
This conceptual and methodological chapter outlines the main elements of 
a political ecology of REDD+, combining critical social theory, Marxist and 
post-modern geography, and legal anthropology, and provides information on 
the multi-sited qualitative approach used for the empirical research. It intro-
duces concepts of power, the state, space, territory, scale and property which 
help to investigate agrarian conflicts in the context of conservation interven-
tions. I argue that REDD+ and broader processes of state transformation have 
induced significant rescaling processes, transforming the governance of land 
and forests and producing new forms of territoriality (Castree, 2008; Cohen 
and McCarthy, 2014; Reed and Bruyneel, 2010; Peluso and Lund, 2011). Inves-
tigating the politics of scales explains in important ways “[. . .] who will have 
access to what kind of nature [. . .]” (Swyngedouw, 2010: 12). Political scales can 
be considered as spatial delimitations of power relations (Meadowcroft, 2002). 
Investigating territorialization processes helps to unravel discursive strategies, 
the construction of social identities, conservation logics and power relations 
inscribed in landscapes (Peluso and Lund, 2011). Power relations in this vein are 
important constitutive elements of the social production of space, scale and ter-
ritory. Thus they are important explanatory factors for the differing abilities of 
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actors to access land and property (Corbera and Brown, 2010; Koch et al., 2008; 
Nuijten, 2005; Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Rodriguez de Francisco and Boelens, 
2014; Wynberg and Hauck, 2014;).
Political ecology
Political ecology explores the production of different “politicized environ-
ments” (Bryant, 1998) in the context of specific power constellations. Politi-
cal ecologists built on a wide range of schools of thought coming from very 
different epistemological perspectives (e.g. Marxist, hermeneutics/social con-
structivism, post-structuralism) loosely drawn together by the objective of 
investigating the interrelations between political economy, ecological pro-
cesses and power relations. Fundamental for Marxist political ecology is the 
basic assumption that the appropriation and transformation of the biophysical 
environment through labor produces a “second nature” (Lefebvre, 1976b: 15) 
or “social nature” (Castree, 2001).
In German-speaking countries the concept of societal relationships with 
nature (Gesellschaftliche Naturverhältnisse) has been quite influential for schol-
ars of political ecology (Görg, 2011: 416; Köhler, 2008: 210; Pichler, 2014: 
19). To some extent the concept of societal relationships goes beyond Anglo-
Saxon political ecology, stressing the importance of institutions and different 
state agencies (Görg, 1999, 2011). The concept explicitly considers that “[. . .] 
conflicts over societal relationships with nature are closely interlinked with 
spatio-institutional transformations of the state” (Brand et al., 2011: 150). In 
line with the societal relationships of nature concepts, this study builds on a 
dual understanding of nature (Görg, 2011: 416). First, a material dimension of 
nature refers to economic and technical forms of appropriation (ibid.). Sec-
ond, a symbolic dimension refers to nature as a cultural construction (ibid.). 
These two dimensions are not binary opposites, they are intrinsically linked 
to each other.
Nature is produced by society through practices, through linguistic and 
scientific meanings, but nature still has a biophysical and material basis with 
inherent physical processes (Escobar, 1999: 3; Görg, 2011: 417). In more illus-
trative terms, the social practices of smallholders, conservationists and log-
ging companies transform the meanings of nature but at the same time they 
transform the biophysical materiality of nature. The biophysical materiality 
of nature is rather shaped by social practices and discourses than determined 
by its materiality. Thus, the very same nature, or more specifically a forest, can 
be experienced differently “[. . .] according to one’s social position” (Escobar, 
1999: 5). For a logging company a forest is primarily a source of timber. The 
semi-nomadic Batin Sembilan in the Harapan Rainforest might conceive the 
same forest as a fruit garden, whilst a frontier migrant might consider the for-
est as empty space for agricultural expansion. In contrast, a REDD+ project 
developer might conceive the very same forest as carbon storage and as a “pro-
duction site” for forest carbon credits.
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Linking social-spatial theory with conservation territories 
and property relations
A socio-spatial perspective on REDD+ provides a number of highly relevant 
insights, shedding light on the historical and social aspects of spatiality (Soja, 
1996). It helps to investigate the formation of territorial units such as protected 
areas and the social construction of nested scales of governance, to question 
the crisis narratives that are used to legitimize green enclosures, and to think 
about how REDD+ – as a market-based conservation mechanism – reproduces 
existing patterns of uneven spatial development. Jessop and colleagues argue 
that “[. . .] socio-spatial theory is most powerful when it a) refers to historically 
specific geographies of social relations, and b) explores contextual and historical 
specific variations in the structural coupling, strategic coordination, and forms 
of interconnection among the different dimensions of the latter” (Jessop et al., 
2008: 392).
The social production of conservation spaces
Protected areas are social spaces that Zimmerer (2000: 358) describes as 
“nature-society hybrids” containing second nature. “Environmental conserva-
tion makes both space and spatial scale” argues David M. Hughes (2005: 157). 
The implementation of protected areas redefines space, implies certain rules 
and designates boundaries, thus conservation implies the “making of territory” 
(Zimmerer, 2000: 358). In this book, space is considered as a social product. 
Based on post-modern and Marxist critical theorists, such as Henry Lefebvre 
and Edward W. Soja, I consider space and spatial units such as forested land-
scapes as socially produced (Lefebvre, 1976a; Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 1980). Soja 
(1989: 79–80) explains that “space in itself may be primordially given, but the 
organization and meaning of space is a product of social translation, transfor-
mation and experience”. The social space or created space, according to Soja 
(1980: 2010), is socially produced through transforming “[. . .] the given con-
ditions inherent in life-on-earth”. Lefebvre argues in the same direction. He 
claims that “space has been shaped and molded from historical and natural ele-
ments, but this has been a political process” (Lefebvre, 1976a: 31). For Zimmerer 
(2000) conservation areas “belong(s) fully to the production of nature and space 
in the transition to a late capitalist modernity” (ibid. 360). Hence, socially pro-
duced space reflects modes of production, political organization and ideology 
(Lefebvre, 1976a: 31; Soja, 1980: 210).
Protected areas, as an environmentalist spatial practice (Hughes, 2005: 157), 
contain space. By establishing new conservation areas and by implementing 
different zones for conservation and for “sustainable” resource use, conserva-
tionists fix non-human species and the human population in space. Protected 
areas are the spatial manifestation of what Garland (2008: 61) and Brockington 
and Scholfield (2011: 83) describe as the conservationists’ mode of production 
which “[. . .] incorporates wildlife into the capitalist system”. Conservationists 
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not only raise money for new protected areas, they also use space to produce 
a number of commodities such as scenic beauty, spectacular images of endan-
gered flagship species, sites for ecotourism and – more recently – carbon credits. 
Garland (2008: 62) argues that “[. . .] as is the case for other kinds of natural 
resource exploitation, the relations of production involved in wildlife conser-
vation depend greatly on the control over productive assets in question [. . .]”, 
which in most cases is space.
In this sense, the social production of conservation spaces are dialectical 
processes. Space, political organization and relations of production mutually 
depend on each other (Soja, 1980: 211). Conservation spaces such as the Berbak 
Carbon Initiative are the outcome of social relations. And, at the same time, by 
imposing certain rules they structure and mediate social relations.
Scale
The concept of scale expands the socio-spatial theory of Lefebvre and Soja 
since it locates social practices not as fixed within space but rather as within 
dynamic socially produced scales (Brenner, 1998: 459, Wissen, 2008: 19). The 
starting point is the premise that scale is a socially produced hierarchical spatial 
element (Jessop et al., 2008: 393; Towers, 2000: 26). In contrast to the interna-
tional relations and multi-level governance literature, I do not take the multi-
scalar and hierarchical organization of the state for granted (Bulkeley, 2005: 
876). Hierarchical scalar structures of the state including territorial units and 
their institutionalized forms and levels of representation in Indonesia (e.g. pro-
vincial government, district government and village government) are the out-
come of societal struggle and political negotiation (Brenner, 1998; Hein et al., 
2018a; Houdret et al., 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). They demarcate arenas of 
socio-political struggle and regulation. “Scales of regulation” (Towers, 2000), 
for instance, refer to spatial entities such as nested jurisdictions with a specific 
regulatory order (Hein et al., 2016). Actors might produce additional scales or 
shift political struggles to a specific scale of regulation or political forum to 
pursue their interests (Hein et al., 2018a; Smith, 2008: 232; Towers, 2000; von 
Benda-Beckmann, 1981).
Scale theorists and political ecologists share many theoretical and empiri-
cal concerns and have recently been increasingly engaged in an intense dia-
logue (Neumann, 2009: 398–400). Early political ecologists such as Blaikie 
and Brookfield (1987: 79) already highlighted the interconnectedness “[. . .] of 
political economic relationships at the local, regional and international scales 
which determine the actions of land-user [. . .]”. Authors such as Erik Swyn-
gedouw (2010), Karl Zimmerer (2000, 2006) and Alina Brad (2016), as well as 
Ulrich Brand and colleagues (Brand et al., 2011), have bridged both strands of 
literature drawing on the concept of scale to analyze the production and the 
societal relationships of specific natures (Neumann, 2009: 402).
Three aspects of the current academic discussion within human geography, 
political science and anthropology are relevant for understanding the different 
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agrarian conflicts in the context of REDD+ in Indonesia. First, scale theorists 
focus not on scale as such but seek to explain social processes that lead to 
the production of scale and the transformation of existing scalar arrangements. 
Neil Brenner, for instance, has conceptualized the role of the state in the pro-
duction of scale (Brenner, 1997, 1998). Drawing on Lefebvre, he argues “[. . .] 
that the territorial state has played a crucial role in constructing a worldwide 
‘second nature’ of socio-spatial configurations organized on multiple, overlap-
ping spatial scales” (Brenner, 1997: 149). He further argues that globalization, 
as ongoing rescaling processes of the world economy, is associated with state 
interventions that support the expansion of capitalistic modes of production 
(Brenner, 2001: 594; Marston, 2000: 227). Brenner claims that the “geoeco-
nomic project of neoliberalism” which goes hand in hand with processes of 
commodification has transformed the scalar organization and scales of “socio-
political regulation” (Brenner, 2001: 594). State interventions facilitated privati-
zation and scalar restructuring, which have territorial and tangible outcomes 
inscribed in landscapes (Marston, 2000: 221–227). Based on Brenner, I use the 
concept of scale in a process-based sense, focusing on the political processes 
(e.g. decentralization of forest governance or the construction of a new trans-
national scale of forest governance) which lead to the production of new scalar 
configurations and which alter existing scalar configurations and scalar hierar-
chies (Brenner, 2001: 600). In Indonesian forest landscapes, the so-called sec-
tor laws (e.g. Forest Law, see Chapter 3 for more detail) aimed to strengthen 
the control of the national government over natural resources and promote 
investment in natural resource exploitation by establishing a concession sys-
tem. In particular, the Forest Law had far-reaching territorial consequences, 
challenging established modes of production (e.g. shifting cultivation practices 
conducted by customary communities) and scales of socio-political regulation 
(Elmhirst, 2001; Peluso et al., 2008; Pye, 2012; Rachman, 2011: 30–36; Towers, 
2000). A new national concession system, for instance, can be considered as a 
new scale regulating access to land for the purpose of facilitating forest exploi-
tation and agro-industrial estates. This new scalar structure restricts access for 
those actors that are not able to establish relationships with national authorities. 
Changes in the scalar structure might have tangible outcomes in landscapes, 
for example a transition from shifting cultivation to commercial large-scale oil 
palm plantation estates.
Second, the politics of scale literature seeks to explain dialectical relation-
ships between structure and agency (Marston, 2000: 220; Towers, 2000: 26). 
Scales may also structure the livelihoods of actors (Wissen, 2008: 20). But actors 
may also actively change the configuration of existing scales and seek to pro-
duce new scales. Neil Smith (1992) stresses that human agency and social and 
cultural practices also contribute to scale production. He conceptualizes the 
politics of scale as the frictions and contestations within scales and between 
scales (Marston, 2000: 228; Smith, 1992: 64). Scale, as he understands it, “[. . .] 
both contains social activity, and at the same time provides an already parti-
tioned geography within which social activity takes place” (Smith, 1992: 66). In 
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Smith’s reading of scale, social conflicts take place on more than one scale. Espe-
cially subaltern groups, marginalized at the local scale, might seek to “jump” 
(Smith, 2008: 232) to a more promising scale. Scale jumping, Smith argues, is 
used as a resistance strategy that might facilitate alliances between actors or that 
might provide access to resources or to political decision making at higher or 
lower scales. Successful actors are consequently those who are able to choose 
the appropriate scale of political struggle for achieving their interests, this might 
include the deconstruction of scales serving the interests of political opponents 
(Smith, 2008: 232). Active scale choices can be used in order to include or 
exclude actors from access to political resources, natural resources and land 
(Lebel et al., 2005: 1).
Third, scale theorists focus on the social and ecological consequences of scale 
construction or reconstruction. As a geographical construction scales divide 
socio-material natures (Swyngedouw, 2010: 12). Consequently, scales can be 
understood as particular spaces containing social processes and biophysical pro-
cesses (ibid). For instance, the construction of a REDD+ project as a new 
scale of forest governance may enhance forest protection but may also exclude 
certain actors, e.g. shifting cultivators and logging companies, from participat-
ing in negotiation processes concerning access and control of the project area. 
George Towers (2000: 26), drawing especially on Soja, Lefebre and Brenner, 
extends the discussion and argues that “the social production of space invests 
the landscape with meaning and regulation [. . .]” dividing social and biophysi-
cal processes within “[. . .] landscapes into scales of meaning and regulation”. 
Both scales are produced through social struggle and may overlap spatially and 
institutionally (ibid.). Forests in Jambi, for example, can be considered as one 
specific occurrence of “second nature”. They have been transformed through 
specific modes of production entangled with modes of social-spatial organiza-
tion. In pre-colonial times, the most relevant modes of production were shifting 
cultivation and the gathering of non-timber forest products. These practices 
transformed nature and produced (cultural) landscapes invested with distinct 
scales of meaning, e.g. community forests as hunting grounds, community for-
ests as spaces for shifting cultivation, and community forests as sources of non-
timber forest products. Dutch colonization introduced new scales of meaning 
constructing Jambi’s forest as a source of colonial wealth and linking Jambi’s 
forests with the colonial administration in Jakarta and the Dutch government 
in the Netherlands. Different conceptualizations of nature and landscape lead 
to competing scales of meaning. The specific outcomes, e.g. Jambi’s forest as a 
source of colonial or of community wealth, might contradict each other, induc-
ing social conflict. Conservationists may refer to the particularities of a specific 
landscape, e.g. a habitat of the endangered Sumatran tiger or the carbon storage 
capacity of peat swamp, and consequently construct a scalar narrative creating a 
new scale of meaning (Hein et al., 2016: 381; Kelly, 1997; Swyngedouw, 2010; 
Towers, 2000). In contrast, indigenous groups construct scales of meaning based 
on their ancestral lands that offer alternative boundaries to legitimize their pres-
ence in a landscape (Hein et al., 2016: 381).
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Territory, property and authority
Territory, property and authority are three deeply entangled social relations. 
There is a vast literature on the three concepts (Hall, 2013; Paasi, 2003; Peluso 
and Lund, 2011; Sassen, 2008). I will use them in the following ways. I consider 
territory as a socio-spatial relation linking space (in most cases land) and iden-
tity (Jessop et al., 2008; Hall, 2013). However, in contrast to scale, I consider 
territory rather as a flat non-hierarchical concept. Property can be defined as 
a legitimate social relation to objects of value (MacPherson, 1978). I define 
authority as a “[. . .] a specific form of power exercised publicly and legitimated 
with reference to the state” (Lund, 2008: 7) or to pre-existing authorities, such 
as lineage leaders or feudals controlling imagined or historical territories. In the 
following paragraphs I will explain the three concepts in detail.
Following Ansii Paasi (2003: 110), I consider “[. . .] territories as a social 
process in which social space and social action are inseparable”. Territory as 
scale is socially constructed (ibid. 110). Paasi has identified a number of crucial 
elements that “make” a territory: a “process of naming”, the creation of sym-
bols such as flags, physical or symbolic border demarcation, institutions (e.g. 
state, parastatal or indigenous authorities), and day-to-day social practices that 
reproduce and internalize territoriality (ibid.). Consequently, territorialization 
is a process that goes beyond the production of space. It involves rule making, 
claims and sanctions (Peluso and Lund, 2011: 673). The concept also extends 
beyond property, thus beyond claiming land. It clearly includes an emotional 
connection to land which is important to identity formation, and a political 
authority which governs not only access to land use but also other aspects of 
social life (Hall, 2013: 11). Territories can be considered as “power relations 
written on land” (Peluso and Lund, 2011: 673). Territorialization goes hand in 
hand with the making of boundaries. Boundaries are lines of in- and exclusion 
(Paasi, 2003: 113). They separate resources of value from economically, ecologi-
cally or culturally less relevant places. In the context of protected area forma-
tion, this often implies the exclusion of people from land and other income 
sources (Hall et al., 2011; Hein and Faust, 2014).
Property as territory is a contested concept in social science, heavily loaded 
with different ideologies, ongoing and century-old philosophical discussions 
on its meaning and its function, intrinsically linked to the constitution of social 
identity and often perceived as a fundamental legal basis of societies (Lund, 
2008: 3; von Benda-Beckmann et al., 2009: 1–2). The understanding of prop-
erty in Western societies is dominated by the argument that formalized private 
property is a fundamental requirement for the efficient use of (natural) resources 
and for “proper” market exchange (van Meijl and von Benda-Beckmann, 1999: 
6). According to Indonesian state ideology, property should contribute to devel-
opment, market exchange and welfare (von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda- 
Beckmann, 1999: 30). In contrast, according to many indigenous ideologies 
such as adat, property should support and balance the livelihoods of the com-
munity and those within it (ibid.).
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For John Locke property is a transformative product that emerges out of 
combining labor and nature (Macpherson, 1978: 18). Locke argues that a con-
tract between the state and individuals guarantees property (van Meijl and von 
Benda-Beckmann, 1999: 2). Property refers to access to or physical possession 
of material objects of value and the ability to benefit from these objects based 
on enforceable rights (Macpherson, 1978: 3). Property can only be considered 
as such if a legitimate public authority sanctions it, and vice versa. Consequently, 
property is clearly linked to authority and territory but also to different scales of 
governance regulating, legitimizing and defining property rights. A central ele-
ment of public authority is legitimacy. An authority, for example a village head 
allocating rights to natural resources, can only be considered as such if villagers 
show a minimum of voluntary compliance with rules imposed by the village 
head (Alagappa, 1995: 23; Lund, 2008: 7; Sikor and Lund, 2010: 1). According to 
Muthiah Alagappa (1995: 14, 31), constituting elements of legitimacy are shared 
norms and values, including the belief in sanctity and traditions, law (procedural 
legitimacy), the ability to control territory and power. Local public authorities, 
such as village heads in Indonesia, draw on the notion of the state to achieve 
legitimacy. They gain legitimacy through using symbols and languages of the 
state and through referring to the legal system of the state (Lund, 2006: 687).
What members of society consider to be legitimate changes over time and is 
subject to historically contingent and continuous struggles about concepts and 
truths within society (Sikor and Lund, 2010: 6). Struggles over the constitu-
tion and legitimacy of public authority and the legitimacy of a specific scale 
of regulation have direct influence on the legitimacy of the property relations 
in place. National laws, regulations and policies structure access and property 
relations. Local public authorities follow especially those policies and laws that 
support their own interest (Lund, 2008: 4). National laws and policies are not 
necessarily fully implemented locally or fully obeyed by local public authori-
ties and by the local population. But they often structure the agency of local 
actors (ibid.). The relevance of a specific national legislation in a local setting 
depends on the power structure in the political arena (ibid. 135). The result is 
“[. . .] neither coherent policy implementation nor complete disregard of law 
and policy” (ibid.). Accordingly, what is perceived as legal or illegal is not only 
the result of changing laws, it is the outcome of what powerful local actors 
consider as appropriate (ibid. 19). When legitimizing specific local activities, e.g. 
the issuance of a village-scale land title1 or of a forest conversion permit, local 
public authorities might translate or transform fragments of national regulations 
and policies (e.g. land laws or land-titling policies) which correspond to their 
objectives into locally relevant rules (Kunz et al., 2016).
The legitimacy of public authorities in local politics is in many cases charac-
terized by “[. . .] endless chains of reference to bigger authorities” (Lund, 2006: 
693), and consequently has a direct scale component. Different public authori-
ties entangled with different scales might compete over legitimizing property 
rights for the very same piece of land. To strengthen legitimacy, public authori-
ties seek to gain additional recognition from other institutions (Lund, 2008: 2), 
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in many cases from institutions at higher scales of governance. Political scales are 
relevant as reference points for local public authorities. However, local public 
authorities actively produce and reproduce scales (e.g. village scale), as well as 
employ scalar strategies, such as scale jumping, to achieve their interests. Public 
authorities such as village heads, district heads, provincial governments and the 
national government stabilize scalar configurations through regular interaction 
with their citizens (and vice versa), for example by enforcing land claims (Lebel 
et al., 2005). They channel social interaction and stabilize the social production 
of space and scales (Towers, 2000: 26). Access to specific public authorities on 
higher or lower scales is an important factor in explaining socially differentiated 
abilities to benefit from resources (Leach et al., 1999: 233).
In particular, societies with plural land tenure systems have nested and plural 
legal authority arrangements (legal pluralism) with unequal ranges of validity 
and unequal abilities to enforce claims. Claims backed by high-level adminis-
trative authorities may have greater legitimacy than claims backed by a village 
official or vice versa (Sikor and Lund, 2010: 6f). In frontier regions, with their 
confusing and dynamic institutional landscapes, social identity is a key factor 
shaping the ability to access public authority and to benefit from resources 
(Hein and Faust, 2014: 23; Rhee, 2009: 53; Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 170). Eth-
nicity and kinship shape patron–client linkages and permit privileged access to 
state officials and, consequently, to formal or semi-formal processes facilitat-
ing resource access (Rhee, 2009; Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Ethnicity is context 
dependent (Wimmer, 2008: 977) and determines affiliation to groups with spe-
cific customary arrangements permitting resource access for their members. 
Classifications such as putra daerah (child of the region) or “first comers” and 
“late comers” serve as ethnic markers and as factors influencing access to natu-
ral resources and political power (Lund, 2008: 16; Rhee, 2009: 43).
A few notes on the transnationalization of the state and on  
market-led environmental governance
Recently, a number of scholars have started to strengthen political ecology by 
theorizing the state and its role in socio-ecological conflicts (e.g. Brad, 2016; 
Hein et al., 2018a; Ioris, 2014; Pichler, 2014, 2015). I argue that the state or, in 
broader terms, different “notions” of the state have an important role in agrarian 
conflicts, in the process of legitimizing property rights to land and in developing 
and enforcing environmental law. However, the state is not a homogeneous actor. 
Ulrich Brand and Christoph Görg (2003: 226), following the Marxist scholar 
Nicos Poulantzas (1978), conceptualize the state as a “[. . .] power-based social 
relation which creates, in the form of apparatuses, a materiality which by itself 
is full of conflicts and contradictions”. For Poulantzas, the state consists of the 
different state apparatuses that “[. . .] organize the specific relations between the 
ruling classes” (Demirović, 2011: 43). State agencies on different scales, ministries 
and state administrations such as the forest service and the national land agency, 
represent the different functions of the state and the division of labor within the 
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state (Poulantzas, 1978: 155). However, different policies developed and imple-
mented by these different apparatuses (such as land tenure regulations and envi-
ronmental laws) are neither unitary nor coherent (Demirović, 2011: 44; Hein 
et al., 2018a: 4–5). Different apparatuses mediate between competing actors and 
reflect their competing interests. In consequence, they often develop contradic-
tory state strategies. For example, the agricultural agency may push agricultural 
expansion while the forest agency is expanding protected areas. Ambiguous state 
strategies often induce environmental conflict and reflect contradictions and 
compromises among powerful groups in society (Demirović, 2011: 44; Hein 
et al., 2018a: 4–5). The state reflects “societal relationships” and is part of society. 
In this sense, “[. . .] the ‘state’ and ‘(civil)’ society [are] formally separate, at the 
same time they form a contradictory unity” (Brand et al., 2008: 35).
Broader restructuring of global capitalism (Brand et al., 2011; Demirovic´, 
2011: 51, Robinson, 2001: 164; Wissen, 2011: 234) and the reorganization of 
political power in Indonesia have transformed the spatial organization of the state 
and societal relationships with nature (Aspinall, 2013: 37–39; Hadiz, 2001: 144–
145; Hein et al., 2018a). For this book, two aspects of state transformation are 
relevant: first, the transnationalization of environmental governance and the for-
mation of transnational state apparatuses; second, increased competition between 
states, in other words the formation of international and transnational competition 
states (Behrens and Janusch, 2012; Hirsch and Kannankulam, 2011: 26).
First, the “theory of a transnational state” considers the state as a heterogene-
ous multi-layered and multi-centered network of actors that consists of national 
actors, supra-national institutions such as UN agencies, the World Bank, IMF 
and ASEAN, and transnational lobby groups, such as environmental NGOs, 
private forest carbon standards and business associations (Demirović, 2011; Hein 
et al., 2018a; Robinson, 2001). Robinson (2001: 158) argues that “[. . .] eco-
nomic globalization has its counterpart in transnational class formation and in 
the emergence of a transnational state that has been brought into existence to 
function as the collective authority for a global ruling class”. In the realm of 
environmental governance, the mentioned actors that constitute the apparatuses 
of the transnational state have established a set of transnational and international 
rules that provide a framework for global market-oriented solutions to main-
tain economic growth in the context of multiple environmental crises (McA-
fee, 2012b: 26). Global market environmentalism, including mechanisms such as 
REDD+, require transnational and national state power (Pellizzoni, 2011: 796), 
new transnationalized authorities and the transnationalization of environmen-
tal regulation (Heyvaert, 2017) to operate. Especially climate governance has 
experienced a significant shift towards transnational network forms of govern-
ance where private actors (such as carbon brokers and carbon standards) are 
becoming increasingly relevant (Bulkeley and Newell, 2015; Chan et al., 2015, 
2016). At the same time, the emergence of global peasant movements like La 
Via Campesina and the Asian Peasant Coalition have transnationalized resist-
ance against neoliberal agrarian policies such as market-led land reforms (Bor-
ras, 2008) and market-based conservation instruments (Cabello and Gilbertson, 
2012: 175; Hein and Faust, 2014: 23).
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Second, in Indonesia and in other emerging economies, the interventionist 
development state has been transformed into the “national competition state” 
(Hirsch, 1995; Hirsch and Kannankulam, 2011) supporting the privatization, 
commercialization and transnationalization of natural resources (Pye, 2012: 
202). In Indonesia, this transformation did not occur in a unidirectional fashion, 
reflecting tensions between protectionists and world-market-oriented actors 
(Ufen, 2002: 120). Andreas Ufen (2002: 124) has identified three phases of state 
transformation since Suharto came to power: first, a period of economic lib-
eralization between 1965 and 1974; second, a period of petro-dollar-financed 
interventionist development policies between 1974 and 1983; and, third, again 
and still ongoing, a period of economic liberalization associated with deregula-
tion, privatization, decentralization and market opening (ibid.).
National competition states are increasingly considering the opportunities 
of carbon, biodiversity and conservation markets and seek to provide perfect 
framework conditions for private investors, and for the interventions of trans-
national NGOs and international donors (Brand and Görg, 2003; While et al., 
2010). Biodiversity offsets, genetic resources, privatized conservation and forest 
carbon offsets constitute the “ecological phase” of capitalism (Escobar, 1996: 
326). They are becoming increasingly relevant to maintaining economic growth 
but also accessing climate finance (e.g. Green Climate Fund) and carbon trad-
ing instruments. In Indonesia, the first market-based conservation policies del-
egating protected area management to private actors emerged in the 2000s, 
permitting private conservation concessions and payment for ecosystem service 
projects. The first regulations permitting private actors to run REDD+ offsets 
were issued in 2008 (Hein, 2013b; Hein and Faust, 2014; Walsh et al., 2012a).
Based on the above-mentioned spatio-institutional transformations and on 
the work of Maureen G. Reed and Shannon Bruyneel (2010: 651), I derive 
three rescaling processes relevant in the context of REDD+ implementation 
in Indonesia:
• the up-scaling of state functions towards international and transnational 
state apparatuses (e.g. UNFCCC, FCPF);
• the down-scaling of state functions towards regional state apparatuses and 
local communities (e.g. local governments, community-based conservation 
projects);
• the scaling-out or delegating of state functions towards non-state actors 
(e.g. conservation companies running REDD+ projects, transnational car-
bon standards certifying forest carbon offsets).
Conceptualizing power and resistance
Power is considered as an important explanatory factor for differences in the 
abilities of actors to access land and property and to develop multi-scalar resist-
ance strategies (Corbera and Brown, 2010; Koch et al., 2008; Nuijten, 2005; 
Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Rodriguez de Francisco and Boelens, 2014; Wyn-
berg and Hauck, 2014). Different schools of thought have influenced political 
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ecology and the literature on the politics of scale. Post-war French Marxism, 
Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony, post-structuralism based on Foucault 
and realism have been picked up and combined by different political ecologists 
and scale theorists (e.g. Bryant, 2001; Ekers et al., 2009; Forsyth, 2008; Mann, 
2009). In this section, I will first take the notions of a number of great theorists 
as a point of reference for a brief review of the different power concepts used in 
the politics of scale literature and in political ecology. Thereafter, I will argue for 
a three-dimensional conceptualization of power based on the work of Steven 
Lukes (2005) and John Gaventa (Gaventa, 1982)
• For Michel Foucault (2006: 14–15), power is an ensemble of mechanisms 
and procedures, which is inherent in all social relationships. In his under-
standing, power is not attached to people, institutions, or class (Balan, 2010: 
38; Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 156). Furthermore, Foucault links power 
intrinsically to knowledge and discourse (Gaventa, 2003).
• Antonio Gramsci uses the term hegemony for describing unjust power 
relations between different social actors. Hegemony, as the dominance of 
one group over another, is achieved through social relations of coercion 
and consent (Karriem, 2009: 317) and especially through “[. . .] active and 
moral and intellectual leadership” (Ekers and Loftus, 2008: 702).
• In post-war French Structural Marxism, power is defined as the ability of 
social groups (e.g. classes) to achieve their (class-specific) interests. Power, 
according to Nico Poulantzas (1978), is relational and not quantifiable. He 
argues that power emerges from a relational system of material positions 
that different social actors can hold (ibid. 136).
• In realism, power is conceptualized as the ability to achieve one’s objec-
tives (Keohane and Nye Jr, 1998: 86). The ability to achieve objectives is 
determined by the ability to control the necessary resources (e.g. financial 
resources, weapons, organizational strength) (ibid.).
Early scale theorists such as Smith (2008, 1992) argue explicitly that power 
asymmetries between specific actors, e.g. between classes, are inherent in 
 capital–labor relations and are reflected in the socio-spatial organization, or – in 
other words – in the scalar structure. Many authors focus on the consequences 
of power asymmetries as explanations for scalar configurations. Most of the 
authors share the following arguments: scales are spatial manifestations of power, 
changing power relations may influence the scalar structure, and scale-power 
relations are dialectical (Meadowcroft, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2004; Zulu, 2009). 
Some authors frame power as a capacity and as based on material resources, e.g. 
as the ability of certain actors to accomplish certain activities (Allen, 2003: 97; 
Ekers and Loftus, 2008: 701; Swyngedouw, 2004: 17; Zulu, 2009). Lebel (2005) 
argues that powerful actors have the ability to influence social and political 
processes on different scales. Authors such as Swyngedouw and Zulu use rather 
critical realist framings of power and implicitly combine these with an under-
standing of power akin to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony.2
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Political ecologists argue that unequal power relations are an important 
explanatory factor for uneven access to natural resources, including access to 
land. (Blaikie, 2012; Bohle and Fünfgeld, 2007; Bryant, 1998; Forsyth, 2008; 
Rodriguez de Francisco and Boelens, 2014). Nevertheless, in many cases power 
is not explicitly conceptualized and understandings of power within political 
ecology have changed significantly over time. Early work, often referred to as 
first phase political ecology scholarship (Bryant, 1998; Forsyth, 2008), links structural 
Marxism with thoughts on the emergent environmental crisis (Forsyth, 2008: 
758) and consequently draws on rather Marxist definitions of power (e.g. the 
ability of classes to achieve their class-specific interests).
The second and third phase of political ecology has various theoretical refer-
ences. For some scholars, structural Marxism remained important while others 
increasingly shifted towards Foucault, Gramsci and others (e.g. Bryant, 1998; 
Ekers et al., 2009; Peet et al., 2011). A political ecology based on Gramsci 
inquires into, for instance, “[. . .] how hegemony is achieved through particular 
spaces and natures” (Ekers et al., 2009: 288). In the “Theory of Access”, Jesse 
Ribot and Nancy Peluso define power in line with Foucault as “[. . .] embodied 
in and exercised through various mechanisms, processes and social relations – 
that affect people’s ability to benefit from resources” (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 
154). In addition, they have a rather critical realist understanding and argue that 
“ability is akin to power”. They cite Steven Lukes (1986: 3 cited in ibid. 155) 
arguing that power is defined “[. . .] as the capacity of some actors to affect the 
practices and ideas of others” (ibid.).
Three-dimensional power
This short literature review shows that different scale theorists and political 
ecologists have different understandings of power. Likewise, many scholars 
refer to power but do not explicitly conceptualize or analyze it empirically. 
However, I argue that political ecological research would benefit from more 
explicit engagement with power theories and from empirical analysis focus-
ing on power asymmetries and their root causes. I believe that Steven Lukes’ 
(2005) and John Gaventa’s (1982, 2006) “three dimensional” view on power, as 
suggested by Jean Carlo Rodriguez de Francisco and Rutgerd Boelens (2014), 
provides a number of very useful “tools” to analyze power in its different forms.
Lukes (2005) and Gaventa (2006) distinguish three different types of power 
which have to be understood in relation to different socially produced politi-
cal arenas and scales (Gaventa, 2006: 25; Rodriguez de Francisco and Boe-
lens, 2014: 353). The three dimensions of power reflect complementary ways 
of thinking about power. They are also used at least implicitly in the politics 
of scale and explicitly in some of the political ecology literature (Ribot and 
Peluso, 2003; Rodriguez de Francisco and Boelens, 2014; Rodríguez de Fran-
cisco et al., 2013).
According to Gaventa (1982, 2006), visible power (the first dimension of 
power) refers to material resources, capacities, organizational strength and to 
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participation in decision-making processes, and is akin to realist understand-
ings of power. Visible power “[. . .] may be understood primarily by looking at 
who prevails in bargaining over the resolution of key issues” (Gaventa, 1982: 
14). In other words, visible power3 refers to the capacity of actor A to get actor 
B to do things that are against his own interest (Lukes, 2005: 16–17). Visible 
power includes economic resources, such as financial assets or land and political 
resources, e.g. the number of members of a political organization.
Hidden power (the second dimension of power) refers to the “rules of the 
game”, e.g. according to Barach and Baratz (1970, cited in Gaventa, 1982: 14) 
to “[. . .] a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures 
that operate systematically and consistently to the benefits of certain persons 
and groups at the expense of others”. Hidden power also refers to the ability 
of actors to set the community agenda and to exclude certain actors, and to 
mechanisms ensuring compliance with rules (Gaventa, 2006: 29; Lukes, 2005: 
21). As Lukes (2005: 111) expresses it, hidden power refers to the “ [. . .] power 
to decide what is decided”.
Invisible power (the third dimension of power) is akin to Gramsci’s concept 
of hegemony. However, hegemony for Lukes (2005) refers to unconscious and 
internalized domination and subordination and to active and coordinated strat-
egies to achieve or to resist domination. Invisible power points to forms of 
power that “[. . .] prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances 
by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they 
accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or 
imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, 
or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial” (Lukes, 2005: 28). 
Invisible power importantly shapes how marginalized social actors perceive and 
accept the dominant social production of nature and space (Gaventa, 1982: 
16–19).
Gaventa (2006: 25) argues that Lukes’ three power dimensions are interre-
lated sets of dynamic relationships rather than static categories which operate 
across scales and spaces. Gaventa acknowledges that power and space are intrin-
sically linked. Powerful actors or successful resistance movements have to apply 
different forms of power across spaces and scales to maintain their interests or 
to change existing power relations significantly.
In order to identify power empirically (Table 2.1), and especially to identify 
the role power has for the ability of different actors to access land and prop-
erty, this study builds on and extends a methodology developed by Gaventa 
(1982: 20–32). Visible power can be identified by investigating: the organiza-
tional strength of a specific organization (e.g. members), the material resources 
(e.g. land, financial resources), who prevails in formal decision-making and 
who holds formal or customary functions (e.g. village head, hamlet head, cus-
tomary leader) (ibid.). Hidden power can be identified by investigating: non-
involvement in decision-making (e.g. by investigating alternative developments 
facilitated by power-shifts), resistance activities (e.g. land occupations), com-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26 Political ecology of agrarian conflicts
subordinate actors), and the historical development of specific legal orders (e.g. 
established by force in the context of colonization) (ibid). The identification 
of invisible power is mainly based on interpretation, as Gaventa argues (1982: 
29), considering, for instance, what would have been of interest to an actor in 
a specific situation. Furthermore, the identification of beliefs of inferiority by 
actors and the explicit acceptance (e.g. through statements) of a certain legal 
order that acts against their interest might further support the identification of 
invisible power (ibid. 31).
Resistance and three-dimensional power
Caouette and Turner (2009b: 9) argue that “[. . .] conceptualizations of resist-
ance are situated within understandings of power; power being comprised of the 
relational interplay of dominance and subordination”. Gaventa (1982: 23) has 
pointed out that resistance or, as he puts it, “[. . .] rebellion may develop if there is 
a shift in the power relationships – either owing to loss in the power of A or gain 
in the power of B”. Peasant resistance occurs in open and rather collective forms 
or in hidden and rather individual forms (Chin and Mittelman, 1997; Turner 
and Caouette, 2009). Both forms are spatial and territorial practices (especially 
in the case of land conflicts), challenging the power constellations in place but 
also the pre-existing scalar structure and pre-existing scales of meaning and 
regulation (Moore, 1998; Turner and Caouette, 2009; Towers, 2000). Hidden 
and open forms of resistance have to be understood in relation to the conceptu-
alization of power introduced above and should be treated as different categories 
in social science, to be specific as dynamic, interrelated and overlapping.
Hidden resistance, in James C. Scott words “every day peasant resistance” or 
“infrapolitics”, comprises relatively safe and silent practices (Chin and Mittel-
man, 1997: 31; Scott, 1989: 34). “Every day peasant resistance” is characterized 
by resisting without openly contesting the existing political order. It is rather 
negotiated in the informal sphere, e.g. household or community, and does not 
openly challenge hegemony (Chin and Mittelman, 1997: 31). Peasants prefer 
relatively safe resistance strategies to avoid open conflict with actors that are 
more powerful (Scott, 1989: 34–35). Scott (1989: 35) and Turner and Caouette 
(2009: 11) argue that when power constellations change, individual and hidden 
peasant resistance can turn into larger resistance activities, e.g. silent encroach-
ment on plantations or protected areas can develop into larger organized and 
open land occupations.
Power constellations change, argues Gaventa (1982), when subordinates, or 
in his words “the powerless”, are able to challenge all three dimensions of power 
(ibid. 24). To develop material resources (visible power), the powerless have 
to defeat invisible and hidden power (ibid.). To overcome invisible power, the 
powerless have to develop an understanding of their subordinate role in society. 
Moreover, they need to develop strategies for changing the existing political 
circumstances and intrinsically linked power constellations (ibid. 21). Strate-
gies and the development of political objectives and issues of concern allow 
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political mobilization, thus overcoming hidden power. In many cases, powerless 
actors employ clandestine strategies, such as ignorance, smuggling, sabotage, or 
silent encroachment on state forest land (Gaventa et al., 2011; Scott, 1989: 34). 
The various strategies might then allow the development of visible power and 
engagement in open resistance (Gaventa, 1982: 21–24). Peasant groups such as 
Serikat Petani Indonesia (SPI) have developed the means to employ open resist-
ance strategies, e.g. larger-scale occupation of state forest land and demonstra-
tions (see Chapters 3 and 5 for more detail).
Resistance as a spatial strategy might also involve “scale jumping”. The term 
scale jumping has been picked up by many authors for describing attempts to shift 
the political struggle of actors that are marginalized at a specific scale to higher 
or lower scales4 (Hein and Faust, 2014: 24; Smith, 2008: 232; Zulu, 2009: 687). 
Gaventa (2006: 31) argues that contemporary resistance movements need to 
build up strategic alliances with actors operating on different political scales to be 
successful. Scale jumping, in other words the spatial expansion of protest to 
higher scales, has been facilitated by the transnationalization of governance and 
growing interrelations between formerly separate national policy fields (Caou-
ette and Turner, 2009a; Smith, 2008; Swyngedouw, 2000).
Key arguments
Beyond understanding the root causes of the agrarian conflicts challenging 
REDD+ implementation, this book aims to advance our conceptual and theo-
retical understanding of emerging agrarian conflicts in the context of transna-
tional conservation interventions. It aims to contribute to a “political ecology 
of transnational agrarian conflicts in the context of REDD+”.
The different elements of the framework help to investigate differing but 
interrelated empirical phenomena. Political scales, for example, demarcate arenas 
of political contest (Smith, 1992: 66). In line with Swyngedouw (2010), I assume 
that questions of access to natural resources (including land) can be explained 
by analyzing the socio-spatial configurations of scales. I argue that rescaling pro-
cesses in the course of state transformations (e.g. colonization, nationalization, 
decentralization) structure the abilities of different social actors to access prop-
erty rights. Thus, I consider scales as arenas of political struggle which are not 
fixed and which are linked through actor networks and scale-jumping strategies 
(Bulkeley, 2005; Flitner and Görg, 2008; Swyngedouw, 2010). Social conflicts 
could change the scalar configuration (e.g. deconstruct pre-existing scales, widen 
existing scales or construct additional scales) and the material and biophysical 
content of a specific scale. Powerful groups are able to actively choose or alter 
the scale of regulation to achieve specific interests. Subaltern groups seek to 
jump to higher or lower scales or to establish networks across scales to achieve 
their interests (Perreault, 2003: 65; Zulu, 2009: 695). Thus, scale and rescaling 
reflect the dialectical relationship between structure and agency. They structure 
and contain space and social practices within space and they are the outcome of 
social practices (Smith, 1992: 60).
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The work of Towers (2000) provides the opportunity to analyze the social 
construction of scales of meaning and scales of regulation separately. This is of 
specific importance in the context of REDD+ and conservation debates where 
different scales of meaning such as carbon forests or customary forest overlap 
with local, national and transnational scales of regulation (Flitner and Görg, 
2008; Lebel et al., 2005). Brenner stresses the central role of the state in produc-
ing hierarchical scalar structures (Brenner, 1997, 2001). Political scales in this 
sense also constitute and are the result of the division of labor among different 
apparatuses of the state. I argue that public authorities (such as the village head, 
the forest service and district government) and private actors (such as forest 
carbon standards) seek to control their respective scales of regulation. By legiti-
mizing the property rights of peasants and companies, or by issuing a carbon 
credit, they regularly engage with their citizens and customers and construct 
and maintain a specific scale of regulation in the first place.
Public authorities have the ability to exercise power publicly. They often 
build on symbols and the legal texts of the state (Lund, 2008: 7). In order 
to establish legitimacy, in many cases public authorities refer to authorities at 
higher ends of the scalar hierarchy (Lund, 2006: 693) or seek to scale back 
(Reed and Bruyneel, 2010: 651) by making reference to past authorities and 
interrelated political scales (e.g. imagined lineage chiefs). The legitimacy of a 
public authority and of a specific scale of regulation is a matter of degree (e.g. 
continuum between strong and weak) and changes over time while new public 
authorities emerge. As in other countries, in Indonesia different public authori-
ties, in other words different apparatuses of the state, might act in contradic-
tory ways and thus might not reflect the will of apparently dominant groups 
in society. Scales of regulation constructed by public authorities and stabilized 
by interactions with citizens, e.g. through issuing land titles, might overlap or 
compete.
Especially in the context of rapid scalar restructuring (e.g. decentralization) 
scales of regulation may overlap leading to competing access and property rela-
tions. The transformation of the Indonesian state (the transformation from the 
colonial state, to the development state of the Suharto era, and to the competi-
tion state of the Reformasi era) has also changed the socio-spatial configuration 
of Indonesia’s forest and land tenure governance significantly. In this context, 
Indonesia’s forest apparatus has promoted foreign direct investment and the 
commodification of natural resources, land and very recently of ecosystem ser-
vices (Nevins and Peluso, 2008).
Conservation territories, such as the Berbak Carbon Initiative or the Harapan 
Rainforest, and interrelated socio-ecological scales contain social and physical 
processes. Social conflict and changing power relations have an impact on the 
structure, content and spatial extent of conservation territories (Swyngedouw, 
2010). The successful protest of an environmental movement might lead to an 
expansion of the borders of the Berbak Carbon Initiative changing the char-
acteristics and meanings of the ecosystem and of the social relations contained 
by the project area. The expansion of the project may restrict specific land use 
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practices, thus changing land use practices and social positions within the eco-
system of actors. However, the very same ecosystem – or in other words, the 
very same space – might be experienced differently depending on the social 
position of an actor (Escobar, 1999: 5). As outlined above, for some actors a 
forest is an empty space “ready” for agricultural expansion whereas a REDD+ 
project developer might consider the same space as a site for the production of 
forest carbon credits.
Lastly but equally importantly, I argue that the ability to change scales of 
meaning and regulation and consequently the ability to access land and prop-
erty is linked to the question of power. Social actors that are willing to change 
access and property relations have to make use of different forms of power 
across spaces and scales (Gaventa, 2006). Social actors have to rely on resources 
(visible power), have to have the capability to change formal and informal regu-
lations (change the rules of the game, hidden power) and have to influence the 
“organizing ideology” (invisible power) (Alagappa, 1995).
Multi-sited qualitative research
After outlining the conceptual framework, one question remains: How to inves-
tigate the political ecologies of REDD+ empirically? REDD+, and indeed 
most of the other relevant themes of this book such as property rights, forest 
governance and agrarian resistance, are negotiated and regulated on various 
political scales, e.g. at the village scale by the village head, by the district head 
or (in the case of forest land) by the Ministry of Forestry in Jakarta, or (in the 
case of REDD+) at UNFCCC conferences and in the headquarters of donor 
agencies. Consequently, the empirical research for this book was “multi-sited” 
and inspired by “deterritorialized” (Merry, 2000: 130) and “multi-sited eth-
nography” (Marcus, 1995: 80). Multi-sited ethnography was first outlined by 
Marcus (1995) as a response to “empirical changes” (ibid. 80) in an increasingly 
globalized world. He argued, referring to Immanuel Wallenstein’s world system 
theory, that research which is “embedded in a world system [. . .] cannot be 
[. . .] focused on a single site of intensive investigation” (ibid. 79f). In multi-sited 
fieldwork the so-called “global” is not external to the field of investigation, the 
global is rather part of the relationships constituting the field of research (ibid. 
86). Multi-sited fieldwork is process-based and “[. . .] emerges from putting 
questions to an emergent object of study whose contours, sites and relationships 
are not known beforehand” (ibid. 86).
Multi-sited research, according to Marcus and Merry, should trace the net-
works of interaction between actors across field sites. This provides the oppor-
tunity to analyze peasants’ resistance across scales and to investigate the attempts 
of actors to alter the scalar configuration or to identify scales that actors pref-
erably use for political struggle. Multi-sited ethnography follows the “transla-
tors and intermediaries” (Merry, 2000: 131). Translators and intermediaries are 
those actors that travel between field sites and link the different sites of social 
struggle and empirical investigation; this can include village heads, community 
30 Political ecology of agrarian conflicts
representatives and members of NGOs (ibid.). Researchers conducting multi-
sited research have different options to guide their investigations. Marcus (1995: 
90–94) proposes following people, things (e.g. commodity chains), metaphors, 
plots, stories, lives or conflicts. This book seeks to follow conflicts.
Doing multi-sited fieldwork and selecting  
the main sites of investigation
The main sites of empirical investigation of this book are the Harapan Rain-
forest (Hutan Harapan/Forest of Hope) and the Berbak Carbon Initiative on 
the island of Sumatra, Indonesia (Figure 2.1). In addition, the book is based 
on qualitative research conducted along the lines of different networks of 
interaction linked to project implementation and resistance across field sites, 
namely the provincial capital of Jambi, the national capital Jakarta, the city of 
Bogor as an important hub for academia and conservation NGOs, UNFCCC 
climate change conferences, and the headquarters of donor agencies in Ger-
many. Field trips to the project sites were conducted in 2012, 2013 and 2016. 
At the various field sites, the author has conducted (in Indonesia with the 
support of an Indonesian field assistant) semi-structured and open interviews, 
focus-group discussions and participatory observations. In addition to the 
different types of qualitative interviews as a primary empirical source, analysis 
focused on various types of documents such as Indonesian land and forest 
policies and laws, political strategies, NGO reports and scientific literature on 
REDD+ and land-use conflicts.
Figure 2.1  Map of Jambi and main sites of empirical investigation
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Empirical research for this book was embedded in two research projects, 
namely the collaborative research center on “Ecological and Socio-economic 
Functions of Tropical Lowland Rainforest Transformation Systems” (CRC 
990) in Jambi led by the University of Göttingen, and the research and advi-
sory project on “Climate Change and Development” at the German Devel-
opment Institute in Bonn. In addition to these institution-related reasons 
for doing research in Jambi, the province is of particular interest because 
Jambi became an Indonesian REDD+ pilot province in 2013, because of 
the engagement of the German International Climate Initiative (IKI), and 
because of land conflicts taking place within or at the margins of the REDD+ 
pilot projects and conservation initiatives.
When selecting the research villages within or adjacent to the two REDD+ 
projects, I built on the “follow the conflict” premise developed by Marcus 
(1995). Furthermore, sites with conflictive access and property relations, e.g. 
competing property rights systems, were preferred over other potential sites. 
With the support of researchers from the University of Jambi and the Agricul-
tural University of Bogor and based on interviews with NGOs (mainly with 
environmental NGOs, environmental justice groups and peasant organizations), 
the staff of donor agencies and with village heads, I identified five research vil-
lages (Table 2.2) located within and adjacent to the REDD+ projects. Each 
village has its own specific conflict history, e.g. with oil palm plantation compa-
nies as well as a shared history of conflicts related to broader rescaling processes 
such as colonization and decentralization. Within the villages, I have focused 
in particular on conflicts that are affected or caused by the implementation of 
protected areas and REDD+ pilot projects.
Additional field sites are the transnational, national and local nodes of REDD+, 
land and forest governance. Nodes of the transnational REDD+ governance 
include, for instance, the ministries and governmental institutions involved in 
REDD+ and located in Bonn, Jakarta and Jambi City, UNFCCC conferences 
and the headquarters of environmental organizations (head office of Burung 
Indonesia in Bogor), peasant movements (e.g. SPI head office in Jakarta) and 
donor agencies (e.g. offices in Jakarta and Germany) (von Benda-Beckmann, 




Harapan Rainforest Bungku (including the hamlets of Kunangan 
Jaya I and II)
Batang Hari
Tanjung Lebar (including the hamlets of 




Air Hitam Laut Tanjung Jabung 
Timur
Seponjen Muaro Jambi
Kampung Laut Muaro Jambi
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von Benda-Beckmann and Griffiths, 2005; Bulkeley, 2005; Flitner and Görg, 
2008; Merry, 2000). These different locations are linked through decision-mak-
ing processes and resistance strategies. They are part of competing and contra-
dictive scales of meaning and regulation. Following von Benda-Beckmann and 
colleagues (2005: 9), I tried to follow “[. . .] the chains of interaction connect-
ing transnational, national and local actors in multi-sited arenas of negotiation 
along with power relations that structure these interactions and are reproduced 
or changed by them”.
The two REDD+ project sites and the various case-study villages
The area of the Harapan Rainforest project has 98,555 ha and is officially 
located in the district of Batang Hari and Sarolangun and in the neighbor-
ing province of South Sumatra (Figure 2.1). The north-eastern parts of the 
project area are claimed by the district of Muaro Jambi, but according to the 
maps of the Ministry of Forestry they are part of the Batang Hari district. 
The conservation company PT REKI runs the Harapan Rainforest project. 
The company is owned by a transnational NGO consortium consisting of 
Figure 2.2  Picture of road sign of Bungku village and border signs of the Sultan Thaha 
Syaifudin Forest reserve
(Source: taken by the author, 2013)
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Birdlife International, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) 
and Burung Indonesia and has received funding from, among others, the Ger-
man International Climate Initiative (IKI), the Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (DANIDA), the European Commission and Singapore Airlines (fur-
ther information in Chapter 4). The project is implemented in an ecosystem 
restoration concession. As case-studies, I selected the villages of Bungku and 
Tanjung Lebar adjacent to the Harapan Rainforest according to the “follow 
the conflict” premise (Table 2.2).
The village of Bungku is located in the district of Batang Hari and in the 
sub-district of Bajubang north of the Harapan Rainforest project and south 
of the Sultan Thaha Syaifudin Forest Reserve. The village arose from a reset-
tlement scheme for local Batin Sembilan groups in 1972 (Faust et al., 2013: 9; 
Hein, 2013b: 15). However, a number of pre-existent settlements in the area 
prove that the area has been populated since pre-colonial times (Zainuddin, 
2013: 6). The village has approximately 10,215 inhabitants and a village ter-
ritory of 77,000 ha (Faust et al., 2013). Land use in Bungku is dominated by 
oil palm and rubber cultivation. Shifting cultivation is still practiced by some 
households but is becoming less relevant. In any case, most of Bungku’s village 
territory is either designated as state forest (e.g. part of the Harapan Rainfor-
est project or of the Sultan Thaha Syaifudin Forest reserve) or is part of large 
plantation concessions.
The village of Tanjung Lebar is located in the district of Muaro Jambi and in 
the sub-district of Bahar Selatan. The center of the village is located north-east 
of the Harapan Rainforest concession. The village officially has 2876 inhabit-
ants; the population is probably much larger, since official village data only 
exists for the hamlets located outside of the Harapan Rainforest (Polsek Sungai 
Bahar, 2011). The autochthon population of the village consists of Batin Sem-
bilan, Melayu Jambi and Melayu Palembang. Tanjung Lebar dates back to the 
pre-colonial era. The official village territory has an area of 6500 ha, but again 
this figure does not include the area within the Harapan Rainforest claimed by 
the village. The village territory is fragmented, consisting of different dispersed 
and unconnected hamlets located between transmigration settlements and cor-
porate oil palm plantations.
The Berbak Carbon Initiative is located in coastal Jambi, south of the 
Batanghari River delta and northeast of the provincial capital (Figure 2.1). It 
has a project area of 250,000 ha. The landscape is dominated by tidal peat 
swamps that are partly degraded because of settlement formation, the construc-
tion of drainage channels, forest conversion and almost annual peat fires (Clar-
idge, 1994; Giesen, 2004; Hein et al., 2018a). The Berbak Carbon Initiative is 
listed as a REDD+ demonstration project by the Indonesian REDD+ agency 
(further information in Chapter 4). The project is a collaborative initiative by 
the Zoological Society of London (ZSL), the Jambi-based NGO Gita Buana, 
the Berbak National Park Agency and the Provincial Forest Service (Dinas 
Kehutanan Provinsi Jambi). Here I focused my investigations on the villages of 
Air Hitam Laut, Kampung Laut5 and Seponjen (Table 2.2).
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The village of Air Hitam Laut is part of the sub-district of Sadu and located 
in the district of Tanjung Jabung Timur. The village is located directly on the 
coast of the South China Sea, at the mouth of the river Air Hitam. The village 
territory has a size of 4320 ha (Alamsyah, 2004: 27). In 2012 the village had a 
population of 2328 inhabitants, according to the village secretary. Seventy-five 
percent of the population is Bugis and originally from South Sulawesi (ibid. 9). 
Land use is dominated by coconut plantations. Oil palm has been introduced 
recently. Air Hitam Laut was founded by Bugi seafarers from the Luwu district 
in South Sulawesi in 1965. Conflicts between the local population and the vari-
ous forest authorities have been ongoing since the 1970s.6
The village of Kampung Laut is located in the district of Muaro Jambi. The 
village is located on the south-eastern riverbank of the tidally influenced lower 
course of the Batang Hari River. The village had 1573 inhabitants in 2012 and 
has a village territory of 12,000 ha. Melayu Jambi people are the dominant 
ethnic group. Oil palm, wet rice, rubber, cocoa and vegetables are the impor-
tant crops. Fishing, swallow breeding and logging are other significant liveli-
hood strategies. According to interviews with the village elders, the village was 
founded in pre-colonial times. In 2008, the Transmigration Agency of Muaro 
Jambi started to construct a transmigration settlement within the forest reserve, 
inducing land conflicts between various state apparatuses.7 Kampung Laut is 
one of the pilot sites for a community reforestation scheme which is part of the 
community benefit package of the Barbak Carbon Initiative.
The village of Seponjen was founded in 1931 by the Melayu Jambi people 
(Kepala Desa Seponjen, 2013: 6). Seponjen is part of the sub-district of Kumpeh 
and belongs to the district of Muaro Jambi. Seponjen is located on both sides 
of the tidally influenced Sungai Kumpeh River, which is an arm of the Batang 
Hari River. Seponjen has a village territory of 16,000 ha and a population of 
1315 people (ibid. 8). Wet rice and oil palm are grown in the flood-prone lower 
parts of Seponjen. On the higher lands rubber, cocoa, langsat8 and durian9 are 
cultivated. Since 1999, parts of the village territory have been designated as 
forest reserve. Seponjen is also one of the pilot sites for a community reforesta-
tion scheme which is part of the Berbak Carbon Initiative’s community benefit 
package. The village is impacted by a number of land conflicts involving oil 
palm companies and the state forest agency.
Reflection, limitations and challenges
As Kim V. L. England stated, fieldwork is “[. . .] a dialogical process in which 
the research situation is structured by both the researcher and the person being 
researched” (England, 1994: 84). Multi-sited approaches also pose a number 
of challenges. Researchers using a multi-sited approach have to consider that 
positionality and power constellations (e.g. between researcher and participants) 
change across research sites. The researcher must be aware of the fact that his 
identity is constantly negotiated, affecting his ability to access relevant knowl-
edge. Furthermore, the researcher must ensure that the questions he might ask 
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have to be formulated in ways understandable for actors living in the differ-
ent social fields under investigation. In the case of this piece of research, the 
different lingual contexts have posed an additional challenge. Interviews with 
German donor agencies and ministries were held in German, interviews at 
UNFCCC conferences and some of the expert interviews in Jakarta were held 
in English, and all other interviews (in Jambi city and in the research villages) 
were held in Bahasa Indonesia with the support of an Indonesian field assistant. 
Moreover, multi-sited research is probably not able to investigate the full com-
plexity of local processes, since time at each location is much more limited than 
in single-sited research.
Research on conflicts, on illegal or semi-legal land occupations, and com-
peting property right regimes creates a number of additional challenges as the 
researcher might be perceived as threatening the activities of the participants, as 
being part of the opponent conflict party or as a threat to the status quo (Eng-
land, 1994: 85). The conservation company PT REKI and the Royal Society for 
the Protection of Birds (RSPB) as one of PT REKI’s shareholders, for instance, 
argued from the very beginning that any research on land tenure would be 
impossible within the project area. A staff member of the RSPB argued that 
research in the conflictive areas of the Harapan Rainforest would exacerbate 
the conflict. Furthermore, he argued that conducting interviews would not be 
possible, adding that settlers’ responses would give the impression of stronger 
tenure than was de jure the case (Manager of Royal Society for the Protection 
of Birds, 2012). The RSPB manager not only tried to hinder research, but he 
even directly questioned the validity of the statements that the settlers would 
make. PT REKI staff based within the project area argued similarly and only 
permitted research with communities that agreed to cooperate with the con-
servation company. Research in the conflict areas of Bungku and Tanjung Lebar 
was only possible because of permits and invitations from the relevant village 
governments, the settler groups and peasant organizations. Despite the permits 
from the village governments, the fact that PT REKI did not permit research 
in the conflict areas influenced my behavior at the field sites. Without an official 
permit from PT REKI, I felt unsafe, as someone acting “illegally”, and tried to 
limit overnight stays in PT REKI’s project area.
In the Berbak area the situation was different. The implementing agencies 
of the Berbak Carbon Initiative, such as the Provincial Forest Agency, the Ber-
bak National Park Agency, ZSL and the sub-contracted NGO Gita Buana, 
supported my research project from the very beginning. The context of my 
fieldwork was consequently fundamentally different in the two areas, affecting 
my positionality in the field situations. In the Harapan landscape, my research 
was welcomed by village governments and informal settlers and rather rejected 
by the conservation company PT REKI. The informal settlers perceived my 
research as supportive for their concerns, especially those who were aware that 
the Harapan Rainforest project received funding from the German govern-
ment. Settlers hoped that a German researcher would convey their concerns 
to the decision makers in Germany, and thus supported my fieldwork. In the 
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Berbak area, implementing agencies hoped that research from an “independ-
ent” third party might help them to solve ongoing conflicts.
In all of the villages, the village heads felt obliged to support my activities 
because of my formal letter of request from the University of Jambi. All the 
village governments supported my fieldwork, and most facilitated accommo-
dation and access to interview partners. This formal support from the political 
elite of the villages facilitated my research but may have hindered my ability 
to cover marginalized actors within the political arena of my research villages. 
I encountered similar problems in the settlements controlled by the peasant 
movement SPI. SPI supported my trips to the settlement and all actors at the 
field site perceived me as an SPI guest. This probably discouraged local oppo-
nents of SPI from voicing criticism in interviews.
Additional challenges and limitations to my research are directly linked to 
my positionality and to power imbalances that structured interviews and field-
work. As a researcher from Europe, I was highly visible in all field situations 
and attracted attention. As part of the “developed world” I was often asked 
about how trade-offs between development and conservation are solved in the 
“West”, why Germany is supporting a conservation project in their region, or 
why forests in Jambi should be conserved to reduce Germany’s greenhouse gas 
emissions. Questions of identity, of positionality and of being external to the 
community came up almost every day and were part of the field experience. 
The fact that a person from Europe was doing research in their village in Jambi 
made some villagers proud but also caused some individuals to be awestruck or 
afraid in interview situations and face-to-face communication. Furthermore, 
with my being a guest of the village government, some interview partners may 
have felt obliged to participate and to respond to questions despite having mis-
givings about discussing semi-legal land use or land access practices to outsiders. 
A general weakness of this study is that, as a male researcher, access to female 
household members and interview partners was difficult; therefore, only a few 
women participated in my interviews.
The next chapter is devoted to the politics of scale of Indonesia’s forest 
and land tenure governance. It outlines the dynamic context of implementing 
REDD+ on the island of Sumatra and explains how customary authorities and 
village governments supported by peasant migrants successfully challenged the 
integrity of Indonesia’s state forest.
Notes
 1 Village heads in the various case-study villages issue documents used as land titles, but 
officially only the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional, BPN) has the 
authority to issue land titles (see Chapter 3 for more details on de jure and de facto land-
titling procedures).
 2 In their case studies, they show how different actors reshape the politics of scale of the 
Spanish waterscape and of community forest management in Malawi to consolidate legit-
imacy (Swyngedouw 2010, Zulu 2009).
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 3 Visible power is also akin to Max Weber’s definition of power. Weber argues that men have 
power if they are able to achieve their objective against the will of others (Weber 1993: 20).
 4 Keebet von Benda-Beckman (1981) developed the concept of “forum shopping” to 
explain the attempts of actors to choose between different conflict mediation institutions; 
she argues that their selection is based on the hope that the institution might support their 
interest.
 5 Because of ethical considerations, I use a fictitious name of this village.
 6 Interview with key informants in Air Hitam Laut, 28.09.2012, 30.09.2012, and with staff 
member of ZSL in Air Hitam Laut, 29.09.2012.
 7 Interview with staff member of the sub-district administration (Kecamatan) of Kumpeh, 
in Sua Kandis, 02.09.2013.
 8 Lansium parasiticum
 9 Durio zibethinus
3  Rescaling of the governance 
of forests and land in 
Indonesia
The main assumption guiding this chapter is that broader rescaling processes in 
the course of state transformation – e.g. colonization, de-colonization, democ-
ratization and decentralization – changed the abilities of different actor groups 
to access land and property. Moreover, I argue that scaling back, in other words 
understanding historical scalar arrangements and associated land and forest ten-
ure regulations, is a precondition for understanding land conflicts in REDD+ 
target areas (Eilenberg, 2015; Galudra et al. 2014; 2011; Howson and Kindon 
2015; Mc Gregor 2010). The chapter shows that REDD+ and conservation 
initiatives are not implemented in a social and political vacuum. Land conflicts 
in the context of REDD+ implementation are embedded in historically con-
tingent social and political dynamics.
In this chapter, I primarily investigate the dynamic context of REDD+ 
implementation in Indonesia, namely processes of state transformation, ter-
ritorialization, intertwined reforms of forest and land tenure governance at 
different scales, agricultural expansion in the state forest territory, and a highly 
complex de facto land tenure regime. The different political regimes mentioned 
above facilitated the construction of specific scales of meaning and regulation. 
Some of them outlived the historical conditions that led to their construction. 
They are still inscribed in the landscape. Others have been deconstructed and 
replaced over time.
The chapter starts with a description of the pre-colonial and colonial for-
est and land tenure governance. It explains de jure land and forest tenure and 
subsequently scales down and investigates local histories of land governance, de 
facto land tenure and the attempts of sub-national governments, local authori-
ties and indigenous groups to regain access to the state forest territory in the 
landscapes that later became part of the Harapan Rainforest and the Berbak 
Carbon Initiative in Jambi.
The history of Indonesia’s forest and  
land tenure governance
Forest and land governance in Indonesia can be broadly divided into a pre-
colonial phase, a colonial phase, a transitional phase of early independence, 
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an autocratic and development-oriented phase (New Order) and a contem-
porary phase characterized by decentralization, democratization and (neo-) 
liberalization.
Each of the phases has its specific socio-spatial structure, was driven by differ-
ent larger state projects and was influenced by broader narratives on how to use, 
manage and govern forest and land resources (Galudra and Sirait, 2009). The 
different phases had no abrupt end; some elements of each phase were persis-
tent and influenced the subsequent phase. Indonesia’s dualistic land governance 
system based on forest and agricultural laws, for example, has been inherited 
from the colonial period (Brockhaus et al., 2012: 32).
Indonesia as a nation-state was founded in the context of the colonial lib-
eration war. No pre-colonial Indonesian nation state existed and consequently 
there was no pre-colonial archipelago-wide forest and land tenure govern-
ance. There is, however, no doubt that the various pre-colonial Sultanates and 
customary communities had rules for land and forest use in place. The next 
section discusses some of those known for Jambi and briefly introduces Jambi’s 
pre-colonial history.
Jambi’s pre-colonial history
In pre-colonial times, Jambi was one of a number of Sultanates on the island 
of Sumatra. Jambi’s location close to the Strait of Malacca and the natural 
resources in its rich hinterland provided the basis for Jambi’s ascent and its 
early involvement in international trade (Guillaud, 1994: 114). In the 18th 
century, Jambi was one of the most prosperous trade ports on Sumatra (Guil-
laud, 1994: 114; Locher-Scholten, 2004: 39). Forest products such as beeswax, 
resin, gum, rattan and timber were collected in the hinterlands and trans-
ported via the Batang Hari River and the Strait of Malacca to the outside 
world (Locher-Scholten, 2004: 37).
In 1852, Jambi had approximately 60,000 inhabitants (ibid. 36). In contrast 
to other Sumatran Sultanates, the population of the Sultanate of Jambi was 
relatively heterogeneous. The Malay population lived mainly on the banks of 
the Batang Hari River. The semi-nomadic Orang Laut lived along the coast 
(Locher-Scholten, 2004: 48). Jambi’s hinterland was home to different nomadic 
and semi-nomadic ethnic groups. The Orang Rimba lived in the Bukit Duab-
elas Region. Batin1 and Kubu2 tribes settled on the upper courses of the main 
rivers and in the borderlands between Jambi and Palembang along the Batang 
Hari and Musi River tributaries (Andaya, 2008: 205; Locher-Scholten, 2004: 
37; Steinebach, 2013a: 126).
Elisabeth Locher-Scholten (2004: 45) describes the pre-colonial Malay state 
of Jambi (the Sultanate) as a state without “[. . .] precise borders or a power-
ful central authority, their central government had no monopoly on the use 
of force, their rulers had no well-defined constitutional powers, and there was 
not a trace of popular sovereignty”. The pre-colonial Sultanate had nothing in 
common with modern Western states, the “[. . .] ruler was more fluid in terms 
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of territory and structure, and sacral and symbolic in nature” (ibid. 45). Success-
ful ruling was a result of balancing earth and divine and was indicated through 
wealth and prosperity. In formal terms the Sultan was the highest authority of 
the state but he ceded most of his tasks to the pangeran ratu,3 to ministers and to 
a council of nobles (ibid.).
Jambi’s Sultanate had no uniform administrative structure such as charac-
terizes modern Western states. Jambi’s administration reflected its heterogene-
ous population (Locher-Scholten, 2004: 48–49). In general, the Sultanate was 
divided into different jurisdictions called Kalbu. Each Kalbu consisted of a num-
ber of settlements called dusuns (hamlets) (Hidayat, 2012: 29). The Sultan had 
only direct authority over the Malay population, who had no tax obligations 
but were responsible for law and order and for the security of the Sultan. The 
Batin had to pay taxes and were responsible for border protection but were 
relatively independent of the Sultanate. The Batin had their own leaders ruling 
over their hamlets and over the surrounding forests (ibid.). Orang Laut and the 
Kubu lived within the borders of the Sultanate but were not under the author-
ity of the Sultan (ibid.).
Colonial forest and land tenure governance
Colonial forms of forest and land tenure governance in Indonesia date back to 
the activities of the Dutch East Indian Company (VOC, Vereenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie) in the 17th century (Galudra and Sirait, 2009: 525). The activities 
of the VOC were mainly limited to timber extraction (ibid.). The first colonial 
regulations were enacted for the island of Java in 1808 (Nurjaya, 2005: 38). This 
first regulation defined any not privately owned forest areas as state domain, 
established a colonial forest service accountable to the Colonial General Gov-
ernor, and stated that the timber demand of the colonial government should 
be prioritized. Furthermore, the regulation stipulated logging permits for local 
communities (ibid.). Early colonial forest policies were aimed at facilitating 
forest extraction (Galudra and Sirait, 2009: 525). During the mid-19th century, 
colonial forest policies shifted towards conserving forests and maintaining asso-
ciated environmental services such as water provision (ibid.).
Based on the belief that forests are the main determinant for the hydrological 
balance of watersheds, colonial forest authorities argued that forest protection 
was of colonial interest (Barr et al., 2006: 19; Galudra and Sirait, 2009: 525). The 
main argument of foresters at the time was that forests act as sponges that are 
able to assure water provision for irrigation agriculture during the dry season. 
According to the dominant scientific discourse of the 19th century, deforesta-
tion – especially in the upper parts of watersheds – would significantly reduce 
water availability in adjacent low lands (Galudra and Sirait, 2009: 525). The 
argument that deforestation would disturb the hydrological balance was used 
to legitimize the first resettlements, to legitimize the exclusion of local com-
munities from forests and to legitimize the prohibition of shifting cultivation 
(Galudra and Sirait, 2009: 530; Metzner, 1981: 47). Watershed protection was 
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constructed as a new colonial scale of meaning and regulation restricting access 
to land and forest resources to safeguard colonial interests.
Colonial forest policy was further developed during the mid-19th cen-
tury. The first colonial forest law (Boschordonatie) for the islands of Java and 
Madura was issued in 1865. At the same time, the colonial government intro-
duced a formalized concession system to facilitate forest exploitation (Nur-
jaya, 2005: 40). In 1870, the domein verklaring4 declared that all vacant lands on 
Java and Maduro belong to the colonial state. In addition, the colonial forest 
agency initiated initial forest zoning activities (ibid.). In the same year, the 
colonial government enacted a second law, the Agrarische Wet. The Agrarische 
Wet aimed to regulate land ownership and promote private investment. It 
introduced a Western concept of private property, provided a framework for 
renting out land to private agricultural estate companies, and again declared 
all unused land to be the property of the colonial state (Gamin et al., 2014: 
55; Nurjaya, 2005: 38; Szczepanski, 2002: 235). Agrarische Wet and Boschordo-
natie established a dualistic legal structure for land declared as forests and for 
land prescribed for agriculture which continued in post-colonial Indonesia 
and which is still reflected in contemporary Indonesian forest and agrarian 
laws (Indrarto et al., 2012: 36).
Colonial authority over land and forests on the outer islands5 (e.g. Sumatra, 
Sulawesi) remained limited until the end of the 19th century. Colonial rule on 
the outer islands was mainly based on indirect rule and self-governance (Barr, 
2006: 19). Dutch colonial authorities negotiated contracts with local Sultanates 
which forced them to accept the sovereignty of the colonial government and 
facilitated access to resources for Dutch and European companies (Locher-
Scholten, 1994: 95; 1996: 140–141). Forests remained under the authority of 
the Sultanates, of allied elites and local communities. At the end of the 19th 
century, Dutch colonial policy shifted from indirect rule to attempts to fully 
subject the outer islands, especially Sumatra (Locher-Scholten, 1996: 142). In 
several military operations, the Dutch started to expand direct control and 
conquered most of Sumatra at the beginning of the 20th century (Locher-
Scholten, 1996: 95). The first agrarian regulation, the Agrarische Reglement, was 
enacted to clarify land use and forest management in Jambi and other parts of 
Sumatra. The legislation provided the legal basis for dividing forests into three 
categories: permanent forests, forest reserves and forests for the extraction of 
non-timber and timber forest products (Nurjaya, 2005: 42).
In 1927, the colonial government enacted a new forest law that strengthened 
the role of the colonial forest service (Galudra and Sirait, 2009: 530). Since this 
time, the colonial forest service and its post-colonial successors (e.g. Ministry of 
Forestry, (MoF)) have had the authority to designate land as state forest and to 
control the use of forest resources (Galudra and Sirait, 2009: 530). Furthermore, 
forest zoning and the designation of the forest domain was expanded towards 
Sumatra and other islands (ibid.). However, the colonial authorities lacked the 
capacities to spatially extend the forest management approaches developed for 
the colonial core areas to the vast forest areas of Sumatra, Borneo and Papua. 
42 Rescaling of the governance of forests and land
With some exceptions, zoning and forest management on Sumatra existed 
mainly on paper. Various types of customary law (adat)6 remained the most 
relevant legal order governing access to forest and agricultural land (Nurjaya, 
2005: 42). However, in some areas of Jambi (and beyond), the colonial land and 
forest authorities induced significant changes, altering pre-existing customary 
arrangements. For instance, the colonial authorities established protected areas 
that still exist today. The Wildreservaat Berbak (today the Berbak National Park 
and Berbak Carbon Initiative) was established in 1935, while north of the pre-
sent-day Bungku village a protected area (today the forest reserve TAHURA 
Sultan Thaha Syaifuddin) was established in 1933 (Pemerintah Kabupaten 
Batang Hari, 2010: 8).
In addition, colonial administrative reforms challenged pre-existing admin-
istrative structures and customary forms of regulating access and property. In 
1903, after the Dutch conquest, the former independent Sultanate of Jambi 
became part of the Residence of Palembang (today South Sumatra) (Locher-
Scholten, 2004: 239). Later, Jambi became an independent Residence but the 
former jurisdictional division of the territory of the former Sultanate into 
Kalbus was replaced by the administrative system used in Palembang (Guillaud, 
1994). From 1919 onwards, the Residence of Jambi received a hierarchical 
territorial structure divided into Onderafdeeling (departments), Margas (sub-
districts) and dusuns (hamlets/villages). Margas consisted of five to six villages 
and were governed by the Pasirah. The Pasirah was usually a member of the 
leading lineage in the area and received the authority to legitimate property 
rights for the non-European population (Galudra et al., 2014: 723; Sevin and 
Benoît, 1993: 97). The Pasirah outlived the colonial regime and remained a rel-
evant authority in property issues in Jambi at least until the New Order regime 
enacted its village law in 1979. The first land titles issued by the Pasirah and the 
Dutch colonial authorities are still used as a source of legitimacy for stakehold-
ers in land conflicts. The Dutch not only changed the territorial structure, they 
also introduced rubber and started oil drilling close to the present-day Bungku 
village. Rubber became one of the most important agricultural commodities of 
the province during the 20th century.
The development of a colonial forest and land tenure policy on the island of 
Sumatra at the end of the 19th century had territorial and scalar consequences. 
Colonial forest authorities established a colonial scale of forest regulation that 
challenged pre-existing rules for accessing forest resources. Forest zoning, mon-
itoring activities and border demarcations underpinned the territorial claims 
and the new scale of regulation. Moreover, the colonial forest authorities con-
structed watershed protection and even climate protection (Galudra and Sirait, 
2009: 529) as scales of meaning for legitimizing colonial forest claims. In the 
Residence of Jambi, the colonial administration introduced a new scale of land 
tenure regulation and established the Pasirah as a new public authority respon-
sible for allocating land to Indonesian citizens (Guillaud, 1994: 125; Sevin and 
Benoît, 1993: 97).
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The early post-colonial period
Indonesian independence induced no abrupt changes in forest and land tenure 
governance. The Indonesian forest service (Jawatan Kehutanan) started activi-
ties on Sumatra7 in 1947 (Barr, 2006: 19; Nurjaya, 2005: 45). The structure 
and political orientation of the service was heavily influenced by its colonial 
precursor (Barr, 2006: 19). At least until the 1950s, most of the colonial forest 
regulations remained valid (Nurjaya, 2005: 46).
In 1957, Government Regulation 64/57 handed far-reaching forest manage-
ment competencies to provincial governments and provided significant timber 
revenues for provincial governments (Barr, 2006: 21; Nurjaya, 2005: 46). Chris-
topher Barr (2006: 20) argues that the new regulation represented a political 
commitment by the government of Indonesia’s first president Soekarno to the 
provincial governments in order to maintain the integrity of the newly inde-
pendent state. The regulation permitted provinces to issue logging concessions 
of up to 10,000 ha for up to 20 years. Furthermore, the regulation guaran-
teed the independence of the provincial forest services (ibid.). The regulation 
induced the down-scaling of forest management competencies but failed to 
clearly define the forest estate on the outer islands (ibid. 21). Consequently, the 
co-existence of customary law and formal law continued for at least the first 
two decades of independent Indonesia (ibid.).
In 1960, the Basic Agrarian Law (Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria) was passed. 
The BAL still applies (at least for non-forest land) and is highly relevant for 
understanding contemporary land conflicts and especially agrarian reform 
movements such as the Indonesian Peasant Union (Serikat Petani Indonesia 
(SPI)) (Rachman, 2011). The law aimed to harmonize customary law (adat) 
and formal law and replace colonial laws and regulations such as the Agrarische 
Wet (Bachriadi and Wiradi, 2011: 2; Bakker and Moniaga, 2010: 188). The Basic 
Agrarian Law (BAL) was designed as a holistic law encompassing all natu-
ral resources of land, water and air, thus including forest land (Bachriadi and 
Wiradi, 2011: 1; Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1960b).
The BAL clearly reflects the socialist-oriented zeitgeist of the President 
Soekarno era. The law stresses the social function of land rights (Article 6), 
prohibits “excessive ownership” of land (Article 7), postulates the redistribution 
of land (Article 17 (3)), limits exploitation rights to 35 years (Article 29), guar-
antees equal opportunities in obtaining land rights (Article 9 (2)) and regulates 
different types of private property (Articles 16, 20) (Presiden Republik Indone-
sia, 1960b). The BAL recognizes customary rights (adat) as long as they do not 
contradict the interests of the state (Article 2 (4)), but it does not provide clear 
regulation on how to solve conflicts between adat and formal state law (Barr, 
2006: 21). Furthermore, to register and certify rights based on adat, the adat 
rights have to be transformed into one of the private property concepts stated 
in Article 16 (Bakker, 2008: 3). However, according to a study conducted by 
the University of Palangkaraya and cited by Sandra Moniaga (1993: 139), most 
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of the indigenous communities at the forest margins had no knowledge of the 
law, were not informed about the necessity to formalize their adat-based land 
claims, and consequently do not hold registered land titles (ibid.).
Broadly speaking, there are today two common lines of criticism of the BAL 
(Bachriadi and Wiradi, 2011: 4). The first line of criticism argues that the law is 
dysfunctional because of the lack of implementing regulations, and that it has 
been used in ways that were not intended by the authors. The second argues 
that the law has actually increased inequality, since it expands state control and 
has therefore been used to legitimatize the dispossession of local communities 
(Bachriadi and Wiradi, 2011: 4).
On the one hand, the wording of the law indicates a strong commitment to 
policies that promote social and agrarian justice (Bachriadi and Wiradi, 2011: 2). 
In an interview, one of the leading experts on the Indonesian agrarian move-
ment argued that the law has “[. . .] an inclusive spirit, was socially balanced and 
gender sensitive and an attempt to abolish large land holdings”.8 The redistri-
bution of land (e.g. land reform) as stipulated by the law was not implemented 
except for small-scale pilot schemes on Java (Rachman, 2011: 40). On the other 
hand, the law privileges Western forms of private property over community 
property, aims to transform collective rights based on adat to individual prop-
erty rights, and strengthens the right of the state to control land (Bachriadi and 
Wiradi, 2011: 2–3; Bakker and Moniaga, 2010: 188). The New Order regime 
limited the applicability of the BAL to non-forest land (Barr, 2006: 23). There-
fore, today the BAL is relatively weak in legal terms but is still used by NGOs, 
social and environmental justice movements, and peasant organizations to 
underpin political campaigns for a more equal distribution of agrarian resources 
(Bakker and Moniaga, 2010: 88; Hein and Faust, 2014: 25; Rachman, 2011: 54). 
For example, members of SPI refer to the BAL to legitimize land occupations 
within the Harapan Rainforest project (see Chapter 5 for more detail).9
The BAL can also be understood as an attempt to construct a new national 
scale for governing natural resources and as an attempt to deconstruct pre- 
existing colonial scales. For instance, Craig C. Thorburn (2004: 36) stresses 
that the authors of the BAL “[. . .] envisioned an entire national community 
guided by an overarching sense of social function. The state, as the ultimate 
arbiter of ‘national adat’, was in effect granted beschikkingsrecht [rights of disposal, 
translation added by the author] to all the land, sea and natural and economic 
resources in the country”. The post-colonial state sought to legitimize the BAL 
as a new national scale of regulation by constructing a complementary scale of 
meaning based on nationalism and on the key role of land for achieving welfare 
and social justice in rural areas.
New Order
The New Order regime refers to the period under former President Suharto. 
The autocratic and modernization-oriented regime changed forest and agrarian 
politics significantly (Bachriadi and Wiradi, 2011: 6). The regime established and 
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stabilized political control over the outer islands, liberalized forest exploitation, 
standardized and Javanized village administration, expanded the transmigra-
tion program and stopped the land redistribution policies initiated by Soekarno 
(Bachriadi and Wiradi, 2011; Barr, 2006; Kato, 1989; Levang and Sevin, 1990). 
These political processes changed scales of meaning and regulation (e.g. cen-
tralization of forest governance), induced far-reaching landscape transformation 
processes (e.g. the island of Sumatra lost 25–30 percent of its forest cover, Barr, 
2006: 28) and significantly altered the ability of local actors to access forest land.
In 1967, President Suharto enacted the Basic Forest Law. According to Barr 
(2006: 23), the law provides the first comprehensive legal and administrative 
framework for managing Indonesia’s forest estate. Through the enactment of 
the Basic Forest Law, Suharto’s regime reestablished the dualistic structure of 
the colonial system – with two separate laws, one regulating forest management 
and access to the state forest and one regulating access and property outside of 
the state forest. First, the law defines state forest (Kawasan Hutan) as a forested 
territory or a non-forested territory designated for reforestation (Article 4). It 
gives the Directorate General of Forestry within the Ministry of Agriculture 
(later upgraded to the Ministry of Forestry (MoF)) the authority to desig-
nate approximately 70 percent of Indonesia’s land mass as state forest (Article 
7) (Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1967). Second, the law delegates authority 
to conduct forest zoning to the Directorate General of Forestry and intro-
duces four different forest categories: production forest, recreation forest, forest 
reserve and nature conservation forest. Third, the law provides the legal frame-
work for commercial forest exploitation and for the economic liberalization of 
forest management (Hak Pengusahaan Hutan, HPH) (Article 14). Fourth, the law 
states that customary forest is part of the state forest and that the activities of 
customary (adat) communities that contradict the law (e.g. shifting cultivation) 
are prohibited (Article 17). Furthermore, only the still existing adat communi-
ties have rights to the forest, with the important addition that the state decides 
which community is eligible and which is not. Consequently, many local and 
indigenous communities, including those living within the forests that became 
the Harapan Rainforest and the Berbak Carbon Initiative more than 50 years 
later, lost at least de jure access to their customary land.
Forest management during the New Order era aimed to achieve at least 
three major objectives. First, revenues from forest exploitation were neces-
sary in order to stabilize the state and its various apparatuses (Barr, 2006: 23). 
This was mainly achieved by establishing clientelistic networks creating mutual 
dependencies of actors of the civil and military bureaucracy from the central 
government down to the village level (Barr, 2006: 24; Barr, 1998: 4). Second, 
revenues from forest exploitation were necessary to stabilize the state budget 
and enhance the trade balance. Third, forest resources were used to attract for-
eign investments (Barr, 2006: 27).
In the 1970s, the central government established full control over Indonesia’s 
forest resources and allocation procedures for all types of forest concessions. 
The central government revoked any rights of the sub-national governments 
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to issue forest exploitation permits (Barr, 2006: 25) and started to allocate 
concessions to timber companies. The first logging concessions in the area of 
today’s Harapan Rainforest project (e.g. PT Asialog10 and PT Tanjung ASA)11 
date back to this period. Through up-scaling the permit procedures for all 
concession types, the central government sought to prevent sub-national elites 
and their patronage networks from accessing forest resources and to facilitate 
access to forest resources for the Jakarta-based elite (Barr, 2006: 25–26). Up-
scaling finally consolidated Jakarta’s attempts to control the forest resources of 
the outer islands.
Javanizing the outer islands: village law and transmigration
After the central government consolidated control over the forests, another 
major state project was initiated: Javanizing the outer islands. The Village Law of 
1979 (Undang-Undang tentang Pemerintahan Desa 5/1979) aimed to homogenize 
the administrative structure of the archipelago, and the transmigration program 
was set to promote modernization and development and export Javanese culture 
to the outer islands (Burkard, 2002: 5; Kato, 1989: 91–94; Warren, 1990: 1–2).
The Village Law was intended to replace the pre-existing structures that were 
based on colonial concepts or customary law (adat) by imposing the Javanese 
village (Desa) concept (ibid.). Indonesia’s local governance and administrative 
structure remained highly diverse until the end of the 1970s. As the lowest 
administrative unit, villages had different names, meanings and sizes and were 
led by local leaders with different names, sources of legitimacy, and responsibili-
ties concerning the customary regulation of land and forest tenure (Kato, 1989: 
91). This diversity was also acknowledged by Indonesia’s constitution of 1945 
(Kato, 1989: 114). In Jambi, for example, the colonial system of village admin-
istration remained relevant until the enactment of the Village Law in 1979 
(Galudra et al., 2014: 723).
The new Javanized village concept introduced a new hierarchical socio-spatial 
organization that undermined previous forms of socio-spatial organization. 
According to the law, the village (desa) as a jurisdiction should be led by a vil-
lage head (Kepala Desa) as the executive body and by a village council (Lembaga 
Musyawarah Desa) as the legislative body of the village government. The Village 
Law stipulated the sub-division of the village territory into hamlets (dusuns) led 
by a Kepala Dusun. Hamlets are further divided into different neighborhood 
units12 (Rukun Tetangga) led by the Ketua RT (Bebbington et al., 2004: 192; 
Kato, 1989: 94; Warren, 1990: 3).
Through standardizing and formalizing village government and village 
administration, the Village Law undermined the traditional customary authori-
ties and the traditional income sources of villages (Kato, 1989: 105). The village 
territory was imposed as a new scale of regulation contradicting previous scales 
of regulation, such as the Wilayah Adat13 (customary land) of the Batin Sembilan 
in Jambi. New village boundaries disrupted previous forms of the Batin Sem-
bilan’s socio-spatial organization, which were based on lineages and watersheds.
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Furthermore, the Village Law decoupled traditional local leaders from their 
material basis of power and authority (Bebbington et al., 2004: 193). Their pre-
vious sources of power, in Steven Lukes’ words their sources of visible power, 
were based on the right to allocate land and fishing rights and to collect rub-
ber taxes (Galudra et al., 2014: 725; Kato, 1989: 108). In the Berbak area, for 
instance, land was controlled by the Pasirah of the Marga of Berbak until the 
early 1980s.14 Today, the village head is de facto in charge of land allocation and 
drainage permits.15 Galudra and colleagues (2014) identified similar develop-
ments in other parts of Jambi.
The aim of the Village Law was not only to standardize scales of regulation. 
The law was also part of a set of policies aiming to establish national moderni-
zation and development as new scales of meaning to replace previous scales of 
meaning based on local adat (e.g. customary authority and locally relevant cul-
tural meanings of landscapes and territories). The New Order regime regarded 
village diversity and non-Javanese forms of socio-spatial organization as poten-
tial threats for development and as signs of underdevelopment (Bebbington 
et al., 2004: 192; Hoey, 2003: 112; Kato, 1989: 93). As the lowest administrative 
unit, village governments were to act in line with national development targets. 
At the same time, they were the lowest part of the national surveillance and 
control network of the New Order regime (Kato, 1989: 107–113). However, 
the New Order regime was not fully able to defeat customary authority. Many 
village governments were not fully operational and in many peripheral villages 
adat and traditional public authorities remained influential, rapidly regaining 
importance during the Reformasi16 era (Bebbington et al., 2004: 193).
Whereas the Village Law focused on Javanizing the administrative structure, 
the transmigration program focused on Javanizing the population, land use prac-
tices and property relations. Transmigration is a government-led resettlement 
program and rural development initiative. The program received significant 
financial support from the World Bank (Kebschull, 1986: 152–153).17 In many 
parts of the Archipelago, the transmigration program contributed significantly 
to the expansion of a Western and individualized concept of property, of cash 
crops, of wet rice production and of a modern bureaucracy (Armitage, 2002: 
211; Cramb et al., 2009; Kebschull, 1986: 37; Li, 2005: 14–15; Roth, 2009: 202).
Transmigration dates back to the colonial period. The Kolonosatie program 
resettled Javanese farmers mainly to Lampung but also to Jambi (Levang and 
Sevin, 1990: 1,3). The official rational of the transmigration program and of its 
colonial precursor was to reduce population pressure and land scarcity on Java 
and Maduro and to redistribute the population to the sparsely populated outer 
islands (ibid.). Resettlement was also driven by the imagination of the superior-
ity of Javanese and Balinese culture and land use practices (Fearnside, 1997: 559; 
Levang and Sevin, 1990: 4). Javanese and Balinese transmigrants were framed as 
model farmers that would persuade “backward” slash-and-burn farmers of the 
outer islands to use more modern land use techniques (ibid.).
The transmigration program had its peak in the 1980s. By 1989, five million 
people had been resettled to the outer islands (Fearnside, 1997: 554). Numbers 
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declined in the 1990s but remained substantial (e.g. 90,762 families in 1996–
1997) (Potter, 2012: 272). In the Reformasi period, the relevance of the project 
declined significantly (e.g. 2265 families in 2000) (Potter, 2012: 272). Authority 
over the program was transferred to district governments. Today, potential send-
ing districts and receiving districts directly negotiate with each other (Potter, 
2012: 273) and candidates can select between different destinations using an 
online platform (Dinas Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi Sumatera Barat, 2015; 
Hein et al., 2018a).
The transmigration program allocated between 1.75 ha and 3.5 ha land to 
each household for crop production, including official land titles issued by the 
National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional, BPN) (The World Bank, 
1979: 33, 73). In addition, the transmigration authorities provided a 0.25 ha 
house lot, seeds and start-up funding (Fearnside, 1997: 555). In Jambi, the first 
post-colonial projects were developed in the peat swamps of the Batang Hari 
delta, north-east of today’s Berbak Carbon Initiative (Levang and Sevin, 1990: 
6). The projects induced enormous landscape transformation processes caused 
by drainage and land reclamation activities. Additional projects were developed 
in Jambi’s hinterland, for instance in the Sungai Bahar area north of the Hara-
pan Rainforest project.
In many parts of Indonesia, the transmigration settlements overlapped with 
the customary land used by local communities. In Jambi, transmigration and 
local resettlement schemes very likely contributed to the transformation of 
lineage-based property concepts to individualistic and commodified property 
(c.f. Hauser-Schäublin and Steinebach, 2014; Krishna et al., 2014). A member 
of the village parliament in Tanjung Lebar, for instance, stated: “In the times 
before the transmigration project was implemented we did not use land titles 
in the village [. . .]”.18
The transmigration program was also used as inspiration and as a source of 
legitimacy for settlement and forest conversion initiatives by village and dis-
trict governments that violated the Forest Law and re-claimed former custom-
ary land within the state forest territory. The name of an informal settlement 
within Harapan Rainforest, Transswakarsa Mandiri, makes direct reference to 
a sub-program of the state-based formal transmigration program. Within the 
Berbak Carbon Initiative at least two new district-to-district transmigration 
settlements were recently established, causing conflicts among different state 
agencies and settlers (see Chapter 5 for more detail).19
Reformasi and post-reformasi: rescaling through  
democratization and decentralization
On 21 May 1998, President Suharto announced his resignation after two years 
of student protests calling for democracy, and after ethnic violence and sharp 
economic decline (Hofman and Kaiser, 2002: 3). His successors President 
Habibie, President Wahid and President Megawati implemented far-reaching 
democratic reforms and decentralization processes that significantly transformed 
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Indonesia’s political landscape. Indonesia’s “big bang decentralization” was nei-
ther a controlled nor a planned process (Hofman and Kaiser, 2002). The first 
decentralization laws and regulations, e.g. Law 22/1999 on Regional Govern-
ance, were formulated in an over-hastily way, reflecting the weak power base of 
the central state during the political transition period after the fall of Suharto 
(Barr et al., 2006: 2; Hofman and Kaiser, 2002: 3). Decentralization and regional 
autonomy and new revenue-sharing arrangements among the central govern-
ment, provincial and district governments did not follow a stringent plan but 
were rather an ad hoc response to separatist tendencies, with the aim of main-
taining the integrity of the nation state (McCarthy, 2007: 96).
Regional governments including village heads and customary leaders took 
advantage of the confusion and the political vacuum caused by the weak cen-
tral state. They interpreted reforms to their advantage and started to assert far-
reaching administrative authority over forests, land tenure and natural resources 
(Barr et al., 2006: 2; Hein et al., 2016). On the local level, decentralization 
increased competition between different actors over the new profit options. In 
some regions of the archipelago (e.g. Central Sulawesi and the Maluku Islands) 
violent conflicts about access and control of natural resources and political 
power emerged along ethnic and religious lines (Acciaioli, 2001: 87; Rhee, 
2009: 46). Ethnicity and customary law reemerged as means of controlling 
land and natural resources (Barr et al., 2006: 12; Moeliono and Dermawan, 
2006: 109; Rhee, 2009: 109). The reemergence of ethnicity and customary law 
are highly relevant for understanding contemporary conflicts about access and 
property in Jambi and other parts of Indonesia (Beckert et al., 2014; Hein and 
Faust, 2014; Hein et al., 2016; Steinebach, 2013b).
Reforms of forest, land and village governance induced a wide range of 
changes. However, in many cases and especially in the forest sector, the reforms 
only temporarily shifted de jure competencies. Most relevant competen-
cies remained on the national level. However, the changed political context 
extended the agency of local public authorities including village governments, 
customary communities and agrarian reform movements (Barr et al., 2006: 11; 
Moeliono and Dermawan, 2006: 109; Peluso et al., 2008: 388). Whereas de jure 
authority over the state forest only temporarily shifted, especially the district 
governments benefitted substantially from new forest revenue-sharing arrange-
ments. Districts in which forest concessions are located now receive a four 
times higher share of the concession license fee and receive 40 percent of the 
reforestation fund (Resosudarmo et al., 2006: 61, 67).20
Decentralization of the forest sector was initiated through the enactment 
of Regulation 62/1998 on the Delegation of Partial Authority on the Forest 
Sector to Regions and Regulation 6/1999 on Regional Governance (Reso-
sudarmo et al., 2006: 88). These two regulations and a couple of subsequent 
decrees issued by the MoF permitted district governments to issue small-scale 
logging and forest conversion concessions in areas designated as conversion and 
production forest (Resosudarmo et al., 2006: 99; Indrarto et al., 2012: 27). Fur-
ther legitimacy was provided through Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance. 
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The law delegated authority over various governance functions, such as health, 
education, agriculture, environmental protection and (to some extent) over 
agricultural land, to district governments (Barr et al., 2006: 11; Indrarto et al., 
2012: 27).
In Jambi, district governments issued Community Timber Extraction Permits 
(Ijin Pemungutan Kayu Rakyat, IPKR) within production and conversion forest, 
inducing a short logging boom on forest land that became part of the Berbak 
Carbon Initiative after 2008. In 2002, the central government withdrew the 
authority to issue small-scale logging and forest conversion concessions from 
district governments after lobbying by the Association of Indonesian Forest 
Concession holders, and reestablished full authority over the state forest estate 
(Resosudarmo et al., 2006: 90). With Regulation 34/2002, the central govern-
ment abrogated small-scale logging but gave provincial and district govern-
ments at least the opportunity to provide recommendations during the permit 
process for forest concessions (Indrarto et al., 2012: 28; McCarthy et al., 2006: 
45; Resosudarmo et al., 2006: 90, 104). These seesaw changes of competencies 
led to uncertainty and confusion, providing room for monetary and political 
rent-seeking behavior among actors (Moeliono and Dermawan, 2006: 106; and 
for similar practices in sub-Saharan Africa, please refer to Lund, 2008: 152).
Today, some district governments continue to issue small-scale forest con-
version permits, according to an MoF expert in Jakarta. During the interview, 
the expert explained: “[. . .] the authority was given to the local government 
actually with a hope to speed up the process, but the problem then the issued 
licenses were not used for timber but mostly for estate crop plantations. That’s 
why the decision has been revoked, but they continue to release the license 
but mostly not for small-scale timber [. . .] the local government mostly related 
to the issuance for oil palm plantation, small scale although this is not legal”.21
Forest Law 41/1999 mostly resumes the forest policy of the New Order era, 
e.g. the law declares that customary forests are part of the state forest and allows 
access to forests only for formally recognized adat communities (Bedner and 
Van Huis, 2008: 184). However, for instance in its Article 68 on community 
participation, the law goes beyond New Order policies and provides room for 
implementing regulations on village forestry (hutan desa, Ministerial Regulation 
49/2008), community forestry (hutan kemasyarakatan, Ministerial Regulation 
37/2007) and smallholder forestry (hutan tanaman rakyat, Ministerial Regula-
tion 55/2011).
On the one hand, district and provincial governments have de jure only few 
management competencies today, e.g. management of forest reserves (Tanaman 
Hutan Raya also known as TAHURA) and conservation forests (Hutan Lind-
ung) and they have neither the authority to issue concessions nor to decide 
on forest classification and designation. On the other hand, they have gained 
significant influence outside the forest sector. This includes spatial planning, 
environmental impact assessments and the lucrative approval of agricultural 
plantation and mining permits on non-forest land (Indrarto et al., 2012: 31; 
Paoli et al., 2013: 27–28).
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Like the forest sector reforms, the reform of village administration was char-
acterized by seesaw changes. Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance no longer 
describes villages as the lowest administrative unit but as “autonomous units”, 
recognizing local customary law and regional characteristics (Moeliono and 
Dermawan, 2006: 115). Only a few years later, the revised decentralization law 
of 2004 and the regulation on village government (Government Regulation 
76/2001) again stipulated that villages across the archipelago should have a uni-
form structure (ibid.). Despite this drawback, the reforms have democratized 
village governments. Village heads and village parliaments (Badan Permusyawara-
tan Desa, BPD) are elected for six years for a maximum of two terms. BPDs 
and village heads can enact village regulations, prepare village development 
plans and must be involved in spatial planning processes conducted by higher 
authorities (Bedner and Van Huis, 2008: 174).
The new laws and regulations have not changed the spatial organization of 
village governance. Villages are still sub-divided into hamlets and neighbor-
hoods. Although the reforms provided more room for self-determination for 
village governments, they offer no de jure control over forest resources within 
the state forest. In any case, de facto former village heads in Bungku and Tan-
jung Lebar have exercised authority over state forest since the fall of Suharto. 
Village heads in both villages legitimize their control over the state forest (e.g. 
demonstrated through the issuance of village-scale land titles and the support 
of forest conversion and settlement within the state forest) with reference to 
pre-existing customary territories. These activities are at least partially backed 
by the older Governmental Regulation 24/1997 on land registration (Article 
24) issued under the Suharto Presidency. This regulation gives village heads a 
formal role in registering adat land rights and other rights based on oral history 
(Nurhaniah, 2006: 74; Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1997).
Access to different types of de jure land and forest rights
Indonesia’s forest and land tenure regime is complex and governed through a 
wide set of laws and regulations (Brockhaus et al., 2012: 32). I have introduced 
the most relevant ones, e.g. the Forest Law 41/1999 and the Basic Agrarian 
Law 5/1960. These laws and regulations translate into different types of de jure 
land and forest rights accessible by different actors, including rights that permit 
ecosystem service trade (relevant for selling forest carbon credits).
First, it is relevant where the land is located. If land is located within the 
state forest, it is subject to the Forest Law and related regulations. State forest 
land is under the authority of the MoF. If land is located outside the state for-
est, also called areas for other use (APL, Areal Penggunaan Lain), it is subject to 
the Basic Agrarian Law. APL is under the authority of district governments and 
the National Land Agency (BPN). Second, both laws distinguish between land 
and forest rights for individuals (smallholders), communities (including formal 
villages), and corporate actors. Third, the forest regime permits only temporary 
use rights (hak pengusaha hutan) for all actor groups. In contrast, the agricultural 
52 Rescaling of the governance of forests and land
regime permits inheritable and alienable individual rights (hak milik) for small-
holders with a maximum size of 20ha,22 communal land rights (hak ulayat) 
for adat communities and temporary cultivation rights (hak gunah usaha) for 
larger corporate actors (Bedner and Van Huis, 2008: 179–180; Presiden Repub-
lik Indonesia, 1960b, 1960a, 1999). However, as we will see later, the de facto 
rights regime is far more complex than the formal legislations allow for.
De jure rights to forest and land
The allocation of forest concessions is a complex process which has often been 
described as non-transparent and corruption prone (Casson and Obidzinski, 
2002; Smith et al., 2003). To obtain most of the various forest concessions avail-
able, actors have to establish a company or a cooperative and have to apply for 
a permit from the MoF. The legal procedure for accessing ecosystem restoration 
concessions, for instance, has been described as long and complex (Walsh et al., 
2012a; Walsh et al., 2012b). The Forest Law provides different forest concessions 
for corporate actors (e.g. ecosystem restoration, forest plantation and logging 
concessions), for village communities (hutan desa/village forest concession), for 
communities (hutan kemasyarakatan/community forest concession) and for indi-
vidual smallholders (hutan tanaman rakyat/smallholder forest concession). How-
ever, it is usually difficult for village governments, communities and individual 
smallholders to access these concessions. Smallholder forest concessions (hutan 
tanaman rakyat, HTR) are often allocated by forest authorities as a means to 
solve conflicts between the forest authorities and smallholders occupying land 
designated as state forest.23 This was the case in a village in the southeastern 
part of the Berbak Carbon Initiative, and it was discussed as a conflict solution 
tool for solving conflicts between smallholders in Bungku and the conservation 
company PT REKI, who manage the Harapan Rainforest.24 In other cases, in 
Jambi, the allocation of HTR concessions was often facilitated by NGOs or 
donors. For instance, the NGO Amphal supported by the Finnish Development 
Cooperation runs two smallholder agroforestry projects based on HTR con-
cessions in the surroundings of the Bukit Duabelas National Park in Jambi.25
Asked about how communities could obtain a village forest concession 
(hutan desa), experts from academia, donor agencies and NGOs interviewed in 
July 2012 mentioned that requirements such as the preparation of management 
plans and forest inventories, and the levying of administrative charges repre-
sent significant barriers to local communities and smallholders that cannot be 
resolved without external support.26 In addition, only state forest that is desig-
nated as production forest (hutan produksi) and that is not yet allocated is eligible 
for smallholder forest concessions. Village and community forest concessions 
represent an exception. They can also operate in conservation forests (hutan 
lindung). Furthermore, the respective regulation on village forests clearly links 
village forests to existing and formally recognized villages (Menteri Kehutanan, 
2008a). This excludes groups that settle informally or live nomadically inside the 
state forest.27 The indigenous rights movement AMAN rejects community and 
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village forest concessions and argues “[. . .] we do not agree with that, because 
actually the basis of these forest categories is wrong. Because the forestry law 
itself is wrong [. . .] it doesn’t recognize indigenous people’s rights; [. . .] the law 
is wrong and consequently implementing regulation is also wrong”.28 Commu-
nity and village forest concessions remain part of the state forest territory, thus 
they remain under the authority of the MoF. They only permit temporary use 
rights. AMAN consequently refuses concessions and demands full land owner-
ship and the recognition of indigenous territories.29
The recent constitutional court review declared that adat forest is no longer 
part of the state forest but is subject to the rights of adat communities (Rachman, 
2013: 2). In 2015, after the election of President Jokowi, plans were announced 
to facilitate and expand the allocation of community and smallholder forest 
concessions and to implement the decision of the constitutional court (HuMa, 
2015; Kompas.com, 2016; Nugraha et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, in specific circumstances communities with the support of the 
district government can apply for an enclave. An enclave implies the release of a 
specific area from the state forest. The MoF then assesses the request according 
to specific criteria covering inter alia ethnicity, the history of the area, evidence 
of community rights and ecological indicators.
While a number of different corporate concessions have existed (e.g. log-
ging concessions, forest plantation concessions) since 2008, a new concession 
type has been established that permits private actors to conduct conservation 
and ecosystem restoration activities (see Chapter 4 and Walsh et al., 2012a and 
2012b). Ecosystem restoration concessions are private conservation concessions 
for habitat protection, habitat restoration and management (Ministry of For-
estry, 2008: 5). They permit the commercial exploitation of non-timber forest 
products and the commercial use of ecosystem services such as ecotourism, 
biodiversity and carbon capture (ibid. 7). The conservation company PT REKI 
who runs the Harapan Rainforest project holds a concession of this sort.
In the process to obtain land rights in areas designated as APL, district gov-
ernments and the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional, BPN) 
have the final voice. In peripheral areas without land registration, the village 
heads are (according to Governmental Regulation 24/1997 on land registra-
tion) in charge of land deeds and issuing the documents that are required to 
convert customary ownership to a formal land title (hak milik).
The BPN distinguishes between two procedures for registering land as hak 
milik. The first, called sistematik, refers to government-sponsored and govern-
ment-assisted land-titling schemes conducted in specific areas, such as the 
Proyek Operasi Nasional Agraria (PRONA), for agricultural land. In this case, 
village heads and civil servants from the BPN jointly conduct tenure map-
pings to identify and certify land. The second procedure is called sporadik and 
refers to the process of individual land registration. The certification of a plot of 
land requires several documents, including a declaration confirming that land 
taxes have been paid, a document on the ownership history, a document that 
describes the location of the land and its borders (Surat Pernyataan Penguasan 
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Fisik Bidang Tanah), and a declaration that the plot is not claimed by another 
party. To convert customary rights, a statement from the village head is neces-
sary. However, in many parts of Jambi, the term sporadik customarily refers to a 
village-scale land title, which is even recognized in part by the BPN in Jambi. 
According to a BPN officer in Jambi, a sporadik is not a legal land title but it 
can be considered as a Surat Pernyataan Penguasan Fisik Bidang Tanah and can 
be accepted by the BPN as a document legitimizing ownership by the village 
government.30 The document is needed for a land title application for previ-
ously untitled land (Presiden Republik Indonesia, 1997; Wibisono, 2012: 9–11).
To obtain a concession for cultivation rights (hak gunah usaha (HGU)) cor-
porate actors have first to apply for a location permit (ijin lokasi) from the 
district government. Before issuing a location permit, the district government 
has to consult local communities potentially affected by the concession (Paoli 
et al., 2013: 24).31 After holding the location permit, the planned plantation 
estate is subject to an environmental impact assessment involving the environ-
mental protection authority of the district (ibid. 28). In a last step, the BPN 
issues the HGU (ibid.). In some cases, e.g. in Seponjen, companies run planta-
tion estates based only on the location permit without having conducted an 
environmental impact assessment and without having a concession for culti-
vation rights (HGU).32
The different types of land and forest rights described above are subject to 
different laws and regulations and involve a range of authorities such as vil-
lage governments, district governments, the BPN and the MoF/MoEF. Each 
authority has its specific scale of regulation which reflects the position and the 
different dimensions of power of authority within the different apparatuses 
of the state. However, as the previous sections have shown, power constella-
tions and scales of regulation are not stable but are continuously re-negotiated. 
Table 3.1 shows an overview of the different rights or, in other words, property 
types, their legal basis, limitations, the authorities involved and lists of stake-
holders eligible for each property type.
De jure land rights and state-based settlement schemes
As outlined above, transmigration settlements were established in many parts of 
Jambi during the New Order era. The program participants usually also received 
titled agricultural land. The settlements in the Sungai Bahar area north of the 
Harapan Rainforest (developed between 1983 and 1986) provided approxi-
mately 2 ha of agricultural land and a 0.25-ha plot for a house, yard and garden. 
However, a member of the village government argued that the local popula-
tion had difficulty joining the program and receiving the pledged land. He 
reported that some Batin Sembilan households paid a fee to join the program 
but received no land from the transmigration authorities.34 A Batin Sembilan 
household head said that a total of 56 Batin Sembilan households from Tanjung 
Lebar joined and received start-up credits and land titles issued by the National 
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The program for underdeveloped villages (Impress Desa Tertinggal) and the 
Transsos settlement program were presented as social programs to “develop the 
local population”. They were developed from the 1970s until the late 1990s. 
The aim was to sendentarize the semi-nomadic Batin Sembilan families; the 
programs provided them with standardized wooden houses. The program in 
Bungku provided no agricultural land; in Tanjung Lebar a few participating 
households received 1 ha of agricultural land (Table 3.2).36
Jambi’s contested landscapes: from dispossession and 
development to conservation
Today, large parts of Jambi are covered by oil palm, rubber, and pulp and paper 
plantations. Jambi’s economy is dominated by agribusiness and by the exploita-
tion of black coal, oil and gas. Because of agricultural expansion and open pit 
mining, Jambi lost 76,522 ha of forest per year between 2006 and 2009 (Per-
batakusuma et al., 2012: 55). Jambi’s high deforestation rate and the conversion 
of peat swamps lead to net annual GHG emissions of 57 MtCO2e (Pemerin-
tah Provinsi Jambi, 2012).37 The area under oil palm cultivation in Jambi has 
increased from 44,000 ha in 1990 to 714,399 ha in 2016 (Direktorat Jenderal 
Perkebunan, 2017). This rapid expansion of the oil palm frontier continues to 
be a highly conflictive and contradictive process, in particular because conser-
vation areas have also been expanded significantly. Corporate and smallholder 
oil palm plantations as well as the new conservation areas challenge pre-existing 
land-use practices such as gardening, swiddens, logging and hunting and gath-
ering, and the related customary regulations (Hein et al., 2016).
The landscapes surrounding the Harapan Rainforest project and the Berbak 
Carbon Initiative have different histories. I argue that unraveling them helps 
to improve understanding of the conflict dynamics in the two areas. Both are 
impacted by an unprecedented oil palm boom but there are differences in 
landscape transformation and especially in the agents driving the change and 
the conflicts. While the area of the Harapan Rainforest has been transformed 
by periods of violent primitive accumulation, the transformation of the peat 
swamps of the Berbak region was less conflictive and mainly driven by Bugi 
seafarers and Malay elites.
Landscapes of the forest of hope: dispossession, conflict and  
interethnic alliances
In pre-colonial times, the landscapes around todays Harapan Rainforest were 
the home of semi-nomadic Batin and Kubu tribes (Andaya, 2008: 205; Hagen, 
1908: 19–20; Hein et al., 2015: 5). Leonard Y. Andaya (2008: 205) describes the 
Batin of the landscapes between Batang Hari and Musi Rivers “[. . .] as collectors 
of forest products for former Malayu Kingdoms, they filled a complementary 
niche that helped them to maintain a distinctive lifestyle and ethnic identity”. 
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were common and many Batin increasingly adopted the Jambi Malay language, 
lifestyle and religion during the colonial period (Andaya, 2008: 205). Today, 
most Batin Sembilan speak Malay and describe themselves as Muslims.
The Batin Sembilan groups living in the borderland between Jambi and 
South Sumatra trace their origins back to these groups (Hein et al., 2016: 384; 
Steinebach, 2013b: 71). The hamlets of Pangkalan Ranjau (Hagen, 1908) and 
Sungai Beruang founded by Batin Sembilan and today part of the village of 
Tanjung Lebar, confirm their pre-colonial presence in the area (Figure 3.1 
and Table 3.3). The villages of Tanjung Lebar and the neighboring village of 
Markanding38 were the oldest settlements in the Harapan landscape, explained 
a Batin Sembilan elder.39 The settlements were cultural and socio-economic 
centers of the Batin Sembilan. Over the year, the Batin Sembilan stayed alter-
nately in the settlements or in the forest shelters to hunt, gather forest products, 
care for fruit trees and practice shifting cultivation (Hidayat, 2012: 49).
The Batin Sembilan share a common myth of origin. According to this 
myth they descend from nine sons of a legendary noble named Raden Nago-
sari. Each son settled on the shore of one of nine rivers (Bulian, Bahar, Jebak, 
Jangga, Pemusiran, Burung Antu, Telisak, Sekamis, Singoan) in the borderland 
between the Sultanates of Jambi and Palembang (c.f. Hidayat, 2012: 3).40 This 
myth of origin is reflected in the traditional and, at least in part, still relevant 
socio-spatial organization of the different lineages of the Batin Sembilan.41 In 
pre-colonial and colonial times different lineage leaders of the Batin Sembilan 
controlled forests in the upper watersheds of the Bulian, Bahar and Lalang Riv-
ers (Figure 3.1A). Extended families controlled the forests in a sub-watershed, 
permitting only family members to establish fruit gardens and dry rice fields.42 
Today, different lineages and extended families of the Batin Sembilan still refer 
to these and other rivers to explain and legitimize the borders of their ethnic 
territories (Table 3.3).
The traditional leadership structure of the Batin Sembilan and their socio- 
spatial organization has been transformed and overlaid by colonial and post-
colonial administrative and jurisdictional reforms. In the villages of Bungku and 
Tanjung Lebar, much of the knowledge of traditional authorities and traditional 
socio-spatial organization seemed to be lost. The remaining information on 
the role of traditional authorities and on the hierarchy of authorities is rather 
contradictive. Rian Hidayat (2012: 71) argues that the Depati was the high-
est authority of the Batin Sembilan during the Sultanate. The Depatia usually 
governed a dusun (hamlet). A Batin Sembilan leader in Tanjung Lebar argued 
that the Temenggung43 was the highest authority in a dusun, positioned above the 
Depati. The Temenggung was a cultural and political leader responsible for con-
flict mediation. Batin Sembilan elders that I met argued in line with Hidayat, or 
they did not know a Depati at all or explained that the Depati was called Mangku 
in the settlements around the Harapan Rainforest.
In the early 20th century, the Dutch took control and, as described earlier in 
this chapter, introduced the administrative system of Palembang and established 
the Pasirah as a new authority governing a Marga and holding the authority to 
Figure 3.1  Different thematic maps of the Harapan Rainforest and its surroundings
(Source: adapted, based on Hein et al., 2016)
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Table 3.3 Lineages of the Batin Sembilan and their settlements
Name of Batin sub-group 
and river name
Old settlement Official villages
Bulian (Sungai Bulian) Dusun Singkawang Kel. Bulian, Kel. Sridadi, Kel. Pasar, 
Kilangan, Singkawang, Sungkai, 
Kel. Bajubang, Petajin, Batin
Bahar (Sungai Bahar) Dusun Pinang Tinggi, 
Dusun Padang Salak, 
Susun Tanah Menang, 
Dusun Mengkanding, 
Dusun Tanjung Lebar
Pelembang, Nyogan, Tanjung 
Lebar, Tanjung Pauh Illir, 
Ladang Peris, Sungai Landai, 
Dusun Baru, Bungku and 
transmigration villages in the 
Kec. Sungai Bahar and Bahar 
Selatan
Other sub-groups: Jebak, Pemusiran, Singoan, Jangga, Burung Antu, Sekamis, Telisak
(Source: Hidayat, 2012: 33 and own investigations)
allocate land. The landscape became part of the Marga of Pemajoeng Hoeloe 
and the first roads were built linking the region with Jambi city (Tidemann, 
1938: 251). The Dutch colonial administration also sought to settle and to “civ-
ilize” the native population, challenging their semi-nomadic lifestyles.
After independence, the region initially remained relatively stable. Funda-
mental transformation processes were triggered by Suharto’s autocratic New 
Order regime (1967–1998). Almost the entire region was classified as state for-
est area despite the presence of peasant and indigenous communities such as the 
Batin Sembilan (Figure 3.1B) (Hein et al., 2016: 384–385). To fight “backward-
ness” and “unproductiveness”, in other words to promote “development”, the 
central government allocated large forest areas claimed by the Batin Sembilan 
to logging companies in the 1970s and to oil palm companies in the 1980s. In 
the 1970s, the forests in and around today’s Harapan Rainforest were divided 
into three corporate logging concessions. The southern part was assigned to PT 
Asialog, the northern part to PT Tanjung ASA and the eastern part to PT Suka 
Rimba Raya (Badan Inventarisasi dan Tata Guna Hutan, n.a.). The classification 
of the area as state forest and the allocation of state forest to logging compa-
nies illegalized the settlements and livelihood practices of the Batin Sembilan 
and led to de jure dispossession of the Batin Sembilan. De facto, many Batin 
Sembilan groups were still able to practice shifting cultivation and domestic 
logging was tolerated, but the companies restricted access to the concession 
for non-local groups.44 A Batin Sembilan leader in Bungku argued that the 
logging company PT Asialog accepted the land rights of the Batin Sembilan.45 
However, some Batin Sembilan had other experiences with the company and 
reported that shifting cultivation and crop cultivation were not allowed within 
PT Asialog’s concession and early conflicts, especially between Batin Sembilan 
and the PT Asialog, were also reported, e.g. when staff of the company logged 
fruit trees belonging to the Batin Sembilan.46
Rescaling of the governance of forests and land 61
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the Law No. 05/1979 on Village Govern-
ance imposed the Javanese village administration and jurisdictional system and 
established villages (desa), hamlets (dusun), and neighborhoods (rukun tetangga) 
as new scales of regulation (Hein et al., 2016). For instance, the foundation of 
Bungku village and the establishment of new jurisdictional boundaries between 
the villages were superimposed on the scales of regulation established by line-
ages of the Batin Sembilan, and ignored the previous separation of the different 
lineages living along the rivers of the Bulian River watershed (Batin Bulian) 
and those living along the rivers of the Bahar and Lalang River watersheds 
(Batin Bahar) (Hidayat, 2012: 28).
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the allocation of large-scale oil palm con-
cessions and the development of the state-sponsored transmigration resettle-
ment scheme induced the most disruptive transformation processes, which have 
some similarities with what Karl Marx (1887) has described as primitive accu-
mulation. The vast logging concession still provided the possibility for com-
mercial large-scale resource extraction to coexist with the livelihood patterns 
of the Batin Sembilan. In the 1980s, a number of transmigration settlements 
were established in the north of today’s Harapan Rainforest project. Through 
the transmigration program, land was allocated to Javanese farmers acting as 
out-growers for the state-owned oil palm plantation company PT Perkebu-
nan Nusantara VI (PTPNVI). Only very few Batin Sembilan were able to par-
ticipate in the program and many of them had difficulties earning a living in 
the settlements and moved back to their traditional settlements.47 In 1986, the 
establishment of the 20,000 ha oil palm estate of PT Bangun Desa Utama (PT 
BDU), today named PT Asiatic Persada, led to the displacement and disposses-
sion of many Batin Sembilan and to a still-unresolved violent land conflict (c.f. 
Steinebach, 2013b; Beckert et al., 2014). The new transmigration settlements 
and the plantation estates led to the fragmentation of the customary land of the 
Batin Sembilan and especially of the territory claimed by the village elites of 
Tanjung Lebar. Today, Tanjung Lebar has no contiguous village territory; its five 
hamlets are scattered and located within and north of the Harapan Rainforest.
Settlement policies for Batin Sembilan groups, such as the program for 
“underdeveloped villages” (Impress Desa Tertinggal), provided no land, or only 
very limited land, for agriculture. The provision of settlements without land 
and the eviction of the Batin Sembilan from their customary land that they 
previously used for swiddens and forest gardens freed up their labor for the 
demands of the rising plantation sector. Thus, the companies that contributed 
to the displacement of Batin Sembilan employed many of those that lost access 
to their forest gardens and swiddens. Others moved south into the forests that 
later became the Harapan Rainforest, or engaged in hidden resistance strategies 
such as stealing and selling the fruits of the corporate oil palm plantations.
Following the regime change in 1998, political turmoil, decentralization and 
democratization induced the most recent and conflictive rescaling processes that 
have been ongoing in the region (Hein et al., 2016). District heads (Bupati), vil-
lage heads (Kepala Desa) and customary leaders took advantage of the political 
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vacuum, interpreting the reforms to their advantage and asserting far-reaching 
administrative authority over forests (Barr et al., 2006: 2; Hein et al., 2016: 384). 
Within the areas in and around today’s Harapan Rainforest, Batin Sembilan 
increasingly started to accentuate their social identity as an indigenous group. 
Hidayat (2012: 3) argues that the active reconstruction of the ethnic identity 
of the Batin Sembilan should be considered as a process of resistance against 
the neglect of their rights to land and natural resources, which was especially 
prevalent under the New Order regime. Furthermore, customary leaders of the 
Batin Sembilan began using their agency to reestablish their former custom-
ary land as a relevant scale of meaning and regulation. Batin Sembilan elites 
started to collaborate with peasant organizations such as SPI and adopted the 
land-use practices of mainly Javanese migrants (e.g. oil palm cultivation). They 
began allocating the forests of the 67,000 ha PT Asialog concession (abandoned 
since 2003; Figure 3.1C) to arriving migrants (Hein et al., 2016) and started to 
openly resist the oil palm company PT Asiatic Persada that had displaced them 
at the end of the 1980s.
Interethnic marriages between Batin Sembilan and migrants gained impor-
tance as strategic alliances (Hein et al., 2016: 384; Steinebach 2013b: 74). They 
enhanced the social status of the indigenous Batin Sembilan and provided 
migrants with access to land, timber and non-timber forest products within the 
state forest. The assigning of land to migrants can be considered a socio-spatial 
resistance strategy of the Batin Sembilan elite to regain authority over state 
forest land, which they lost during the New Order period, and to reestablish 
their customary land claims within the state forest (Hein et al., 2016: 384–385). 
Leaders of the formal village governments – in most cases, Batin Sembilan 
or individuals with strong kin-ties to Batin Sembilan – legitimated the land 
transactions by allocating forest conversion permits and village-scale land titles 
(ibid.). In 2010, the MoF challenged land allocation by village and customary 
authorities and turned the abandoned logging concession of PT Asialog into 
a conservation concession, ignoring the existence of settlements and farmland 
and assigning the area to the conservation company PT REKI (Figure 3.1C, D) 
(ibid.). The land conflicts emerging in the context of the implementation of the 
conservation concessions are described in Chapter 5.
Historical and customary rights regime within and  
around today’s Harapan Rainforest
As described above, the Batin Sembilan lived mainly close to rivers in order 
to be near water, fish and transport. Different lineages and sub-lineages of the 
Batin Sembilan controlled the adjacent land and forests. The landscape’s water-
sheds can be regarded as scales of meaning (they contain spiritual meanings and 
are linked to a lineage’s specific myth of origin) and as scales of regulation (each 
lineage has authority over land within its territory). The first (extended) fam-
ily to convert forest and establish a swidden in a specific area generally owned 
the land.48 Other families needed permits to establish swiddens in that area, 
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and land rights continued after the forest had regrown. Batin Sembilan in the 
hamlet of Kunangan Jaya 1 (part of Bungku village) explain that only members 
of their lineage are allowed to live in their neighborhood (RT, rukun tetangga) 
and to convert forest along the upper Kandang River (a tributary of the Bahar 
River).49 Specific trees, watercourses, hills and other landmarks demarcated the 
borders of land that was held by various extended families and lineages.50
As mentioned above, details of the traditional leadership structure are contra-
dictory, making it difficult to assess the role of traditional Batin Sembilan public 
authorities in terms of land governance, and especially their role in granting 
access permits to non-lineage members and other outsiders. A key informant 
explained that when outsiders stopped using land for more than six months, 
their rights to the land reverted to the Temenggung.51 The suggestion that the 
Temenggung had authority over land issues is confirmed by a study conducted 
by the Forest Peoples Program (FPP). Marcus Colchester and colleagues (2011: 
10) state that the Temenggung “[. . .] had overall authority over adat territories”. 
Interviewed Batin Sembilan elders generally agreed that outsiders – migrants 
– needed permits from Batin Sembilan leaders to convert forests.52 This is also 
confirmed by colonial sources. Tideman (1938: 78) explains that migrants had 
to pay rent to Batin Sembilan groups to access land rights. In cases of border 
disputes or violations, such as the destruction of another family’s fruit tree, 
compensations were negotiated for any losses.53
As population density was very low in pre-colonial and colonial times, land 
was abundantly available. At that time, tree property (fruit trees and sialang 
trees54 with beehives) might have been more relevant than land rights. Sialang 
tress with beehives, for example, were owned by specific families and only fam-
ily members had the right to harvest honey.55 Fruit trees were usually owned 
by the families that planted or took care of them. Batin Sembilan planted trees 
such as durian, langsat and rubber on abandoned swiddens. Old fruit trees in 
the remaining forest patches of the Harapan Rainforest provide evidence of the 
historical presence of Batin Sembilan groups. Present-day rubber and fruit tree 
agroforestry can also be considered as relicts of Batin Sembilan forest gardens 
that existed before the deep transformation processes that began with the New 
Order.
As described above, Dutch jurisdictional reforms for the Netherlands East 
Indies changed pre-colonial scales of meaning and regulation (e.g. watershed 
scale) and lineage-based access and property relations. A Batin Sembilan elder 
in the Harapan landscape explained, “We were colonized by the Dutch. The 
Dutch formed a new government and we received a pasirah [. . .] replacing the 
authorities based on adat”.56 In Bungku, the head of a Batin Sembilan family 
explained that to convert forest, a permit was required from a pasirah.57
In the late 1980s, the Batin Sembilan’s customary regulations in the landscapes 
around today’s Harapan Rainforest project became less important; today, the 
land claims of different Batin Sembilan families, sub-groups and lineages appear 
to be contested: their leaders and other public authorities interpret the bor-
ders between lineages and extended families in various ways. A Batin Sembilan 
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elder in Tanjung Lebar argued, for instance, that all Batin Sembilan families in 
Tanjung Lebar, Bungku and Markanding (located west of Tanjung Lebar) have 
the same ancestors but do not share the same territory.58 He explained that the 
territory of the Batin Sembilan groups of Tanjung Lebar is located between the 
mouth of the Sungai Kandang River and the Mandiangin village water divide, 
which is located west of the Harapan Rainforest in the neighboring district of 
Sarolangun.59 A member of the Tanjung Lebar village government argued that 
the old border between the Markanding and Tanjung Lebar groups was located 
in the area of Kunangan Bawah, which is now part of the village of Bungku, 
and claimed that the whole PT Asialog concession had been part of their ter-
ritory.60 A Batin Sembilan elder in Bungku challenged these oral records and 
maintained that his family’s territory was located between Sungai Kandang and 
Bahar: it was neither part of the land controlled by the Batin groups from Mar-
kanding nor Tanjung Lebar.61 Descendants of the former Batin Sembilan leader, 
Depati Jentikan, claimed that their ancestor controlled the forests around the 
main hamlet of Bungku, reaching across watersheds to Air Hitam in the district 
of Sarolangun.62 Members of the 113 group of Bungku, a local resistance group 
formed by the Batin Sembilan and Javanese migrants that occupies parts of the 
oil palm concession of PT Asiatic Persada (for more details on the conflict with 
the 113 group consider Chapter 5; Steinebach, 2013b; Beckert et al., 2014), 
argue that Bungku is located in the border area between two lineages (Batin 
Bulian and Batin Bahar).
The New Order politics of dispossession transformed the Batin Sembilan 
from landowners to landless peasants, illegal settlers, squatters and day laborers. 
The rescaling of forest and land governance facilitated resource exploitation 
by corporate actors but significantly reduced Batin Sembilan groups’ abilities 
to access land and property. Only a few Batin Sembilan families, especially the 
elites and those who had adopted commercial farming, were able to benefit 
from the extra leeway provided by the rescaling processes of the Reformasi era. 
Spontaneous in-migration and the transmigration scheme further altered the 
landscape’s demographic structure. Today, Batin Sembilan groups are minorities 
in Bungku and Tanjung Lebar. According to PT REKI data, only 10 percent 
of the population in the informal settlement of Transwakarsa Mandiri (part of 
Bungku) belong to local ethnic groups (REKI, 2011a). A survey conducted by 
the Forest Agency of the Batang Hari district (2012) in the informal settlement 
of Bukit Sinjal (part of Tanjung Lebar) shows a similar situation.
Landscapes around Berbak National Park: in-migration,  
drainage and logging
The Berbak landscape was sparsely populated until the beginning of the 20th 
century (Sevin and Benoît, 1993: 95). A few small Malay settlements existed 
on the river banks of the lower Batang Hari River (Claridge, 1994: 290; Hein 
et al., 2018a; Sevin and Benoît, 1993: 97). The coastal part of the region was 
home for Orang Laut tribes which were mainly involved in trading, fishing and 
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piracy (Andaya, 2008: 182; Locher-Scholten, 2004: 58). The Malay villages in 
the delta consisted only of a few houses, and interaction between the villages 
was limited (Sevin and Benoît, 1993: 97). However, in contrast to the Batin 
people of Jambi’s hinterland, the Malay settlements were under the full author-
ity of the Sultanate (Locher-Scholten, 2004: 48).
The influence of the colonial administration was relatively strong. A first colo-
nial trade and military post dating back to the 17th century (Tidemann, 1938: 
337) was located on the banks of the Batang Hari River. The Batang Hari delta 
west of the Berbak National Park was a target location for the colonial resettle-
ment project Kolonosatie, a precursor of the transmigration program of the post- 
colonial government that started in 1905 (Sevin and Benoît, 1993: 104). As in 
the area of today’s Harapan Rainforest, the Dutch divided the landscape into 
Margas led by a Pasirah (ibid. 97). The area of today’s Air Hitam Laut was part 
of the Marga Berbak, Seponjen was part of the Marga Kompoe-Hilir and Kam-
pung Laut of the Marga Djeboes (Tidemann, 1938: 251). In 1935, Dutch colo-
nial authorities established the Berbak Wildreservaat as a precursor of the Berbak 
National Park (Claridge, 1994: 288). The protected area covered 190,000 ha of 
peat swamp and mangrove forests (Balai Taman Nasional Berbak, 2013).
In the 20th century, Sumatra’s east coast became a popular destination for 
Banjar from East Kalimantan and for Bugis from South Sulawesi (Benoit and 
Sevin, 1993: 257; Galudra et al., 2014: 719, 722). Banjar people were experi-
enced hydraulic engineers. In their homelands in East Kalimantan, they con-
verted and drained peat-swamp forest for crop production (Galudra et al., 2014: 
722). In Jambi, they mainly settled in the northern parts of the province close 
to the border with the province of Riau. Bugi immigration intensified during 
a period of political violence in South Sulawesi in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
Bugis adopted the drainage techniques of the Banjar, engaged with local politi-
cal authorities to access land and started peat-swamp conversion and settlement 
projects along the coast and in the Batang Hari delta (Claridge, 1994: 290; 
Sevin and Benoît, 1993: 102). More profound changes of landscape and socio-
spatial organization started in 1960 and intensified during the New Order era. 
Transmigrants and the continuing influx of spontaneous migrants from Java 
and South Sulawesi induced rapid population growth in the Batang Hari delta 
(Claridge, 1994: 292). The village of Air Hitam Laut located on the margins of 
the Berbak Carbon Initiative, for instance, was founded by Bugi seafarers63 from 
the Luwu district in South Sulawesi in 1965.64
The villages of Kampung Laut and Seponjen (located on the western border 
of the Berbak Carbon Initiative, Figure 3.2) remained relatively stable until 
the 1990s. The Malay lived mainly from fishing, the gathering of non-timber 
forest products (especially tapping of Dyera costulata, syn. D. laxiflora and gather-
ing of rattan), rubber and fruit tree cultivation. The settlements and the fruit 
tree and rubber gardens were located on the higher alluvial deposits; the lower 
marshes were covered by peat-swamp forests. Small marsh areas were used for 
wet rice cultivation. In 1985, the MoF released large state forest areas on both 
sides of the Batang Hari River and of the Kumpeh River (which is a river 
Figure 3.2  Different thematic maps of the Berbak Carbon Initiative and its surroundings
(Source: adapted and based on Hein et al., 2018)
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arm of the Batang Hari), permitting the expansion of agricultural production 
(Badan Inventarisasi dan Tata Guna Hutan, 1985). Yet the exact borders of the 
reclassified area remained unclear and a 1993 MoF map indicates that at least 
parts of the released land were again reclassified as state forest (Figure 3.2A, B) 
despite the ongoing activities of the local population (e.g. logging and gather-
ing of rattan). The forests east of the villages were designated as a forest reserve 
(TAHURA Sekitar Tanjung) (Badan Inventarisasi dan Tata Guna Hutan, 1993). 
A few years later, in 1997 (Figure 3.2B), the Hutan Suaka Alam (former Wil-
dreservaat) became the Berbak National Park, but the size of the protected area 
was reduced by almost 30,000–162,700 ha (Balai Taman Nasional Berbak, 
2013).
In Seponjen, significant village expansion and peat swamp conversion started 
in the 1990s. In 1992, Pak Hadji Pattimura,65 a Jambi-based business man 
born in the village of Seponjen, received a forest conversion permit from the 
district government of Batang Hari (Izin dari Kabupaten Batang Hari Nomor: 
593.3/5567/pem.tgl 22 desember 1992). In the following years, a number of 
organized forest conversion, drainage and settlement projects were conducted 
in the lower and flood-prone peat swamps, some of them overlapped with the 
borders of the forest reserve TAHURA Sekitar Tanjung. The largest forest con-
version initiative started in 1997 and provided land for Bugi migrants. Today, 
the settlement is one of three hamlets of Seponjen. The hamlet is colloquially 
called Dusun Bugis. In Kampung Laut village expansion started in the 2000s.
The 1990s and the early 2000s saw an unprecedented logging boom in the 
Batang Hari delta and in the forests that later became part of the Berbak Car-
bon Initiative. After the fall of Suharto, in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s, 
villagers in Kampung Laut and Seponjen were able to receive IPKRs (small-
scale logging permits) issued by the Bupati of the district of Muaro Jambi.66 
Villagers in Seponjen received small-scale logging permits and formed logging 
groups that consisted of up to ten individuals.67 Logging occurred outside and 
within the state forest. In both villages, logging was a very significant income 
source, which attracted migrants and led to the establishment of sawmills. In 
2005, three years after the enactment of Regulation 34/2002 that prohibited 
logging permits issued by district authorities, large anti-logging raids by the for-
est police stopped most commercial logging activities in the villages.68
Since the Hutan Suaka Alam Berbak became a Ramsar Site in 1991 and 
a national park in 1997, the region has been a target area for a number of 
conservation initiatives aiming to develop an integrated spatial planning con-
cept for the different land-use categories and jurisdictions of the region (Lubis 
and Suryadiputra, 2004: 111–115). The first larger initiative was the Integrated 
Swamps Development Project (ISDP) running from 1997 to 2000. ISDP was 
funded by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and implemented, among 
others, by Wetland International, the Provincial Government of Jambi and the 
MoF. The main output of the project was a management plan for the Ber-
bak National Park and its surroundings. The plan recommended to not extend 
the logging concessions south of the national park and to designate areas for 
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community forest concessions (ibid. 113). The follow-up project, the GEF Ber-
bak-Sembilang Project (2000–2004), was again an attempt to develop a more 
integrated spatial plan (ibid. 114). In parallel, the first initiative explicitly linking 
conservation and especially peat-land conservation with climate change miti-
gation started in the early 2000s (ibid. 115). The three projects had components 
that involved local communities. In Kampung Laut, key informants mentioned 
that they received support for planting trees on idle village land outside of the 
state forest.69
In any case, the various attempts to establish a larger protected area as a new 
scale of regulation to protect the different ecosystems have been challenged by 
many actors. The province of Jambi is developing an international seaport and 
industrial zone in the Batang Hari delta region, only a few kilometers north of 
Berbak National Park. The MoF has ignored the recommendations of the ISDP 
project, extended the logging concessions, and failed to ensure that communi-
ties receive community forest concessions. State agencies such as the Transmi-
gration Agency of the District of Muaro Jambi have even supported further 
peat swamp conversion by developing transmigration settlements within the 
forest reserve TAHURA Sekitar Tanjung, challenging the authority of the Pro-
vincial Forest Agency and of the MoF (see Chapter 5).
Conflicts between local communities and companies running plantation 
estates or between local communities and central state authorities were not as 
common and violent in the villages around the Berbak Carbon Initiative as in 
the villages around the Harapan Rainforest. A potential explanation is that most 
of the land claimed as village land in Air Hitam Laut, Seponjen and Kampung 
Laut does not overlap with the state forest territory, implying that the district 
government has authority over the land. Generally speaking, the district gov-
ernments in the region seemed to accept traditional village lands. In addition, 
the MoF reclassified large forest tracts to non-forest land in the late 1980s in 
the surroundings of the villages. This has reduced the potential for conflicts. Vil-
lage governments had been directly involved in negotiations with companies 
and were in some cases even actively searching for investors.70 Only recently, 
conflicts occurred but they were not associated with displacements or dispos-
session; they were rather caused by controversies about the interpretation of 
benefit sharing and contract farming agreements between oil palm plantation 
companies and local communities.
Historical and customary rights regime within and around  
today’s Berbak Carbon Initiative
In pre-colonial and colonial times, agriculture was of minor importance in the 
Berbak landscape (Guillaud, 1994: 177; Sevin and Benoît, 1993: 96). Fishing and 
extracting timber and non-timber forest products were much more important 
activities. Key informants in Seponjen claimed that the village has a commu-
nity forest and fruit tree gardens, the exploitation of which dated back to their 
ancestors.71 Community members did not need a permit from a customary 
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leader to convert the community forest. Land was abundant and since agri-
culture was not important, access did not need to be regulated for community 
members.72
Things changed in late 1960s. The Pasirah of the Marga Berbak facilitated 
the creation of the Air Hitam Laut village by permitting Buginese migrants 
to drain and convert peat-swamp forest around the mouth of the Air Hitam 
Laut River. Until the end of the 1990s, Malay families were allowed to convert 
forest according to their needs, with decisions about forest conversion made at 
the household scale.73 Starting in the late 1990s, the government of Seponjen 
village for example restricted individual forest conversions. Decision making 
about converting the community forest was rescaled, producing a village-scale 
of regulation. In the following years, the communities undertook more organ-
ized, cooperative initiatives to drain and convert peat swamps. In Kampung 
Laut and Seponjen, the village governments required that farming groups be 
formed to convert the communities’ traditionally owned peat-swamp forest.74 
The formation of farming groups and regulations restricting individual forest 
conversion permitted Malay elites to consolidate their control of village land 
and timber resources. Moreover, the draining and conversion efforts were only 
possible with the collective labor of a farming group.
Malay village communities in Seponjen and Kampung Laut, and Bugis in 
Air Hitam Laut, have managed to keep control of most of their village territory. 
The village communities of Kampung Laut and Air Hitam Laut still possess 
larger tracts of fallow land and secondary forests. They have allocated parts of 
their land to companies, thereby further strengthening the village-scale of land 
tenure regulation. However, as in the landscape around the Harapan Rainforest, 
the ethnic structure has changed: Javanese, Sundanese and Bugis now outnum-
ber the Malay population in Seponjen and Kampung Laut.
De facto land tenure and the “making” of  
new property in the state forest territory
Agricultural expansion and highly complex local land tenure regimes are an 
important challenge to conservation and REDD+ projects in Jambi. The res-
caling of forest and land governance in the context of the decentralization pro-
cesses of the Reformasi era provided additional agency and the opportunity for 
local actors to expand their authority over forest and land tenure. Consequently, 
de facto access and property relations in and around the Harapan Rainforest 
and the Berbak Carbon Initiative differ substantially from de jure land and for-
est rights. Large parts of Jambi show similarities with what Peluso (1992) has 
described as “forests without trees”. Peasants and indigenous communities use 
large parts of state forest territory, including land located within REDD+ and 
conservation projects, and have transformed forests to swiddens, rubber and oil 
palm plantations without having de jure rights.
Local public authorities have established a village scale of regulation to 
legitimize land claims based on an informed choice of regulatory elements of 
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Indonesian property law, and have started to issue village-level land titles. Actor 
coalitions involving customary leaders, village governments and district agents 
have reinterpreted, copied and transplanted the transmigration program and 
elements of Indonesian property relations to the sub-national scale in order to 
legitimize forest conversion, land allocation and land transactions within the 
state forest, including areas that became REDD+ projects after 2008. The vari-
ous examples outlined in the following show how rescaling has broadened the 
opportunities for local actors to access land and property. They show that differ-
ent state apparatuses might act in contradictory ways and not directly reflect the 
will of dominant groups at the national scale. By using language and symbols of 
the central state, such as sporadik and transwakarsa, and by referring to elements 
of the central state’s legal system, actors gain power and legitimacy (Lund, 2006: 
687). Local public authorities, e.g. village governments, follow the policies and 
regulations that specifically support their interests. The different informal settle-
ment projects in the state forest indicate that specific rules or modes of regula-
tion (Etzold et al., 2009: 8) are negotiated between the political elites (village 
leaders and customary authorities).
The examples illustrate how the power constellations have changed: local 
public authorities have been able to develop invisible, hidden and visible power. 
The active reformulation of the “development” and “progress” narratives of the 
Suharto area has provided new meanings and legitimacy for agricultural expan-
sion and settlement formation, indicating invisible power. Successful occupations 
of the state forest, like those by the SPI peasant movement, show that the MoF 
and central state have lost power – thus providing opportunities for alternative 
developments. In this sense, village-scale land titling and the various village-scale 
settlements that violate forest law can be seen as active scalar resistance against 
the central state’s land allocation policies, especially those of the MoF.
Land-allocation policies (e.g. towards conservation, oil palm companies and 
REDD+ project developers) and forest law are considered unjust – particularly 
in Bungku – and are actively challenged by local actors, as this former village 
head states: “My house is located within the state land. The state officials say that 
is state forest, my house is state forest. That means that myself, as a village leader, 
I am living within the state forest. There is no non-forest land (APL) available 
[. . .]. We cannot get a land certificate for the state forest. We live in this country 
but we cannot get land rights [. . .]. According to the Forest Law 1999/41, we 
should be punished. This is unfair [. . .] Many people have been living within 
the Asialog concession since the 1960s. Now the area [Harapan Rainforest] is 
designated for being the lungs of the world and for forest restoration [. . .]. There 
is no place for the rights of the people there. The communities are threatened by 
the application of the forest law. There is no social justice, no partnership [. . .]”.75
Illustrating de facto access and property relations:  
migrants and access to land
Rural migration makes access and property relations visible. Rural migrants 
are a very heterogeneous group and they have used many different strategies to 
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access land. Some just migrated a few miles from a neighboring village while 
others came from areas as far away as South Sulawesi in Indonesia’s “Far East”. 
The term migrant is a rather blurred category in a dynamic rural frontier land-
scape. Especially in the landscapes of today’s Harapan Rainforest, where semi-
nomadic groups dominated until the 1970s, many families are migrants, to some 
extent. Most migrants who arrived were landless and managed to gain access to 
land with the support of family members and by engaging with the indigenous 
population and local public authorities. Furthermore, the common and ongo-
ing process of rural migration in dynamic, tropical frontier landscapes is a major 
challenge for conservation initiatives seeking to conserve a landscape’s status 
quo (Carr, 2009: 356; Hein and Faust, 2010: 12; Zelli et al., 2014: 29).
The remaining forest within the Harapan Rainforest and the peat swamps 
of coastal Jambi around the Berbak Carbon Initiative are important destina-
tions for frontier migrants. As in other frontier regions (Li, 2005: 136; 2002: 
429), migrants had to engage with the indigenous population and local public 
authorities in order to convert forest and access land (Figure 3.3).
A Javanese migrant who came to Bungku in the 1970s explained: “I directly 
started to work together with the Orang Kubu76 in the forest. We were looking 
for jernang,77 rattan, timber and other forest products. I worked for 12 years with 
them in the forest and in 1975 I married my woman who is from here and we 
stayed in the village [. . .]. After, the forest products were getting scarcer [. . .] 
I started farming in 1995”.78 Local customary regulations require all migrants 
to obtain permits from a local authority (a village head or customary leader), 
or at least from a member of the community. A former community leader in 
Bungku said, “Newcomers should first contact the village head or the ketua adat 
to ask for permission to clear forests”.79 A former community leader in Tanjung 
Lebar confirmed: “Forest conversion had to be reported to the village head or 
at least to an elder [. . .]. Migrants cannot just convert forest; the forests had been 
already used by our ancestors”.80 A migrant from Kerinci (located in the Bukit 
Barisan mountain range of western Jambi) said that he asked the Batin Sembi-
lan before establishing his plots inside the borders of today’s Harapan Rainfor-
est project.81 Various local authorities complained that recently many migrants 
and outsiders had been converting forests without permits. A customary leader 












Figure 3.3  Migrants accessing land in the villages
(Source: Hein, 2013b: 17)
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have a permit from us – from the Batin Sembilan – but those that have financial 
resources convert 20 to 50 hectares of land without asking us”.82
To access land in the villages around Harapan Rainforest, migrants usually 
had to compensate the land’s previous user for his losses instead of buying the 
land outright, a transaction which was not considered to be a purchase: “The 
selling of land is actually not allowed, but migrants can obtain land through 
compensation payments”.83 In the past, cigarettes, rice and other in-kind ben-
efits were sufficient to access land and to get a permit to clear forests from a 
Batin Sembilan elder or village head.84 In most cases today, cash payments have 
to be made that are substantially larger than the earlier IDR 200,000 per ha – 
and can go up to IDR 70 million85 per ha for land planted with harvestable oil 
palms.86 In recent years, migrants and locals have started to abandon the concept 
of compensation, and now describe the transactions as “purchases”. A migrant 
from Kerinci who was farming inside a forest reserve stated: “I bought the land 
and converted the land and planted oil palms [. . .] I have paid IDR 4 million 
per hectare”.87 A Batin Sembilan woman said that she had sold land: “We sold 
3 hectares to family members living in Jambi city because we had to cover the 
costs of a medical treatment”.88 Some migrants reported that they did not have 
to pay for the land but they did have to pay for the public infrastructure in the 
settlements, as well as for land measurement services and land titling.
Among the villages around the Berbak Carbon Initiative, it was only in Kam-
pung Laut that the concept of compensation was known. According to other 
informants, land trade was even supported by the village government of Kam-
pung Laut. In line with narratives used by the central state in Jakarta to legiti-
mize the transmigration program, the village government officials argued that 
migrants promote village development.89 There, land commodification seems 
generally more advanced than in the Harapan Rainforest area. Key informants 
in Kampung Laut and Seponjen confirmed that many native Malay have sold 
their land to migrants, companies, or outsiders.90
In both regions, selling land to migrants accelerated processes that trans-
formed large parts of the local indigenous population from property owners 
who controlled vast forest areas to marginalized smallholders or even to land-
less peasants. Tania Murray Li (2002) discovered similar dynamics in Central 
Sulawesi. Within the Harapan Rainforest, the Batin Sembilan facilitated forest 
conversion and land access for migrants, but as a PT REKI survey (2011a) 
shows, only a minority of the Batin Sembilan has been able to maintain their 
land and only the elites have benefited from land trade.
The reasons for selling land are hard to identify. One explanation might be 
that the owners lack economic resilience because they lack other assets and 
knowledge about how to act in a commodified, market-oriented environment. 
In some cases, land was sold to overcome shocks – the costs of medical treat-
ment or the children’s education, harvest failures or the destruction of a planta-
tion by forest fires. Another relevant point might be that land had always been 
abundant and the Malay and Batin Sembilan groups were not yet able to adapt 
to the new scarcity.
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Village-scale land-titling and the role of local public authorities
Evidence for the territorial claims of local public authorities in Jambi is pro-
vided by the fact that village governments issue and allocate village-scale land 
titles in particular to migrants. Although village-scale land titles have no clear 
legal basis, they are common all over Jambi and Indonesia (Kunz et al., 2016). 
Village-scale land titles are based on a place-specific interpretation of ele-
ments and fragments of state laws and regulations (ibid.). As explained, Gov-
ernmental Regulation 24/1997 is relevant in this context because it explicitly 
mentions the role of village governments in the land-titling process. It gives 
village heads the authority to issue specific documents required to transform 
customary land claims into a certificate of the National Land Agency (Badan 
Pertanahan Nasional). The regulation might thus provide legitimacy for local 
public authorities (e.g. village governments) to consolidate control over unti-
tled customary land. Moreover, the regulation provides legitimacy to facilitate 
land transactions and room for political and economic rent-seeking for village 
governments (c.f. Lund, 2008: 23).
Conceptually, village-scale land titles might be seen as the result of rescaling 
processes. The day-to-day interactions of smallholders and rural migrants seek-
ing to get land certified by village governments, and local banks’ acceptance of 
some village-scale land titles as collateral for small loans, consolidates the village 
scale of land tenure regulation. Moreover, I argue that the new village scale of 
regulation reflects the requirements of a specific mode of production: small-
holder oil palm cultivation. Village-scale land titles have facilitated the expan-
sion of smallholder oil palm plantings and contributed to the commodification 
of former lineage-based property.
Currently, at least seven different documents issued by the village authorities 
or by sub-district authorities are used in the different villages surrounding the 
Harapan Rainforest and Berbak Carbon Initiative (Table 3.4). The most com-
mon important one, sporadik (Figure 3.4), will be explained in detail.
According to Governmental Regulation 24/1997, sporadik is the National 
Land Agency’s application procedure for an individual land title. However, in 
the villages I studied and in other parts of Jambi, sporadik refers to a village-scale 
land title and at the same time to a document that can be used for the National 
Land Agency’s official sporadik titling procedure. Sporadik has different meanings 
at different scales: at the village scale, the document is a land title that provides 
security of tenure; at the national scale, the National Land Agency considers it 
to be one of many documents required when applying for a land title through 
the sporadik titling procedure (Figure 3.4).
The sporadik village-scale certification process is facilitated by the neigh-
borhood head (Ketua Rukun tetangga (RT)), who organizes the certification 
process and appoints a team that usually consists of landowners of adjacent 
plots and village elders; in some cases, the head of the hamlet, village secretary 
and customary leaders are also involved. The team approves the plot size and 
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the ownership rights, the village head issues the sporadik title. This certification 
procedure is quite similar in the various villages. The Bungku village govern-
ment, for instance, issues sporadik land titles also for plots in state forests and 
even for plots in the Harapan Rainforest (c.f. Mardiana, 2014: 42). In Seponjen, 
two types of sporadik titles are in use: titles issued by the village government and 
those jointly issued by the head of the sub-district (camat) of Kumpeh and the 
village government. Both types are considered to be equally strong, and both 
can be used as collateral for bank loans and the formal land-title application 
process.91 The titles issued jointly by the sub-district head and the village gov-
ernment might reflect Bugi migrants’ higher expectations of formalized land 
titling. As newcomers, Bugis do not belong to local kin networks that provide 
access to land and tenure security (c.f. von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-
Beckmann, 1999: 18). They are, therefore, interested in getting strong land titles. 
The document might also be traced back to the role of the pasirah in the 
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Figure 3.4  Village-scale land-titling in the villages and the changing meaning of sporadik 
across scales
(Source: compiled by the author)
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permits to Bugi migrants. The position of a Pasirah and the administrative unit 
of a marga were abolished through administrative reforms and replaced by the 
kecamatan (sub-district), in which the camat replaced the Pasirah. At least offi-
cially, the camat has no authority over land. However, as the sub-district’s highest 
public authority who supervises village heads and the Pasirah’s successor, his 
signature might help to increase the legitimacy of sporadik titles.
Counter territories and settlement schemes prior to  
the formation of the Harapan Rainforest project
As mentioned, during the period of political turmoil local public authori-
ties, mainly village and district governments, started to reclaim the state for-
est territory and organized forest conversion, settlement formation and village 
expansion. Before the start of the Harapan Rainforest project in 2010, at least 
four settlements were established within today’s project area (Figure 3.1C, D 
and Table 3.5). The settlements’ formation was facilitated by actor coalitions 
(Figure 3.5) involving Batin Sembilan elites, members of village governments, 
and migrants – most of whom were Javanese. The coalitions received sup-
port from local investors, members of district and sub-district governments, 
and peasant organizations such as SPI and STN (Serikat Tani Nasional) (c.f. 
Hein et al., 2016; Mardiana, 2014; Silalahi and Erwin, 2013). The formation 
of the settlements of Transwakarsa Mandiri (TSM) (Bungku), Camp Gunung 
(Bungku), Tanjung Mandiri (Tanjung Lebar), and Sungai Jerad/SPI settlements 
(Tanjung Lebar) led to the conversion of approximately 14,000 ha of forest in 
the Harapan Rainforest by 2013 (REKI, 2013). Especially in Bungku, settle-
ment formation has been further legitimized through the issuance of village-
scale land titles such as sporadik and SKTT.
The actor coalitions actively reproduced the New Order’s development 
narratives to justify forest conversion and settlement formation in the state 
forest. Key informants emphasized that the settlements were intended to pro-
vide land for landless migrants and agricultural extension services for poor 
Batin Sembilan families to help them to overcome “backwardness” and achieve 
“development”.92 The settlement projects mostly provided peasants with land. 
Regulations developed by Batin Sembilan elites, village governments, and Java-
nese migrants limit the maximum amount of land per household and stipulate 
that direct replanting must occur after forest conversion.93
The regulations incorporate elements of formal state law, such as the Basic 
Agrarian Law (maximum amount of land) and the Forest Law (prohibition of 
oil palm cultivation in state forests), and customary regulations (replanting after 
forest conversion). The institutionalization of the settlements (establishing com-
plex rules) and legal mimicry (c.f. Kunz et al., 2016) (using state language and 
elements of formal state law) further legitimized the settlements. Moreover, the 
settlements indicate different forms of scale jumping, for instance, village and 
Batin Sembilan elites jumped down to the district or sub-district scale to obtain 
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jumped down to the village scale of regulation in order to access land and land 
titles, thus stabilizing the village scale of regulation.
Transwakarsa Mandiri/Kunangan Jaya I
As outlined in the conceptual framework of this book, national policies struc-
ture in situ access and property relations and provide them with legitimacy. The 
formation of the Transwakarsa Mandiri settlement in the hamlet of Kunangan 
Jaya I of Bungku village can be considered as mimicry of the national transmi-
gration program (c.f. Kunz et al., 2016). A mimicry of policies, legal procedures 
and narratives was used to legitimize and justify settlement formation and forest 
conversion (Hein et al., 2016; Kunz et al., 2016). The settlement name, Tran-
swakarsa Mandiri (TSM), directly refers to the earlier central-state Swakarsa 
program, a sub-program of the transmigration program. The New Order era 
Swakarsa program provided subsidies to relocate landless migrants from Java, 
Madura and Bali, as well as land titles from the National Land Agency (Fearn-
side, 1997: 555). However, the TSM settlement in Bungku has no official con-





















Figure 3.5  Schematic representation of settlement formation in the former PT Asialog con-
cession (now the Harapan Rainforest)
(Source: compiled by the author)
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The TSM settlement was founded in 2004 by a Batin Sembilan leader living 
in Muaro Bulian, the district capital, a Javanese teacher named Pak Kumis94 and 
a former Bungku village head. The latter had married into a Batin Sembilan 
family and claims to represent formal village and customary authority. First, the 
three leaders requested a permit from the PT Asialog logging company, which 
was refused, as the company argued that such matters were the MoF’s purview. 
However, the three leaders never received a formal permit from the MoF, or 
from the forest agency of the district of Batang Hari, or from a transmigra-
tion authority.95 Nevertheless, Pak Kumis claimed: “[. . .] We received a permit 
from the district head to plant rubber”.96 While it is impossible to verify his 
claim, it does appear likely that district officials supported the forest conversion 
and settlement formation since the Agricultural Agency and District Educa-
tion Agency later de facto legalized the settlement. The Agricultural Agency 
provided agricultural extension services, such as allocating fertilizer, soy and 
corn seeds for the settlers. Today, the operational support that the settlement’s 
elementary school receives from the District Education Agency further legiti-
mizes the settlement.97 The village government of Bungku issued village-scale 
land titles (sporadik and SKTT) to legalize individual land claims.
According to the settlers I met, the TSM settlement had three objectives 
which were perfectly in line with the objectives of the official transmigration 
program and with those of the program for underdeveloped villages. The set-
tlement provided land, welfare and employment for poor and landless peasants 
and aimed to support poor Batin Sembilan households. Pak Kumis said, “In 
2004, we requested land for a farming group to support 52 Batin Sembilan 
households, building houses for them, educating them”.98 The programs also 
aimed to sedentarize the Batin Sembilan and teach them “modern farming 
techniques” which would help them to achieve “development”.99 As in the 
formal transmigration program, migrants participating in the TSM program 
were supposed to act like model farmers, thereby convincing the “backward” 
Batin Sembilan to abandon shifting cultivation. However, few Batin Sembilan 
families were able to participate in the program.100
To access land, migrants had to pay a development or administrative fee 
of approximately IDR 700,000–1,000,000 per ha (equivalent to US$ 55 to 
US$ 80). Households were allowed to own a maximum of 5 ha of cropland. 
The development or administrative fee was intended to finance the settlement’s 
infrastructure, including roads, electricity supply, housing for Batin Sembilan, 
and an elementary school. The organizers of the TSM settlement used the term 
“development fee” to obscure the fact that land was actually being sold. Par-
ticipating settlers reported how Pak Kumis promised them that, as in many 
transmigration settlements, a plantation company would develop a smallholder 
scheme101 – but no plantation company ever started to operate there.
In 2007, the District Forest Agency and the forest police intervened. Pak 
Kumis was arrested for illegal logging and convicted by the Muaro Bulian dis-
trict court to a prison sentence of one year. In 2010, the PT REKI conser-
vation company received a conservation concession that overlapped the TSM 
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settlement. The community’s request to exclude the settlement from the state 
forest and from the conservation concession was refused by the Provincial Forest 
Service.102 A detailed description of the subsequent land conflict involving the 
settlers, forest service, and the Harapan Rainforest project is given in Chapter 5.
Camp Gunung/Kunangan Jaya II: land for  
second-generation transmigrants
Camp Gunung is the second forest conversion and organized settlement project 
initiated by the government of Bungku village and Batin Sembilan elites that 
challenges the integrity of the Harapan Rainforest project. Like the TSM set-
tlement, Camp Gunung predated the Harapan Rainforest project. PT AAS (PT 
Agronusa Alam Sejahtera) and PT REKI received their concessions in 2009 and 
2010, respectively, and with the support of the police began to campaign against 
the settlers – in a way reminiscent of the TSM case (more details in Chapter 5).
Camp Gunung is part of the hamlet of Kunangan Jaya II (part of Bungku vil-
lage), and is located in a border triangle in the state forest between PT REKI’s 
conservation concession (Harapan Rainforest) and the timber plantation con-
cessions of PT Wanakasita Nusantara and PT AAS. Formed between 2002 and 
2004, Camp Gunung can be traced back to the deceased Batin Sembilan leader, 
Pak Yamin Almarhum and to the former village head of Bungku.103 The village 
government permitted forest conversion within the former PT Asialog conces-
sion and supported the settlement’s formation financially.
A key informant explained that Pak Yamin Almarhum had a land conversion 
permit from the district government of Batang Hari.104 As in the TSM case, it 
is impossible to verify this claim, but in the early 2000s, district governments 
did indeed commonly issue forest conversion permits (c.f. Barr et al., 2006: 
2). Later, the settlement was legalized de facto through agricultural extension 
services provided by the Agricultural Agency of the District of Batang Hari, 
and also by the establishment of a school and a kindergarten financed by the 
Education Agency of the District of Batang Hari.105
From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, Bungku became an important des-
tination for second-generation, mostly Javanese, transmigrants from the Batang 
Hari Delta transmigration settlements of Nipah Panjang and Ranto Rasau in 
the district of Tanjung Jabung Timur.106 Pak Yamin Almarhum facilitated land 
transactions between migrants and Batin Sembilan families, and offered 5 ha 
parcels of land for IDR 750,000.107 As in the case of the TSM, the payment was 
considered to be a development and infrastructure fee, not payment for land.108 
The village government of Bungku and Pak Yamin Almarhum organized the 
construction of roads and bridges, as well as a school, mosque and rice mill.109
Tanjung Mandiri: migrants as model farmers and  
conflictive boundaries
Tanjung Mandiri is the largest settlement in the Harapan Rainforest. Forest 
conversion and settlement formation started there in 2003; activities intensified 
Rescaling of the governance of forests and land 81
in 2006 with the construction of houses and the establishment of the first plan-
tations.110 Today, the settlement is one of five official hamlets of Tanjung Lebar. 
Like Camp Gunung and the TSM settlement, Tanjung Mandiri grew out of 
agreements involving customary elites and local branches of the government, 
in this case the village government of Tanjung Lebar and the sub-district head 
(camat) of Sungai Bahar.
As in Bungku, the former village head of Tanjung Lebar, a Javanese migrant 
who had married into a Batin Sembilan family, claimed to represent both cus-
tomary and village authority. The Tanjung Mandiri settlement, and especially 
the way in which the Tanjung Lebar village elites framed and legitimized it, 
has a lot in common with the TSM settlement of Bungku. Key informants in 
Tanjung Mandiri framed the settlement project as a “win–win” situation for 
migrants and the Batin Sembilan. Village elites in Tanjung Lebar also reproduced 
the narratives used by the New Order regime to legitimize the transmigration 
program and argued that Batin Sembilan would benefit from the commercial 
farming techniques introduced by migrants.111 A key informant explained that 
Tanjung Mandiri “[. . .] is based on an agreement between SAD112 and migrants 
with the aim of developing the SAD that have not understood how to farm 
yet. The settlement project provided the opportunity to meet migrants with 
modern farming techniques so they can work together on the land that was 
already used by their ancestors”.113 Village and Batin Sembilan elites described 
Tanjung Mandiri as a settlement project jointly organized by Batin Sembilan 
and migrants. A settler explained: “[. . .] The settlement was organized by Pak 
Adin114 acting on behalf of the SAD. Without involvement of the SAD, we 
would not have dared to settle here because it is part of their land. He [Pak 
Adin] organized from the beginning that people settle here”.115
Land settlers had to pay a “measurement fee” to access land. As in Bungku, 
key informants stressed that the land as such was gratis. The measurement fee 
and settlers’ additional voluntary contributions were used for infrastructure 
development, especially to construct a school, village hall, mosque and church. 
The first settlers received 2 ha of cropland and 1 ha for a house, yard and garden. 
Settlers were not allowed to own more than 3 ha of land, and land had to be 
planted immediately after forest conversion.116
Today, the settlement has been de facto legalized by the Education Agency 
of the District of Muaro Jambi, which supports its school.117 In 2011, the head 
of the Muaro Jambi district strengthened the settlers’ position by celebrating 
the traditional rice harvest festival in Tanjung Mandiri and promising that the 
settlement would no longer be part of the Harapan Rainforest.118 However, a 
district head has no formal authority to reclassify state forest, and the area is 
officially not even part of the district of Muaro Jambi. According to MoF maps, 
the Harapan Rainforest concession is located in the village of Bungku in the 
district of Batang Hari and not in the district of Muaro Jambi. Nevertheless, 
the northeast of the Harapan Rainforest concession is part of customary land 
(wilayah adat) belonging to Batin Sembilan of Tanjung Lebar, which has been 
part of Muaro Jambi district since 1999. Consequently, most settlers identify as 
being from Tanjung Lebar – not from Bungku.119 Batin Sembilan from Bungku 
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and the village government of Bungku question the land claims of the Batin 
Sembilan of Tanjung Lebar. Batin Sembilan in Bungku accuse Batin Sembilan 
elites in Tanjung Lebar of selling land that traditionally belongs to groups from 
around Bungku.120
Agrarian reform through land occupation
The SPI settlement project is located south of the pre-colonial hamlet of 
Mangkubangan/Pangkalan Ranjau and can be considered as being part of the 
organization’s multi-scalar campaign for agrarian reform (see Chapter 5). The 
settlement is the most recently founded settlement, and the most contested 
settlement in the Harapan Rainforest concession (Hein and Faust, 2014; Hein 
et al., 2016). An SPI activist claimed that SPI members have been present in 
the area since the late 1990s.121 One of the first SPI members to live in the area 
was a teacher who had married into a Batin Sembilan family and who swapped 
a motorcycle for land from the Temenggung Seman who controlled the area 
around Sungai Jerad.122 Temenggung Seman and the teacher were also involved 
in initiating the SPI settlements. The formation of the SPI settlements started 
in 2007 after SPI’s flag was symbolically hoisted in the presence of the hamlet 
head of Mangkubangan/Pangkalan Ranjau. However, some members of the 
village government complained that SPI started the settlement project without 
having formally asked the village head.123
As in the other village-scale settlement projects, reference was made to the 
transmigration program. The head of an SPI basis argued: “During the Suharto 
era we had the transmigration program paid by the government: trillions had 
been paid by the government for transmigration. Today it’s different [. . .]. Today 
farmers like us, we have the problem that we do not have an official permit 
from the government”.124 In 2013, the area claimed by the SPI in encompasses 
more than 2500 ha of PT REKI’s concession and has as many as 18 smaller 
settlements, each inhabited by up to 40 households. Recent numbers claim that 
SPI occupies 17,000 ha (Jambipos Online, 2017).
The settlements have a complex institutional structure established by SPI, 
which has divided its territory into blocks of land of 50 to 60 ha, with each 
block used by approximately ten households. Not all blocks had been con-
verted during field research in 2013. Four to five blocks form a “basis”, the 
lowest level of political organization in the SPI. Each basis is led by an elected 
head (ketua basis) and has 2 ha of collective land that is planted with rubber. 
To access land, smallholders must have a residence permit issued by the vil-
lage government of Tanjung Lebar, belong to SPI, be landless, and pay an IDR 
300,000 (equivalent to US$ 25) “measurement fee” for each hectare.125 Land 
access is facilitated by the SPI leader of the Bahar region (Mardiana, 2014: 36). 
Part of the measurement fee goes to Batin Sembilan elites (ibid. 51). SPI lead-
ers claim that they only accept poor and non-commercial farmers, which is 
hard to verify. A local SPI leader stated: “The poor farmers living in this neigh-
borhood (RT) [. . .] came to survive. They have nothing outside, 99 percent of 
Rescaling of the governance of forests and land 83
the farmers living here are really poor, they don’t have another place of living 
[. . .] We don’t have capitalist farmers living here [. . .] Those are the people 
I know, maybe there are others”.126
SPI permits each household a maximum of 6 ha of land; for larger house-
holds, up to 10 ha are permitted.127 SPI leaders stated that a basic rule for all set-
tlements is the three “T” (tebang, tanam, tumbuh) rule: forest conversion, planting 
and growing.128 Around 2010, after PT REKI got the conservation concession, 
SPI leaders imposed a ban on oil palm cultivation in the settlements. The oil 
palm ban indicates that SPI leaders are willing to obey the Forest Law (cultivat-
ing oil palms is prohibited in the state forest) and the conservation regulations 
of PT REKI, and to act in line with the global anti-bio fuel and food sover-
eignty campaigns of La Via Campesina.129 According to SPI leaders, settlers who 
violate the oil palm ban are expelled from the organization; settlers who had 
already planted oil palms are supposed to replace them with rubber.
Initially, the SPI settlement also aimed to provide benefits for Batin Sem-
bilan families. Mardiana (2014: 51) found that Batin Sembilan elites had not 
fairly allocated the payments received from the SPI to other Batin Sembilan. 
Most Batin Sembilan families had not benefited from the land transactions. 
In July 2013, a Batin Sembilan leader living outside the SPI area said that his 
groups would like to cooperate with SPI to better understand modern farming 
techniques.130 At the same time, he criticized the rapid expansion and forest 
destruction caused by SPI members.131
Village-scale peat-swamp conversion and settlement 
schemes in the surroundings of the Berbak  
Carbon Initiative
Village-scale peat-swamp conversion and settlement projects in the surround-
ings of the Berbak Carbon Initiative have mainly been developed outside of the 
state forest, that is, outside areas protected in the Berbak Carbon Initiative. How-
ever, some initiatives to convert peat-swamp forests extended into the border 
of the Berbak National Park.132 In addition, according to conservationists from 
the ZSL, the conversion of drained peat swamps adjacent to the Berbak Carbon 
Initiative also affects the hydrological balance of the swamps within the project 
area and increases the risk of peat fires. In contrast to the settlement projects in 
the Harapan landscape, the area used for agriculture within the Berbak Carbon 
Initiative is rather small, with only a few households living permanently within 
the protected areas. The sole exception is the district-to-district transmigration 
settlement in the forest reserve Sekitar Tanjung, established by the Transmigra-
tion Agency of Muaro Jambi. In 2008, a district-to-district transmigration set-
tlement for Javanese families was established in Kampung Laut – in the Sekitar 
Tanjung forest reserve and the Berbak Carbon Initiative. The formation of the 
transmigration settlement in Kampung Laut started in late 2008, with the dis-
trict government selecting a location that was part of the Forest Reserve Seki-
tar Tanjung and the Berbak Carbon Initiative (Figure 3.2C, D). This was thus 
84 Rescaling of the governance of forests and land
an ineligible site for a transmigration settlement according to Forest Law, and 
consequentöy the MoF and Provincial Forest Agency attempted to stop the 
settlement’s formation.133 Chpater 5 contains a detailed description of this land 
conflict that involved different state apparatuses and settlers.
Most of the peasants I met in Seponjen, Kampung Laut and Air Hitam Laut 
said they accept the prohibition on planting crops in the state forest territory, 
and most village governments considered new forest conversion that violated 
the borders of the Berbak Carbon Initiative to be illegal. A key informant in 
Kampung Laut said that the village government refused to issue the docu-
ments necessary for an identification card for a household that had settled in 
Berbak National Park.134 Nevertheless, especially in Kampung Laut, villagers 
questioned why the forest reserve remains protected: “[. . .] the forest reserve is 
for protection, but what do they want to protect? There is no timber anymore 
and animals cannot live there anymore”.135
It may be that the state forest border is so broadly accepted because after 
1985 the release of large areas from the state forest provided enough land for 
smallholders’ agricultural needs. A second explanation could be that converting 
peat-swamp forest requires large investments that especially Bugi elites were 
only willing to make if the land’s status guaranteed safe returns. A third explana-
tion might be that enhanced law enforcement against illegal logging was initi-
ated by the former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), preventing the 
conversion of logged-over forest into agriculture plots. A fourth factor could 
be that agriculture was traditionally of minor importance for Malay groups 
in the area; its relevance having only grown very recently. In the past, logging 
and gathering non-timber forest products were much more important. These 
activities continue – also within the Berbak Carbon Initiative.136
I have identified two different types of organized, collective village-scale for-
est conversion and settlement initiatives in the villages adjacent to the Berbak 
Carbon Initiative that I studied (Table 3.6). The first is directly associated with 
the immigration of Bugis from South Sulawesi, and the second is driven by 
local Malay groups and Javanese migrants.
Bugi colonization around Berbak National Park
In the 1950s, Bugi immigration grew; in the 1960s, the immigrants started to 
drain and found settlements in the Berbak landscape (Claridge, 1994: 290; Sevin 
and Benoît, 1993: 102). The village of Air Hitam Laut dates back to a Buginese 
drainage and settlement initiative. In the 1970s, the Pasirah of the Marga of Ber-
bak gave the Bugi the right to drain and convert the peat-swamp forest around 
the mouth of the Air Hitam River. A key informant in the village explained: 
“The Bugi leader Pak Janggut137 obtained the right to drain and convert land 
from the pasirah. Part of the converted land was used to pay the pasirah after-
wards”.138 Pak Janggut, initiator and head of the project was appointed the 
“head of the river” (Kepala Sungai), and sub-divided land received from the 
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divided by drainage canals. The canal heads were responsible for facilitating 
the drainage and conversion of the peat swamp in their plots. They also looked 
for Bugi migrants interested in land and let them convert the forest areas in 
their plots. A former kepala parit in Air Hitam Laut explained that for each 2 
ha converted by the migrants he received 0.25 ha, part of which he paid to the 
river head and the Pasirah.139 In total, 24 main drainage canals were planned 
along the Air Hitam Laut coastline, partly overlapping the Berbak Wildreservaat 
(Hutan Suaka Alam). Only ten of these have been realized.140 Drainage activities 
were stopped by the Governor of Jambi141 but drainage canals still impact the 
hydrological balance of the Berbak Carbon Initiative, increase the risk of peat 
fires, and facilitate access for loggers and for actors gathering non-timber forest 
products such as jelutung.142
Many Bugi settlements and forest conversion projects in the Berbak land-
scape had land tenure arrangements based on various nested authorities, each 
equipped with a specific scale of regulation. In Seponjen, the hamlet of Sungai 
Lais, founded in 1997, is characterized by a similar arrangement. Pak Hadji 
Pattimura, a Malay business man from Seponjen, held a land conversion permit 
from the land agency of the district of Batang Hari (Dinas Pertanahan Kabupaten 
Batang Hari). With the Bugi leader Pak Selang and the village government, 
he organized a peat-swamp conversion and settlement project for second- 
generation Bugi migrants and local Malay households. The leaders received 
land for investing in the project.143 As in the Harapan landscape, elders stated 
that the settlement would contribute to village development and provide land 
for poor households.144 Pak Selang acted as river head (Kepala Sungai) and allo-
cated land to 10 canal heads,145 each of whom was authorized to regulate his 
own parcel of land. The land was converted by migrants – who again were 
mainly Bugis. Each migrant received half of the land that had been converted; 
the other half was divided between the canal and river heads, and Pak H. Pat-
timura. The land managed by the second and third canal heads was designated 
for local Malay households. Participating Malay households received all the land 
they had converted.146 Many of them later sold it to Bugi or Javanese migrants. 
The hamlet of Sungai Lais was established approximately two to three kilom-
eters from the borders of today’s Berbak Carbon Initiative.
Farming groups for collective forest conversion
In the late 1990s, agriculture became more relevant in Seponjen and Sunga 
Aur. In addition, immigration of Javanese and Bugis increased. In order to meet 
rising demand for agricultural land, Malay elites started to convert the forests 
within the boundaries of their customary village land, called tanah adat.
Although this area overlaps the Berbak Carbon Initiative, only a few plots 
are located in the project area today. However, initially peat-swamp conver-
sion also took place in areas that later became part of the project area. Forest 
conversion was regulated and controlled by the local Malay elite. Community 
members who sought land first had to join a farming group. Such groups, each 
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consisting of 20 to 60 farmers, were led by local Malay elites (the customary 
head, ketua adat) and were supported by the village governments – especially by 
the village heads. Each participant received approximately 2 ha of land. In the 
early 2000s, the farming groups in Seponjen legitimized their activities in the 
state forest territory by referring to community small-scale timber extraction 
permits from the district government.147 Farming groups reduced the cost of 
converting land for individuals and permitted the conversion and drainage of 
larger areas. In Seponjen, and from the early 2000s in Kampung Laut, migrants, 
too, were allowed to access land by joining farming groups. In the Ketapang 
hamlet (in Kampung Laut), migrants and locals worked together to drain and 
convert land. Migrants had to pay to participate in farming groups and received 
the more flood-prone plots.
Summary and preliminary conclusion
State transformation processes induced rescaling processes that altered the 
dialectical relationship between structure and agency and consequently 
changed the ability of actors to access land and property. I argue that four 
subsequent state transformation processes induced rescaling that has altered 
Indonesia’s forest and land tenure governance, namely: colonization, inde-
pendence, New Order and Reformasi. Each period was characterized by spe-
cific land and forest tenure regulations providing different opportunities for 
actors to access forest and agricultural land. Scaling back, in other words 
investigating past scalar arrangements, demonstrated that historically con-
tingent structural inequality is a persistent feature of land and forest tenure 
in Indonesia. Establishing the state forest territory can be considered as an 
attempt to strengthen territorial control and to promote and privatize the 
exploitation of forest resources and the expansion of agro-industrial estates, 
and recently even of protected areas. The Reformasi and the post-reformasi era 
provided additional agency for marginalized actors to construct alternative 
scales of meaning and regulation.
Three, at least partly contradictive, state projects of the post-colonial period 
influenced the scalar configuration and related access and property relations. 
First, the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) as the first attempt to establish a new 
national scale of natural resource governance promoted (probably not inten-
tionally) the commodifcation of land but, at the same time, imposed restrictions 
on large landholders and proposed land reform. Today, the BAL is relatively 
weak in legal terms but is still used – especially by peasant organizations such as 
SPI and KPA – to underpin political campaigns for a more equal distribution of 
agrarian resources (Bakker and Moniaga, 2010: 188; Hein and Faust, 2014: 25; 
Rachman, 2011: 54). Second, the Basic Forest Law has led to a reestablishment 
of the dualistic governance structure, fostering the dispossession of local and 
indigenous communities and seeking to construct private-sector-led economic 
growth as a new national scale of meaning. Third, the Village Law has further 
undermined traditional adat-based scales of meaning and regulation. Moreover, 
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the law has imposed new jurisdictional boundaries and created a standardized 
and homogenous administrative structure across the archipelago.
Land tenure in the landscapes around the two REDD+ projects is contested 
and this can be considered as one of the main causes for the conflicts that are 
described in Chapter 5. An important reason for the contestation of property 
rights are competing authorities. Overlapping and competing property rights 
(e.g. property rights legitimized by village governments versus those backed by 
the MoF) indicate conflicts between different state apparatuses and struggles 
over the constitution and the legitimacy of public authorities. Overlapping 
and contradictive land and forest tenure shows that what members of society 
consider to be legitimate property rights change over time and are subject to 
historically contingent and ongoing societal struggles over concepts and truth 
(Sikor and Lund, 2010: 6). National laws and regulations structure access and 
property relations. However, local public authorities strategically follow those 
laws that support their own interests, explicitly ignoring others. The construc-
tion of village scales of meaning and land tenure regulation can be considered 
as active scalar resistance strategies.
My investigation indicates that access and property relations are explicitly 
linked to specific scalar arrangements (Table 3.7). Pre-colonial scales of reg-
ulation relevant for access and property relations were based on watersheds 
controlled by specific lineages. In the Harapan landscape, the Depati and the 
Temmenggung were responsible for land tenure issues within specific watersheds, 
and kin relations regulated access to land and property. Rescaling induced by 
Dutch colonization changed the scalar structure and led to the establishment 
of a new authority (Pasirah) that was in charge of recognizing land claims for 
the local population, challenging kinship-based property relations. Indonesian 
independence and the formation of the Indonesian nation state have diversified 
access and property relations. Central state apparatuses constructed a national 
Table 3.7 De facto access and property relations in the REDD+ project regions
REDD+ project region Access and property relations
Harapan Rainforest Customary arrangements (customary authority and adat)
Property rights backed by village officials
Property rights backed by private actors (conditional land 
tenure/Harapan Rainforest)
National-scale regulation (including transmigration)
Berbak Carbon Initiative Parit system (Bugi colonization)
Property rights backed by village officials
Provincial-scale regulation (conditional land tenure/Berbak 
Carbon Initiative)
National-scale regulation (including transmigration)
(Source: author’s own investigations)
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scale of meaning and regulations based on national development and narratives 
about economic growth in order to allocate exploitation and cultivation rights 
to corporate actors. Corporate actors actively reproduced the national scale of 
meaning and regulation by requesting these rights from national-scale authori-
ties, such as the MoF. As a national scale of meaning and regulation, the state 
forest territory significantly reduced the abilities of peasants and indigenous 
groups to access land and property.
The socio-spatial configuration changed again after Suharto. Village gov-
ernments, local elites, and customary leaders constructed new village scales to 
regulate access to land and property. These new village scales have in turn been 
reproduced by peasant farmers and especially by rural migrants who request 
land and village-scale land titles. Village scales of regulation – property rights 
that are based on unwritten village-scale tenure regulations – most notably 
overlap with the Harapan Rainforest, challenging the project’s integrity and 
inducing land conflicts. Village governments, local elites, and customary leaders 
have not only legitimized individual land claims but – supported by district-
scale state apparatuses – have also formed larger-scale settlement projects that 
actively reproduce central state resettlement programs and development dis-
courses (e.g. transmigration). Local public authorities translate and reinterpret 
central state policies and regulations to underpin the legitimacy of their actions 
(legal mimicry) and combat historically contingent structural inequality.
To further unpack the various abilities of actors to access land and property, 
it might be helpful to engage more explicitly with power asymmetries. Politi-
cal ecologists argue that unequal power relations help to explain uneven access 
to natural resources, including land (Blaikie, 2012; Bohle and Fünfgeld, 2007; 
Bryant, 1998; Forsyth, 2008). I argue that the ability of different actors to access 
land and property is mediated by the three dimensions of power (visible, hid-
den and invisible) (Gaventa, 2006; Lukes, 2005), as outlined in my conceptual 
framework. The indigenous Batin Sembilan, rural migrants, elites, village gov-
ernments, and companies such as PT REKI are differently positioned with 
regard to the three power dimensions.
In general, peasant farmers – including indigenous groups in the study 
 villages – are poorly positioned with regard to the three dimensions of power. 
They hold fewer material resources than did corporate actors (e.g. less land), 
often have no land titles from BPN, and are excluded through institutional 
procedures and regulations (Forest Law 41/1999). Invisible power, or the social 
construction of meanings or indirect power (Gaventa, 1982: 15) and the inter-
nalization of subordination (ibid. 16), further marginalize peasant farmers and 
indigenous groups. The social construction of the backward shifting cultivator 
by the New Order regime also contributed to their marginalization.
After Suharto’s fall, village governments and Malay and Batin Sembilan 
elites were able to significantly expand their authority and establish new vil-
lage scales to regulate access and property (hidden power). Village govern-
ments gained power by using the symbols and language of the state. They 
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control land in alliance with Malay or Batin Sembilan elites and can allocate 
land, one of most important means of production in rural landscapes (visible 
power). Batin Sembilan elites in particular were able to significantly change 
the rules of the game by reintroducing customary regulations and making 
land claims based on social identity (hidden power). The Batin Sembilan elites’ 
ability to change the rules of the game to their benefit was facilitated by their 
position in the invisible dimension of power. The rise of global discourses on 
indigeneity and the emerging indigenous rights movement may have changed 
the social construction of indigeneity from being associated with “backward-
ness” to being associated with “rights”. It thus provided the opportunity to 
frame land and forest as indigenous territories or customary land (wilayah 
adat). Most migrants interviewed in both regions did not question the author-
ity or land claims of local and indigenous communities. Social identity has 
become a relevant source of power in both landscapes, to the benefit of Batin 
Sembilan and Malay elites.
On the one hand, migrants benefitted from alliances with Batin Sembilan 
elites because of Batin Sembilan land resources, while on the other hand, 
Batin Sembilan elites engaged with migrants in response to the social con-
struction of the backwardness of shifting cultivators fostered by the Suharto 
regime. Interethnic marriages helped the Batin Sembilan to benefit from 
migrants’ social capital. Moreover, the alliances provided significant benefits 
for both parties, especially a better positionality in regard to the visible and 
invisible dimensions of power. However, those Batin Sembilan that were 
not part of the elite of the indigenous group, obviously most of them, have 
been even further marginalized because they were neither able to claim 
and allocate land (visible power) nor to benefit from the altered notion of 
indigeneity.
The changed power balance of post-Suharto Indonesia – caused by shifting 
relationships between structure and agency – provided the opportunity for 
open peasant resistance (see Chapter 5). SPI members in the Harapan Rain-
forest significantly benefitted from their alliances with Batin Sembilan elites. 
The ability to allocate material resources (land) increased the organization’s 
attractiveness, and probably increased its organizational strength as well as its 
ability to occupy large parts of the Harapan Rainforest (Hein et al., 2016) 
(Figure 3.6).
The complex and conflictive access and property relations and tensions 
and contradictions between de jure and de facto land tenure described in this 
 chapter are the dynamic context for the implementation of REDD+ and other 
 market-based conservation instruments, such as conservation concessions discussed 
in the next chapter. These new conservation instruments challenge the different 
village-scale settlements located in the state forest territory and in areas that 
became REDD+ projects later on. Moreover, REDD+ has triggered the for-
mation of a new transnational scale of forest governance and has strengthened 
the role of private actors in forest, climate and environmental governance.
Rescaling of the governance of forests and land 91
Notes
 1 In other sources, the term Batin refers to the leader of semi-nomadic, non- 
Muslim forest dwellers and not to a specific ethnic group (Andaya, 1993: 14).
 2 Kubu is a derogatory term for many non-Muslim nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes 
used by the Malay population and colonial authorities on Sumatra.
 3 The pangeran ratu was chosen by nobles and was in charge of most government affairs 
(Locher-Scholten, 2004: 45).
 4 The domein verklaring is mentioned in article 1 of the Agrarisch Besluit of 1870. In the 
Basic Agrarian Law of 1960, the Dutch terms is translated as follows: General Declara-
tion that lands belong to the state.
 5 The “outer islands” refer to all Indonesian islands except Java, Bali and Madura, which 
are called the “inner islands”.
 6 Adat: According to David Henley and Jamie S. Davidson (2007: 1) the Indonesian term 
adat refers to custom or tradition, including notions of order and consensus. The term 
adat is often used for customary law and the term adat rights is often used to legitimize 
land claims based on customary law, in other words land claims not based on colonial or 
formal state law (ibid.)
 7 Despite the establishment of a Sumatran forest service with specific management ter-
ritories, state forest management in Sumatra remained unspecific and forests remained 
largely under the authority of local rulers (Barr, 2006: 19–20; Nurjaya, 2005: 46). After 
independence Jambi initially became part of a newly formed province of Central 
Figure 3.6  Picture of area used for shifting cultivation inside the Harapan Rainforest
(Source: taken by the author, 2013)
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Sumatra consisting of West Sumatra, Riau and Jambi (Dinas Komunikas dan Informatika 
Provinsi Jambi, 2013). In 1957, Jambi became an autonomous province.
 8 Interview with a staff member of the Sajogyo Institute, Bogor, 08.10.2013.
 9 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 22.07.2013 and interview with a staff 
member of Sajogyo Institute, Bogor, 08.10.2013.
 10 SK. HPH No. 408/Kpts/Um/9/1971 tanggal 23 September 1971 tentang Pemberian Hak 
Pengusahaan Hutan kepada PT. ASIALOG, Decision of the Ministry of Forestry to allo-
cate a logging concession to the company PT Asialog, own translation) (Menteri Kehu-
tanan, 1995)
 11 No detailed information available, according to a key informant in Tanjung Lebar the 
company received a logging concession in 1974, 27.07.2013.
 12 Neighborhood units were not mentioned in the Village Law, they were introduced in 
1983 through an additional decree from the Ministry of Home Affairs (Warren 1990: 3).
 13 Refers here to the customary land of indigenous communities.
 14 Interview with a key informant in Air Hitam Laut, 29.09.2102.
 15 Interview with a key informant in Air Hitam Laut, 30.09.2012 and a key informant in 
Kampung Laut, 30.08.2013. Land allocation by village heads is officially not backed by 
village law but in practice many village heads are involved in issuing different types of 
land-use permits.
 16 Reformasi refers to the democratization period after President Suharto announced his 
resignation on 21 May 1998.
 17 During 1976–1989, 10 percent of the transmigration budget was covered by the World 
Bank (Fearnside, 1997: 6).
 18 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 25.07.2013.
 19 Interviews with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 29.08.2013 and with a staff member 
of Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi Jambi, 27.08.2013.
 20 The reforestation fund (Dana Reboisasi) is a volume-based fee charge on harvested tim-
ber to support reforestation of logged-over forest (Resosudarmo et al., 2006: 62).
 21 Interview with a staff member of the Ministry of Forestry, Jakarta, 23.07.2012.
 22 According to Governmental Regulation 56/1960, Article 1 the maximum land size 
permitted per individual depends on the population density and on the type of land 
(land for wet rice cultivation and dry land). Twenty ha of dry land are permitted in areas 
with a low population density, in areas with very high population densities, only 6 ha are 
permitted.
 23 Interview with the Working Group on Forest and Land Tenure, Bogor, 08.10.2013 and 
with a staff member of Burung Indonesia, Bogor, 11.10.2013.
 24 Interview with activists of the NGO PINSE, Sungai Gelam (Jambi) 05.09.2013 and 
with a staff member of Burung Indonesia, Bogor, 11.10.2013.
 25 Interview with a staff member of the NGO Amphal, Jambi, 17.07.2013.
 26 Interview with a GIZ advisor, Jakarta, 24.07.2012, with a Greenpeace Indonesia activist, 
Jakarta, 27.07.2012, and a Forest Watch activist, Bogor, 20.07.2012.
 27 Interview with Forest Watch activists, Bogor, 20.07.2012.
 28 Interview with an AMAN activist, Jakarta, 27.07.2012.
 29 Interview with an AMAN activist, Jakarta, 27.07.2012.
 30 Interview with a BPN officer, Jambi, 06.09.2013.
 31 Also confirmed in an interview with a BPN officer, Jambi, 06.09.2013.
 32 Interview with key informants, Seponjen, 15.09.2013 and 13.09.2013
 33 Cited laws and regulations: Makamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, 2012; Menteri 
Kehutanan; 2007; 2008a; 2011; 2014; Ministry of Forestry, 2008; Presiden Republik 
Indonesia, 1960a; 1960b; 1990; 1997; 1999.
 34 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 25.07.2014.
 35 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 25.07.2013.
 36 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 37 The most recent figure is from 2005.
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 38 The village of Markanding is part of the sub-district of Sungai Bahar, it is located 
approximately 10 km north-east of Bungku.
 39 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 26.07.2013.
 40 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 12.09.2012.
 41 According to Hidayat (2012: 20–27) there are at least two other versions of a myth of 
origin of the Batin Sembilan, the second argues that the Batin Sembilan descend from 
a leader from Palembang (South Sumatra), and the third consists of elements of the first 
and the second myths.
 42 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 12.09.2012.
 43 The position of the Temenggung existed among the Orang Rimba of the Dua Belas 
landscape (Steinebach, 2013a: 49–50), the extent to which the position of the Temeng-
gung was known among the Batin Sembilan in colonial and pre-colonial times is at 
least debatable, argues Steinebach (forthcoming). Probably, the Batin Sembilan only very 
recently started to call their leaders Temenggung.
 44 Interview with a key informant, Bungku, 21.09.2012.
 45 Interview with a key informant, Bungku, 12.09.2012.
 46 Interview with key informants, Bungku, 12.09.2012 and Tanjung Lebar, 21.07.2013.
 47 Interviews with key informants, Tanjung Lebar, 25.07.2013, Tanjung Lebar, 25.07.2013.
 48 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 26.07.2013.
 49 Interviews with key informants in Bungku, 12.09.2012 and 09.07.2013 and in Tanjung 
Lebar, 23.07.2013.
 50 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 51 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 23.07.2013.
 52 Interview with key informants in Tanjung Lebar, 26.07.2013 and 27.07.2013 and in 
Bungku, 08.09.2012.
 53 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 54 Koompassia excels, a specific tree species that is often used by wild bees for beehives.
 55 Interview with key informants in Bungku, 12.09.2012 and 21.09.2012.
 56 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 12.09.2012.
 57 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 30.07.2013.
 58 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 26.07.2013.
 59 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 26.07.2013.
 60 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 25.07.2013.
 61 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 24.08.2013.
 62 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 08.09.2012.
 63 Bugi migrants have conducted larger-scale land drainage across Sumatra’s east coast. 
According to Hanson and Koesoebione (1979, cited in Claridge, 1994: 292) Bugis con-
verted as much forest as the government led-initiatives in the period from 1969–1973.
 64 Interview with a key informant in Air Hitam Laut, 28.09.2012.
 65 Fictitious name.
 66 Interviews with key informants in Kampung Laut, 28.08.2013 and 01.09.2013.
 67 Interview with key informants in Seponjen, 10.09.2013 and 12.09.2013.
 68 Interview with a key informant in Seponjen, 12.09.2013.
 69 Interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 31.08.2013.
 70 Interview with key informants in Kampung Laut, 30.08.2013 and Seponjen, 13.09.2013.
 71 Interview with a key informant in Seponjen, 11.09.2012.
 72 Interview with a key informant in Seponjen, 13.09.2013.
 73 Interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 30.08.2013.
 74 Interviews with key informants in Kampung Laut, 30.08.2013, 31.08.2013 and 
01.09.2013 and in Seponjen, 08.09.2013, 09.09.2013 and 13.09.2013.
 75 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 08.09.2012.
 76 “Orang Kubu” refers here to the Batin Sembilan.
 77 Daemonorops.
 78 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 16.09.2012.
94 Rescaling of the governance of forests and land
 79 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 08.09.2012.
 80 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 81 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 82 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 26.07.2013.
 83 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 08.09.2012.
 84 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 10.09.2012.
 85 The land prices are difficult to compare and were paid in different years with differ-
ent US$-IDR exchange rates. The exchange rate during the last ten years fluctuated 
between 8455 IDR (2011) and 14120 IDR (2015) for 1 US$.
 86 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 10.09.2012.
 87 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 16.09.2012.
 88 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 12.09.2012.
 89 Interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 31.08.2013.
 90 Interviews with key informants in Kampung Laut, 01.09.2013, 02.09.2013 and in 
Seponjen, 10.09.2013 and 15.09.2013.
 91 Interview with a key informant in Seponjen, 08.09.2013.
 92 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 09.09.2012 and 10.07.2013.
 93 Interview with key informants in Bungku, 09.07.2013 and in Tanjung Lebar, 21.07.2013 
and 27.07.2013.
 94 Fictitious name.
 95 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 10.07.2013.
 96 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 09.09.2012.
 97 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 10.07.2013.
 98 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 10.07.2013.
 99 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 24.08.2013.
 100 Interview with key informants in Bungku, 10.07.2013 and 23.08.2013.
 101 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 23.08.2013.
 102 Interview with a staff member of Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi Jambi, 19.09.2012.
 103 Interview with key informants in Bungku, 14.09.2012 and 09.07.2013.
 104 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, conducted by Stefanie Steinebach.
 105 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 09.07.2013.
 106 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 11.09.2012.
 107 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 11.09.2012, 14.09.2012 and 09.07.2013.
 108 Interview with key informants in Bungku, 11.09.2012.
 109 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 11.09.2012, 14.09.2012 and 09.07.2013.
 110 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 111 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 112 SAD, refers to Suku Anak Dalam, a post-colonial and deprecatory term for indigenous 
communities, in this case the interviewee refers to the Batin Sembilan.
 113 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 114 Fictitious name.
 115 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 116 Interviews with key informants in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 117 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 118 Interview with key informants in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 119 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 26.07.2013.
 120 Interview with key informants in Bungku, 12.09.2012 and 24.08.2013.
 121 Interview with an SPI activist in Jambi, 12.07.2013.
 122 Interview with an SPI activist in Jambi, 12.07.2013.
 123 Interview with key informants in Tanjung Lebar, 25.07.2013 and 27.07.2013.
 124 Interview with key informants in Tanjung Lebar, 22.07.2013.
 125 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 21.07.2013.
 126 Interview with a key informant, in Tanjung Lebar, 21.07.2013.
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 127 Interview with key informants in Tanjung Lebar, 22.07.2013.
 128 Interviews with key informants in Tanjung Lebar, 21.07.2013 and 22.07.2013.
 129 Interviews with key informants in Tanjung Lebar, 21.07.2013 and 22.07.2013.
 130 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 23.07.2013.
 131 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 23.07.2013.
 132 The village of Sungai Cemara is not part of the village sample, it is located south of 
Air Hitam Laut on the coast of the South China Sea. It is very remote and difficult to 
access.
 133 Interview with key informants in Kampung Laut, 29.08.2013 and with a staff member 
of Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi Jambi, Jambi, 27.08.2013.
 134 Interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 02.09.2013.
 135 Interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 29.08.2013.
 136 Interviews with key informants in Air Hitam Laut, 29.09.2012, in Kampung Laut, 
30.08.2013, 01.09.2013 and 02.09.2013 and in Seponjen, 12.09.2013.
 137 Fictitious name.
 138 Interview with a key informant in Air Hitam Laut, 29.09.2012.
 139 Interview with key informants in Air Hitam Laut, 29.09.2012.
 140 Interview with a key informant in Air Hitam Laut, 29.09.2012.
 141 Interview with a key informant in Air Hitam Laut, 29.09.2012.
 142 Interview with a staff member of Dinas Kehutanan Jambi, Jambi 19.08.2013.
 143 Interview with a key informant in Seponjen, 11.09.2013.
 144 Interviews with key informants in Seponjen, 11.09.2013 and 15.09.2013.
 145 Interview with a key informant in Seponjen, 10.09.2013.
 146 Interviews with key informants in Seponjen, 09.09.2013 and 15.09.2013.
 147 Interview with a key informant in Seponjen, 10.09.2013.
4  REDD+, privatization and 
transnationalization of 
conservation in Indonesia
Private companies and donor governments from the Global North consider  forest 
conservation in the South a cost-efficient option to mitigate climate change. 
Environmental organizations and public conservation agencies in the South are 
mainly looking for new options to finance tropical forest conservation. The Indo-
nesian government has initiated a number of governance reforms and established 
REDD+ pilot provinces in order to be “ready” for foreign investments in carbon 
conservation. I argue that REDD+ has induced rescaling processes, leading to the 
emergence of a transnational scale of regulation of forest and land tenure govern-
ance. The trading of forest carbon and the allocation of financial contributions 
from bilateral, multilateral and private donors to governments and forest owners 
and users requires homogenous rules for land tenure and for the involvement 
of local communities. Moreover, REDD+ produces a global scale of meaning 
for local forest conservation efforts since it links place-based forests to the global 
problem of climate change. It provides entry points for conservationists but also 
for transnational resistance against offsetting approaches and for climate justice 
campaigns (Hein et al., 2016).
REDD+ has not only rescaled, it has also transnationalized forest and land 
tenure governance. The mechanism has strengthened the role of private actors 
in forest conservation. Private actors have gained influence and authority 
through implementing conservation projects, and formulating socio-ecological 
and accounting standards for REDD+ pilot projects and forest carbon offsets. 
In addition, new forms of hybrid governance (e.g. Pattberg and Stripple, 2008) 
have emerged where conservation NGOs, private forest carbon standards and 
companies cooperate in developing rules for and implementing forest conser-
vation initiatives. After years of lobbying and conservationist campaigns led by 
the Birdlife member Burung Indonesia, since 2008 private actors in Indonesia 
can apply for conservation concessions within state forest territory.
REDD+ governance and attempts to  
commodify forest carbon
The growing importance of market-based approaches (such as REDD+) and 
private actors in conservation can be traced back to the late 1980s and early 
1990s. At that time international environmental and development organizations 
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(such as the World Bank) and environmental NGOs increasingly started to argue 
that environmental problems, such as climate change and forest and ecosystem 
loss, were caused either by policy failures (Hein, 2013b; McAfee, 1999, 2012a, 
2012b) or by a failure to economically account for externalities (Corbera et al., 
2009; Hein, 2013b; McAfee, 2012b). To cope with the prevalent environmental 
crisis in ways compatible with capitalist development, nature or specific eco-
system services should be internalized into the economic and financial system 
(McAfee, 2012b: 26). The idea of conserving and commodifying forest carbon 
to mitigate climate change came up in the late 1980s when the first private 
companies and NGOs, mainly from the United States, started to engage in for-
est conservation to offset their emissions voluntarily, thereby creating a market 
for forest carbon credits (Hein, 2014: 508; Hein and Garrelts, 2014: 320; Hein 
et al., 2015: 2; Neeff et al., 2009: 8). Forest conservation as a potential threat 
to economic growth has been transformed to a new profit option through 
the invention of REDD+, carbon trade and payment for ecosystem service 
schemes (McAfee, 2012b; McGregor, 2010).
The Kyoto Protocol (KP), agreed on in 1997, introduced the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) as the first formal 
emission trading systems permitting the trading of emission rights (Hein, 2014; 
Hein et al., 2015). The CDM and the JI allow companies to offset their emis-
sions, for instance through investing in reforestation and afforestation projects 
(ibid). Forest conservation and reducing emissions from deforestation were not 
covered by the KP because of critique raised by the EU and some NGOs 
regarding the permanence and additionality of climate mitigation based on 
terrestrial carbon and forest conservation (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006: 64; 
Hein et al., 2015: 2).
In 2005, due to strong lobbying by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea, the 
issue of deforestation re-entered the UNFCCC negotiations (Hein et al., 2015: 2). 
Reintroducing forest conservation into the UNFCCC negotiations helped to 
find a way out of the dead-end of the Kyoto Protocol (Corbera and Schroeder, 
2017: 1). Many countries supported REDD+ because forest conservation was 
perceived as a very cost-efficient option to mitigate climate change (Stern, 2007). 
Despite all the criticisms, risks and challenges, REDD+ is still perceived as having 
lower opportunity costs than phasing-out fossil fuel emissions (Angelsen et al., 
2014; Houghton et al., 2015). The idea of REDD+ aligns the interests of differ-
ent actors in a perfect way, creating momentum for an influential discourse coali-
tion involving those interested in forest conservation (e.g. the big environmental 
NGOs such as Conservation International and The Nature Conservancy) and 
those interested in developing carbon markets and options to offset greenhouse 
gas emissions (e.g. companies such as BP and Intel) (Hein et al., 2015: 2).
Fragmented REDD+ governance
The first official decision of the UNFCCC regarding REDD+ was made dur-
ing the 13th conference of the parties (COP 13) on the island of Bali, Indo-
nesia. The so-called Bali Roadmap includes a decision (Decision 2/CP.13) on 
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“Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches 
to stimulate action” (UNFCCC, 2007). The decision encourages developing 
countries to “[. . .] undertake efforts, including demonstration activities, to 
address the drivers of deforestation relevant to their national circumstances, 
with a view to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
and thus enhancing forest carbon stocks due to sustainable management of 
forests [. . .]” (UNFCCC, 2007). REDD+ gained further political traction after 
COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico. The Cancun Agreements invite developing coun-
tries to formulate national REDD+ strategies and developed countries to sup-
port these actions (UNFCCC, 2010). Moreover, the parties agreed on a set of 
socio-ecological safeguards for implementing forest conservation initiatives.
In 2013, the parties agreed on the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ at COP 
19 in Warsaw. The framework consists of seven UNFCCC decisions. They 
include rules for establishing forest reference levels, monitoring and verifica-
tion, and criteria for the disbursement of result-based payments (Horstmann 
and Hein, 2017: 60). The Paris Agreement signed in 2015 refers to forests in 
article 5. But the agreement does not include additional rules on how to pro-
ceed with REDD+ implementation and finance. However, REDD+ plays a 
prominent role in the National Determined Contributions (NDCs), which are 
the national climate strategies under the Paris Agreement (Bhan et al., 2017; 
Corbera and Schroeder, 2017; Hein et al., 2018b). Most of the countries with 
tropical rainforest cover, including Indonesia, plan to implement REDD+ 
policies.
In contrast to the CDM or the Green Climate Fund, which are governed 
by central management bodies, the governance of REDD+ can be considered 
highly fragmented (Zelli et al., 2014). REDD+ governance consists of a num-
ber of decisions by the UNFCCC and of a diverse set of actors. The UNFCCC 
decisions provide a relatively broad and legally non-binding political frame-
work (Horstmann and Hein, 2017). The diverse set of actors that implement 
and finance REDD+ pilot projects and larger country-wide REDD+ pro-
jects have mostly developed their own rules and financing mechanisms, only 
guided by the decisions of the UNFCCC. Private actors such as the Climate 
Change, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) and Verified Carbon 
Standard (VCS) have developed socio-ecological safeguards and accounting 
standards that facilitate the trade of carbon credits produced through protect-
ing forests (CCBA, 2018; VCS, 2015). In this context a whole new set of actors 
has emerged such as forest carbon consultants, experts measuring and counting 
the carbon content of biomass, and conservation companies setting up pro-
profit REDD+ projects or using carbon markets to finance existing conserva-
tion initiatives. Some of these private REDD+ projects produce carbon credits 
which can be traded on voluntary carbon markets. Large multilaterals such 
as the World Bank have established new funding mechanisms like the Forest 
Carbon Partnership and the Bio Carbon Fund. These are intended to finance 
forest conservation and support national forest governance reforms to prepare 
countries for result-based payments and carbon markets. Germany and Norway, 
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for instance, have established their own schemes to finance forest conserva-
tion in the Global South. Currently, the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO) is considering including REDD+ in its offsetting scheme. This 
is supported by large environmental NGOs, among others by Conservation 
International, The Nature Conservancy and the Environmental Defense Fund 
(Conservation International et al., 2016). The so-called CORSIA (Carbon Off-
setting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation) scheme will also 
have its own rules and governing bodies (ICAO, 2016).
In a nutshell, REDD+ governance is fragmented and transnationalized. It 
involves intergovernmental organizations, development banks, national govern-
ments and private actors. NGOs, companies and NGO-company hybrids such 
as the VCS and the Rainforest Alliance increasingly fulfill the traditional role 
of formal state institutions. They set up conservation rules, provide the regu-
latory framework for carbon markets, and are involved in rule enforcement 
(e.g. they conduct audits). Indeed, private actors can withdraw the certification 
and verification of forest carbon offsets, and – as in the case of the Harapan 
Rainforest – employ private security to enforce conservation regulations. Fur-
thermore, conservation companies cooperate with governmental institutions in 
setting up result-based payment initiatives (e.g. VCS cooperates with the Brazil-
ian state of Acre and with a public forest finance fund in Costa Rica (Fondo de 
Financiamiento Forestal) (Castillo, 2013; Duchelle et al., 2014). In the case of 
the Berbak Carbon Initiative, the cooperation agreements between the Zoo-
logical Society of London and the Provincial Government of Jambi explic-
itly mention that their project is consistent with VCS and CCBA rules (Dinas 
Kehutanan Provinsi Jambi, 2013). Thus the provincial government explicitly 
accepts the regulatory authority of private actors (Hein et al., 2018a: 16).
Contested commodification
REDD+ and forest carbon offsets can be considered as an attempt to assign a 
price to the ability of forests to store and sequester greenhouse gases (Corbera, 
2012). To transform the carbon sequestration services of forests to tradable 
commodities a number of conditions have to be fulfilled. First, clear property 
rights to ecosystem services (e.g. the ability of forests and trees to capture 
greenhouse gases) have to be assigned (privatization) (Castree, 2003: 279–282). 
Second, ecosystem services have to be exchangeable in order to trade them 
(alienability) (ibid. 279). Third, ecosystem services should be separated from 
their supporting context (individuation) (ibid. 280). Fourth, ecosystem services 
have to be homogenized (abstraction) in order to produce services which are 
exactly like any other service produced by a forest located elsewhere on the 
globe (ibid. 281). Fifth, prices have to be assigned (valuation). These rather 
theoretical steps practically involve several technical steps that are conducted 
by state agencies (e.g. MoF), carbon consulting companies and forest carbon 
standard organizations. The starting point is a projection of the amount of 
greenhouse gases sequestered by the forest ecosystem, including emissions 
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avoided by conserving the forest ecosystem. The amount of sequestered carbon 
and the emissions avoided by the project determine the amount of tradable 
emission permits (Hein and Garrelts, 2014: 320). Emission permits or carbon 
credits then allow the ability of a forest ecosystem to sequester greenhouse 
gases to be traded. It actually remains unclear whether the implementation 
of an international REDD+ scheme for financing forest conservation will 
require the full commodification of forest carbon. To this day, the commodifi-
cation of forest carbon remains contested – at the scale of UNFCCC negotia-
tions but, as the conflicts described in Chapter 5 illustrate, also at the village 
and project scale.
It is still unresolved whether forest conservation should be financed through 
an emission trading system, result-based aid or traditional aid modalities. The 
Warsaw Framework for REDD+ leaves the question on how to finance 
REDD+ relatively open, because countries were not able to agree on whether 
the mechanism should be eligible for offsetting or should be funded through 
carbon markets or non-market mechanisms and global funds. Consequently, the 
Warsaw Framework refers to “appropriate market-based approaches and non-
market-based approaches [. . .] to support the results-based actions by develop-
ing country Parties (UNFCCC, 2013)”. Many existing bilateral and multilateral 
REDD+ funding programs either support forest governance reforms, REDD+ 
and conservation pilot projects or they pay for achieved emission reductions 
(e.g. FCPF Carbon Fund). The German REDD+ Early Mover program pays, 
for instance, USD 5 per tCO2eq (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, 2017). In 
Indonesia, the Norwegian Forest and Climate Initiative first paid for govern-
ance reforms and later would also pay achieved emission reductions (Gov-
ernment of the Kingdom of Norway and Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia, 2010). The German International Climate Initiative (IKI), one of the 
donors of the Harapan Rainforest project, supports actors who manage pro-
tected areas. In the case of the Harapan Rainforest, IKI and Danida advertized 
their financial contribution by referring to the emission-reduction potential of 
the conservation project, but do not pay directly for quantified emission reduc-
tions (DANIDA, 2012a; Internationale Klimaschutzinitiative, 2015).
Even though only few public initiatives directly assign a price to forest car-
bon, and the market volume of the voluntary carbon markets remains low, 
REDD+ has changed the conservation logic (Corbera, 2012). The mechanism 
creates at least the theoretical opportunity to run pro-profit forest conservation 
initiatives. Even without fully commodifying forest carbon, REDD+ facilitates 
access to public and private donors for forest owners. Thus, it can foster argu-
ments such as “no pay no care” (Fisher, 2012), but it might also help chronically 
underfunded conservation authorities in developing countries to receive sup-
port from the Global North. A high-ranking official of Jambi’s Forest Service 
argued along these lines and stated, “We want funding for our four national 
parks. We want compensation for protecting our national parks from inter-
national donors. Our national parks are storing CO2; industrial countries are 
emitting CO
2
 (Hein et al., 2018a)”.
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“REDD+ safeguards” and the rights of local and  
indigenous communities
REDD+ safeguards seek to prevent and mitigate potential negative impacts of 
REDD+ activities. Safeguards are a set of minimal requirements for REDD+ 
activities. In addition to protecting communities from potential negative effects, 
the safeguards should provide security for investments in forest conservation 
by creating homogenous rules for community participation, benefit sharing 
and environmental integrity. Safeguards have been used by the World Bank 
and other multilateral development and environmental agencies for decades 
(Duchelle et al., 2017; Poudyal et al., 2016). Private actors, such as the Plan Vivo 
and CCBA, already developed safeguards for forest carbon offsets and REDD+ 
projects in the late 1990s and early 2000s to facilitate the transaction of forest 
carbon credits (CCBA, 2018; Plan Vivo, 2017).
Safeguards and rights-based language were avoided in early UNFCCC 
REDD+ negotiations (Jodoin, 2017: 54). However, this changed a few years 
later at COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico, where parties agreed on a list of social-
environmental safeguards. The so-called Cancun Safeguards reflect the ambition 
to ensure a balance between providing prescriptive rules, accepting national 
sovereignty and minimizing transaction costs (Jagger et al., 2012: 305). REDD+ 
activities should “be undertaken in accordance with national development pri-
orities, objectives and circumstances and capabilities and should respect sover-
eignty” (UNFCCC, 2010). Relevant safeguards referring to the rights of local 
and indigenous communities are listed in the following (UNFCCC, 2010). 
REDD+ activities should:
• “be undertaken in accordance with national development priorities, objec-
tives and circumstances and capabilities and should respect sovereignty” (1.e);
• “be consistent with the adaptation needs of the country” (1.h);
• show “respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and 
members of local communities, by taking into account relevant interna-
tional obligations, national circumstances and laws, and noting that the 
United Nations General Assembly has adopted the United Nations Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2.c);
• guarantee “the full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in 
particular indigenous peoples and local communities, in the actions referred 
to in paragraphs 70 and 72 of this decision”1 (2.e).
The Cancun Safeguards state that REDD+ interventions should “promote and 
support” the rights of indigenous communities and “full and effective” stake-
holder involvement. However, the formulation of the safeguards is relatively 
weak, e.g. the decision only “notes” that the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) has been adopted. The decision does not 
stipulate that any REDD+ intervention must follow the declaration and does 
not mention free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) explicitly.
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As an emerging principle in international law, FPIC dates back to Con-
vention 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO) from 1989, and 
was picked up by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992, 
by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, and 
by FAO in 2012. Today many different interpretations of FPIC exist and no 
general agreement on its meaning and its implications has yet been achieved 
(Sargent, 2015: 88–89). Generally speaking, communities that are affected by 
an intervention (e.g. REDD+) that endangers the survival of the commu-
nity are entitled to FPIC. Especially entitled are indigenous communities or 
communities that share common characteristics with indigenous communi-
ties (UN REDD, 2013: 11–12). In 2013, UN REDD published guidelines for 
the application of FPIC in the context of REDD+. The guidelines stipulate 
FPIC for any REDD+ intervention – especially in cases where indigenous 
populations have to be relocated, propose the mapping of rights before imple-
mentation, and recommend the formulation of national FPIC guidelines (UN 
REDD, 2013: 22–24). Conducting FPIC might be challenging at the local 
level and may raise the following questions: who is entitled to FPIC and who 
represents communities in negotiations with implementing agencies? (Hein 
and Garrelts, 2014: 327). However, it is important to add that the UN REDD 
guidelines on FPIC are voluntary and do not form part of any formal UNF-
CCC decision.
Three years after the UNFCCC agreed on the Cancun Safeguards the War-
saw Framework for REDD+ further strengthened the safeguards of the UNF-
CCC for REDD+ (Horstmann and Hein, 2017). Parties agreed to add that 
developing parties that seek to receive result-based payments “[. . .] should 
provide the most recent summary of information on how all of the safeguards 
referred to in decision 1/CP.16, appendix I, paragraph 2, have been addressed 
and respected before they can receive result-based payments” (UNFCCC, 
2013). Despite the progress in comparison to earlier UNFCCC agreements, 
many NGOs and climate justice organizations have criticized the Cancun Safe-
guards as being too weak, too general and for not having clarified the legal 
status of the safeguards as such (Lang, 2010; Spiller and Fuhr, 2010). However, 
the safeguards also reflect the relative success of recent indigenous activism in 
influencing UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+, in contrast to the negotia-
tions on the Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord where no references to 
indigenous rights were made (Ciplet, 2014; Jodoin, 2017). At the UNFCCC 
scale, the adoption of rights-based language by referring to UNDRIP can be 
considered as an important success for the indigenous rights movement (Ciplet, 
2014 and Jodoin, 2017). At the national and regional scale, indigenous rights 
organizations such as AMAN (Indonesia), AIDESEP (Peru) and COICAA 
(Amazon Basin) have gained increased attention and have mostly been success-
ful in lobbying for the inclusion of FPIC in national REDD+ safeguards and 
REDD+ strategies (Ciplet, 2014; Jodoin, 2017; Zelli et al., 2014). In Indonesia 
AMAN used the slogan “no rights no REDD+” to lobby for the recognition of 
territorial rights, while the organization also influenced the development of the 
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PRISAI (Prinsip, Kriteria, Indikator, Safeguard, Indonesia) REDD+ safeguards 
(UNREDD, 2012: 18).
Despite recent success, REDD+ is still a contested subject within indigenous 
communities and indigenous rights organizations. In Colombia, for example, 
the dispute between groups trying to critically engage and “improve” REDD+ 
and those rejecting the mechanism was openly discussed at a meeting of indig-
enous leaders of the Colombian Amazon in March 2017.2 Some participants 
completely refused attempts to commodify forest carbon, others argued in 
favor of direct financial benefits for indigenous communities, and a third group 
tried to use the forum to gain recognition. In contrast, peasant organizations 
such as the transnational La Via Campesina movement, the Indonesian Peasant 
Union (SPI), and the Agrarian Reform Movement (Alliansi Gerakan Reforma 
Agraria, AGRA) strictly oppose REDD+. Moreover, peasants have not been as 
successful in influencing the UNFCCC negotiations as indigenous groups. The 
UNFCCC safeguards do not provide much additional recognition for peasants 
nor do peasants benefit from the inclusion of UNDRIC. In addition, it is worth 
mentioning that especially in countries that were not impacted by European 
settler colonialism, such as Indonesia, the entire population can be to some 
extent be considered indigenous.
Private carbon standards and donor safeguards
Before and after the formulation of safeguards at the scale of UNFCCC, 
private carbon standards, multilateral REDD+ donors such as UN REDD 
and bilateral donors such as the German, Danish and Norwegian govern-
ments started to develop their own policies to create “no harm”. The German 
bilateral initiatives funded by the BMZ and those funded by Danish bilateral 
cooperation (DANIDA) are committed to human-rights-based approaches. 
German and Danish human-rights-based approaches support the UN Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous People, the Convention 169 of the Inter-
national Labor Organization (ILO) and the implementation of free, prior and 
informed consent (FPIC) where indigenous communities may be affected 
(DANIDA, 2011: 3; Schielmann et al., 2013: 26). The Danish government, 
for example, considers human rights “as means and end in our development 
cooperation” (DANIDA, 2012b: 2).
The German International Climate Initiative (IKI), which has funded the 
Harapan Rainforest project, initially had no coherent safeguard policy in place. 
IKI’s funding guidelines only stipulated that implementing organizations have 
to outline the potential consequences of the project to local and indigenous 
groups (Schielmann et al., 2013: 27). They have to explain how negative conse-
quences might be avoided or minimized, how the rights of indigenous groups 
and local communities are respected, how groups are compensated, and how 
a participatory approach is ensured. The guidelines did not include clear “do 
no harm guidelines”, they did not clarify what is meant by a “participatory 
approach” and they only stated that existing international standards might be 
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helpful for project implementation (ibid.). PT REKI has been criticized by var-
ious actors for neither conducting FPIC nor other forms of participatory com-
munity involvement prior to project implementation.3 Neither were required 
by IKI. Since 2017 and very likely as a result of the conflicts over the Harapan 
Rainforest, IKI has incorporated the safeguard approach of the Green Climate 
Fund (GCF) and the International Finance Cooperation (IFC). Now project 
implementers have to conduct risk assessments prior to project implementation 
(Internationale Klimaschutzinitiative, 2017).
REDD+ projects that aim to sell carbon credits on the voluntary carbon 
markets such as the Berbak Carbon Initiative have to follow certain regula-
tions formulated by transnational carbon standards (e.g. CCBA, VCS, Plan 
Vivo). Certification according to a carbon standard can be considered a pre-
condition for selling forest carbon credits (Hein and Garrelts, 2014: 321). The 
Climate Community and Biodiversity Standard (CCBS) was developed by the 
Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA). CCBA is an organi-
zation founded by the NGOs Care, Conservation International, The Nature 
Conservancy, Rainforest Alliance and the Wildlife Conservation Society, and is 
supported by the companies BP, Intel, Weyerhauser and GFA Envest (CCBA, 
2015). The CCBS provides criteria for assessing REDD+ projects and other 
forest carbon offsets. Projects certified according to the CCBS should at least 
create no harm for local communities, and in the best case they should provide 
benefits for them. Relevant criteria in the second edition of the standard refer-
ring to the rights of local and indigenous communities are listed in the follow-
ing. The project proponents have to:
• “Demonstrate [. . .] that the project will not encroach uninvited on private 
property, community property [. . .] and has obtained the free, prior and 
informed consent of those whose rights will be affected by the project” 
(G5.3).
• Demonstrate that the project does not require the involuntary relocation 
of people or of the activities important for the livelihoods [. . .]. The project 
proponents must demonstrate that the agreement was made with the free, 
prior and informed consent of those concerned and includes provisions for 
just and fair compensation (“including lands that communities have tradi-
tionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired”)” (G5.4) (CCBA, 
2008 cited in Hein and Garrelts, 2014: 324).
The CCBS stipulates FPIC and recognizes traditionally owned land and land 
occupied by local communities. CCBS provides far-reaching recognition of 
local community rights.
Despite, or probably because of, the co-existence of many different approaches 
towards REDD+ (e.g. UNFCCC, bilateral approaches, voluntary carbon mar-
kets), no coherent global or transnational scale of forest governance has yet been 
formed. The current institutional structure of REDD+ remains fragmented 
(Zelli et al., 2014: 18). Many different actors, e.g. UNFCCC, donor agencies 
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and non-state actors such as CCBA, have formulated different standards, rules 
and safeguards and seek to construct their own scales of regulation.
Indonesian REDD+ governance
The highly fragmented institutional structure of REDD+ at the global scale is 
also reflected at national and sub-national scales (Indrarto et al., 2012). Espe-
cially during Indonesia’s REDD+ boom period from approximately 2008 to 
2012, Indonesia’s REDD+ governance was diverse and fragmented involving 
various sub-national, national, bilateral, multilateral, private and transnational 
REDD+ initiatives. In 2012, 37 REDD+ pilot projects were initiated (Forest 
Climate Center, 2012) and public donor initiatives from 11 countries either 
contributed or committed more than USD 750 million for the implementation 
of REDD+ policies. Private sector initiatives (including private foundations 
and NGOs) contribute more than USD 55 million towards REDD+ and good 
forest governance in Indonesia (Forest Trends, 2014). Over the period 2002–
2012, various German donor initiatives contributed USD 33.4 million directly 
for the forest sector and an additional USD 81.9 million for general environ-
mental protection, including forestry and climate change (Buergin, 2014: 76)
The province of Jambi, for example, simultaneously became a REDD+ pilot 
province of the former REDD+ Agency, a low carbon-development pilot prov-
ince of the National Council on Climate Change, and a REDD+ pilot  province 
of the national greenhouse gas reduction strategy (RANGRK). Within Jambi, 
the provincial REDD+ Taskforce selected specific pilot districts. At the same 
time, NGOs and conservation companies in cooperation with external donors 
and state forest agencies established REDD+ pilot projects and landscape-scale 
conservation initiatives including the Harapan Rainforest and the Berbak Car-
bon Initiative (Hein, 2013b: 12–13).
National REDD+ governance
The first domestic Indonesian REDD+ policies were outlined in the MoF 
“REDDI” strategy (REDD Indonesia) shortly before COP 13 in 2007. The 
document contains first options for emission and deforestation baselines, moni-
toring of deforestation and benefit sharing (Ministry of Forestry, 2007). In addi-
tion, the strategy outlines initial pilot activities to test different approaches that 
would help to formalize forest governance through gazettement, law enforce-
ment and land tenure assessments (Ministry of Forestry, 2007: 17, 33). In 2008 
and 2009 the Ministry of Forestry issued its earliest REDD+ regulations. The 
first outlined procedures for the implementation of demonstration activities 
(Regulation 68/2008) and the second outlined procedures for licensing forest 
carbon projects in production and conservation forest, including rules for bene-
fit sharing between government, communities and the implementing company 
(Regulation 36/2009) (Menteri Kehutanan, 2008b, 2009). The third regulation 
(30/2009) further clarifies implementation procedures. Regulation 68/2008 
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remains very unspecific and does not even mention communities. Regulation 
36/2009 states that implementing agencies have to indicate community ben-
efits to receive a license to implement a REDD+ project (article 6) and have 
to support community empowerment (article 14). Furthermore, the regulation 
proposes the use of the existing carbon and social-environmental standards of 
the voluntary carbon market (e.g. CCBS and Plan Vivo) (article 14), strength-
ening the private governance of REDD+. However, the regulation did not 
come into force since the Ministry of Finance opposes it.4 Regulation 30/2009 
lists criteria for selecting REDD+ pilot sites e.g. data availability, deforestation 
risks, and the existence of land conflicts (Ministry of Forestry, 2009). At the pro-
ject scale in Jambi, the different REDD+ regulations did not seem to be very 
relevant, only ZSL staff argued that the design of a benefit-sharing mechanism 
for the Berbak Carbon Initiative is pending because benefit-sharing regulations 
had not come into force.5
In 2009, Indonesia signed the Copenhagen Accord as one of the first emerg-
ing economies to announce an emission reduction target. The Indonesian gov-
ernment declared that it would reduce its emissions about 26 percent below 
business as usual by 2020. Two years later, the former President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (SBY) enacted Presidential Regulation No. 61/2011, providing 
a legal framework for Indonesia’s mitigation targets. The regulation includes 
a detailed work plan for emission reductions, called RANGRK (Rencana 
Aksi Nasional Pengurangan Emisi Gas Rumah Kaca) and refers to mitigation 
actions that are – in most instances – part of the existing short- and mid-term 
national development plans. It is planned that 80 percent of the overall emis-
sion reductions target is to be achieved through changes in land use (ibid). The 
policy proposes emission reductions through the development of plantations on 
degraded non-forest land, through development of timber plantations, through 
the issuance of additional private ecosystem restoration concessions, through 
expansion of community forest concessions and through the development of 
REDD+ demonstration activities in Jambi and Central Kalimantan (Repub-
lic of Indonesia, 2011b). RANGRK consists of the above-mentioned national 
work plan and provincial work plans (RADGRK), which have to be prepared 
by the provincial governors (Hein, 2013a: 2).
An influential bilateral agreement that explicitly considers ongoing discus-
sions about land tenure conflicts in the context of REDD+ is the Letter of 
Intent (LOI) between the Norwegian and Indonesian governments on “Coop-
eration on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation”. The agreement, signed in 2010, consists of three phases, and fore-
sees payments of up to USD 1 billion in the third phase if Indonesia reaches 
specific mitigation and policy goals outlined in the LOI (Government of the 
Kingdom of Norway and Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2010). 
The LOI forms the legal basis of the agreement. It calls for “full and effective 
participation” by all stakeholders, including indigenous groups and local com-
munities, and for the development of “[. . .] appropriate measures to address land 
tenure conflicts [. . .]” (ibid.). The development of appropriate measures to solve 
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land conflicts is listed as one of the official deliverables of the result-based pay-
ments agreement, implying at least theoretically that Indonesia will only receive 
payments from Norway if measures are developed (ibid.). In any case, Norway 
does not support policy measures aimed at solving land conflicts directly. “The 
agreement is result based and therefore we do not provide technical assistance 
for the process” and “[. . .] we do not use specific social safeguards for the ini-
tiative, we draw on Indonesia’s domestic safeguards”, stated an expert from the 
Norwegian Forest and Climate Initiative.6 Other listed deliverables are, inter 
alia, a two-year moratorium for new conversion concessions within peat and 
natural forest, the establishment of a special agency directly accountable to the 
President (REDD+ Agency) and the formulation of a national REDD+ strat-
egy (Government of the Kingdom of Norway and Government of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia, 2010).
The moratorium came into force in 2011 and was extended in 2013 and 
2015 by the current government under President Jokowi. The moratorium 
bans new forest and land conversion business licenses (e.g. oil palm concessions) 
and protects 22.5 million hectares of additional forest and peat land (Murdi-
yarso et al., 2011). Moreover, the moratorium also fostered the formalization 
and homogenization of spatial planning processes. The One Map Initiative 
introduced by the REDD+ Taskforce in 2011 (later upgraded to the REDD+ 
Agency) to monitor the moratorium is an attempt to develop one reference 
map for all state agencies (Hein, 2013a). This might reduce the risk of overlap-
ping concessions in the future.
The REDD+ Agency was established in 2013. However, in 2015 the current 
government closed the agency and integrated REDD+ into the newly formed 
Ministry for Environment and Forestry (a merger of the Ministry for Environ-
ment and the MoF). The national REDD+ Agency was probably an attempt 
by the Norwegian government to strengthen intersectoral coordination, to cir-
cumvent the MoF (Wibowo and Giessen, 2015: 137) and to upscale all REDD+ 
related policymaking to presidential scale. The agency was a ministerial-level 
institution established with the aim of supporting the President in coordina-
tion, planning and control of REDD+ implementation (Korhonen-Kurki 
et al., 2017: 67). Consequently, REDD+ was no longer under the authority 
of the MoF. For some observers, the agency and the national REDD+ strategy 
led to more transparent and progressive forest governance, e.g. reference to 
FPIC (ibid). However, the agency was not successful in implementing policies 
that reduce deforestation and, in particular, the MoF successfully maintained its 
strong material power base, namely controlling access to Indonesia’s vast state 
forest territory (Wibowo and Giessen, 2015: 138).
The national REDD+ strategy, published in 2012, was prepared by the 
REDD+ Taskforce (which was later upgraded to the REDD+ Agency) with 
the support of civil society organizations. The document summarizes different 
policies that aim to achieve Indonesia’s emission reduction targets and develop 
Indonesia’s forests as a net carbon sink by 2030 (Indonesian REDD+ Task 
Force, 2012: 5). The Indonesian REDD strategy can be considered as part of 
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RANGRK or as contributing to RANGRK and at the same time being a 
deliverable of the agreement with Norway.7 The strategy entails a framework 
for the development of social safeguards. Listed safeguards acknowledge the 
land rights of indigenous and local communities based on historical use (Indo-
nesian REDD+ Task Force, 2012: 28), grant indigenous and local communities 
the right to reject decisions related to REDD+, and stipulate conflict resolu-
tion measures and FPIC. Furthermore, the strategy contains a section on “land 
tenure reform” that refers to the “[. . .] constitutional right to certainty over 
boundaries and management rights for natural resources” (ibid. 18), consid-
ers land reforms as “[. . .] an important prerequisite to create the conditions 
required for successful implementation of REDD+”, and stipulates FPIC for 
any new natural resource management concessions (ibid.).
Yet the section on land reform neither explicitly mentions that the state 
forest will be subject to the reform nor that the MoF will be involved. Only 
the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional, BPN) and the Min-
istry of Home Affairs are mentioned as involved actors (Indonesian REDD+ 
Task Force, 2012: 18). An expert from the MoF argued that “the land reform is 
meant to further clarify the status of land used by different actors [. . .]” adding 
that the existing regulations already permit community, smallholder and village 
forest concessions and implying that the reform will not change the status of 
the state forest.8 A CIFOR expert argued, “I don’t think that any government 
will voluntarily conduct a land reform unless there is strong pressure from 
society”.9 An agrarian reform activist lauded the reference to a land reform in 
the REDD strategy but added that the REDD+ Taskforce does not have the 
authority to implement such a reform.10
Officially, Indonesia’s national REDD+ strategy is still effective but it might 
be revised by the current government (Kawai et al., 2017: 18). However, Indo-
nesia’s National Determined Contribution, the country’s national strategy to 
implement the Paris Agreement, does not mention the REDD+ strategy at 
all (Hein et al., 2018b). At the end of 2017, the Ministry for Environment and 
Forestry enacted a new regulation on REDD+. The Ministerial Regulation 
P. 70/MENLHK/SETJEN/KUM.1/12/2017 outlines Indonesia’s pathway to 
REDD+ implementation. The document repeats that REDD+ activities have 
to respect the rights of local communities and the right to FPIC of indig-
enous and local communities. In addition, the document mentions, among 
other things, result-based payments and carbon markets as potential sources for 
REDD+ (Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan, 2017).
The political strategies, policies, agreements and regulations introduced here 
can be considered as an attempt (not successful) by specific apparatuses of the 
state to circumvent the MoF and establish new national scales of regulation for 
implementing REDD+. The political momentum for forest reform provided 
by REDD+ was used to initiate the formalization of forest governance and 
spatial planning and to commodify forest carbon. At the same time, indigenous 
rights organizations tried to benefit from the momentum. REDD+ and the 
high level of attention directed towards Indonesia’s forests may have positively 
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influenced the constitutional court ruling on the release of adat forest from 
the state forest, as an AMAN activist argued prior to the court decision (see 
Chapter 5 for more detailed information on the constitutional court ruling).11 
Furthermore, AMAN was able to map territories claimed by indigenous groups 
in cooperation with the REDD+ Agency.
Yet the legal character of the new REDD+ related scales of regulation 
remains weak. It is, for instance, contested whether disregarding the presiden-
tial instruction, which is the legal foundation for the moratorium, has legal 
consequences or not (Hein, 2013a: 4; Murdiyarso et al., 2011: 2). Furthermore, 
the legal basis of the LOI and of the National REDD+ strategy is challenged 
by some actors. A CIFOR expert argued that, “[. . .] in the National REDD+ 
strategy, there is no explanation and no reference to a presidential decree or 
regulation”.12 Above all, REDD+ related scales of meaning and regulation are 
challenged by other far more influential policies such as the Master Plan for 
Acceleration and Expansion of Economic Development 2011–2025 (MP3EI), 
which refers to the expansion of mining and corporate oil palm and rubber 
plantations. Sumatra, for instance, is designated for oil palm, rubber and coal 
mining (Republic of Indonesia, 2011a: 49). According to the plan, the provinces 
of Jambi, North Sumatra and Riau should become major “oil palm plantation 
nodes” (ibid. 51). Central and East Kalimantan are designated as “timber activity 
nodes”. REDD+ is only mentioned as a potential source of non-timber related 
income. Moreover, timber plantations and not natural forests are considered 
for absorbing additional carbon under an international REDD+ scheme (ibid. 
112). Under the new President Jokowi, REDD+ governance was re-integrated 
into the formal forest apparatus. For some observers, this indicates that climate 
change mitigation then became less important for the Indonesian government. 
The current mid-term development plan (2015–2019), for example, does not 
refer to REDD+ at all (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2017: 69).
Jambi’s provincial REDD+ governance
Jambi was one of the first provinces in Indonesia that hosted conservation 
projects linking local conservation efforts with climate change mitigation. The 
“Climate Change, Forest and Peatlands in Indonesia Berbak-Sembilang Pro-
ject” (CCFPI), 2002–2005) in Jambi and South Sumatra explicitly linked forest 
and peat land conservation with mitigation and carbon sequestration objectives 
(Lubis and Suryadiputra, 2004: 115). The project was funded by the Cana-
dian Climate Change Development Fund. The initiative can be considered as a 
precursor of the Berbak Carbon Initiative. The first province-wide mitigation 
strategy with a strong focus on land-based activities (e.g. REDD+ and refor-
estation) was developed by the National Council on Climate Change and by 
the Provincial Government of Jambi (Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim, 2010; 
Purnomo et al., 2012: 75).
In 2010, the provincial government started its first attempt to become one of 
Indonesia’s REDD+ pilot provinces. The government of Jambi prepared a draft 
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REDD+ strategy. The document “Jambi Sebagai Provinsi Percontohan Untuk 
Mekansime REDD+” (Jambi as a pilot province for the REDD+ mechanism) 
was developed to outline Jambi’s potential as a national REDD+ pilot province 
(Hein, 2013b: 12; Pemerintah Provinsi Jambi, 2011). The strategy supports the 
designation of new community forest concessions (e.g. village forests and com-
munity forests) in Jambi and argues for an acknowledgement of indigenous and 
local community rights to forest land. At that time, Jambi’s attempt to become 
a REDD+ pilot province was not successful. Central Kalimantan became the 
first pilot province.
In 2011, the province started its second attempt and established the Jambi 
Regional Commission for REDD+ (KOMDA REDD+) through Governor 
Decree No. 356/2011 (Hein, 2013b: 12). The members of the commission 
were appointed by the provincial government. In 2013, the commission con-
sisted of the NGOs WARSI, ZSL and Flora and Fauna International; of the 
conservation company PT REKI; of representatives of the provincial planning 
agency (BAPPEDA), the provincial forest agency and of the provincial envi-
ronmental protection authority; and of experts from the University of Jambi 
and the World Agroforestry Center (ICRAF). The commission has no regula-
tory authority and was mainly formed to coordinate drawing up the provincial 
REDD+ strategy. In 2013, Jambi finally became a REDD+ pilot province of 
the National REDD Agency.
The provincial REDD+ strategy covers the period from 2012 to 2030. In 
addition to providing technical details and data on the emission-reduction 
potential of specific land-use policies, the strategy refers to the potential pro-
poor benefits of REDD. The strategy also aims to strengthen the rights of local 
communities and includes plans to map forest land claimed by local communi-
ties and indigenous groups (Perbatakusuma et al., 2012). The strategy was writ-
ten by the commission. Other NGOs were invited to focus-group discussions to 
comment on the document. The strategy designates the districts of Tebo, Muaro 
Jambi and Merangin as REDD+ pilot districts. The pilot districts were selected 
because they represent three different landscapes. Merangin is characterized by 
the upper Sungai Batang Asai watershed and the Bukit Barisan Range. Whereas 
Tebo is characterized by hilly low lands and low mountain ranges, Muaro Jambi 
consists of hilly low lands, tidal marshlands and peat swamps. In addition, the 
districts were selected because of their high numbers of land conflicts.13 In 
these districts, land-use and forest-use permit procedures are to be reviewed, 
and forest monitoring and law enforcement are to be improved. However, 
among village and sub-district governments and administrations knowledge 
of the strategy and the proposed activities seemed to be limited in 2013. The 
village government of Tanjung Lebar and staff of the administration of the sub-
district of Kumpeh in Muaro Jambi, for example, were aware neither of being 
located within a REDD+ pilot district nor of REDD+ related policy shifts at 
the district level.14
Furthermore, the provincial REDD+ strategy argues in favor of strengthen-
ing the rights of local communities and indigenous communities. However, 
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many of the suggested policies cannot be implemented by provincial or district 
governments alone since they involve national scale authorities such as the 
MoEF. Furthermore, the provincial government of Jambi has recently acted in 
ways contradictive to the policies suggested in the REDD+ strategies. Accord-
ing to regional media, the Governor of Jambi refused to sign recommendations 
for nineteen village forest concessions in the province (JambiekspressNews, 
2013). However, it is important to add that Jambi, with its 54,978 ha of village 
forest concessions managed by 25 villages, has the largest village forest area of 
all the provinces in Indonesia (Bakhori, 2013). Through different strategies and 
policies, the provincial government has successfully constructed REDD+ as 
a new scale of meaning in order to attract donor investments, but it lacks the 
authority and probably also the political will to establish a complementary scale 
of regulation.
REDD+ in Jambi: an actor mapping
In this section, I will briefly present a mapping of actors involved either in 
the implementation of REDD+, or in resistance campaigns against REDD+ 
in Jambi. The mapping (Figure 4.1) is mainly based on expert knowledge and 
shows formal state actors and private actors directly involved in REDD+, con-
servation projects and organizations supporting peasant resistance. Stakehold-
ers from state and non-state organizations were asked to identify actors they 
consider relevant in relation to the implementation of REDD+ in Jambi. In 
addition, the mapping and the selection of actors is based on document review 
and on my own judgment.15
The most important state actors are, as a matter of course, the various forest 
authorities, more explicitly the MoF (MoEF) and the different district and pro-
vincial forest services. The MoF has authority over the state forest, has enacted 
various REDD+ regulations and has allocated the Meranti-River-Kapuas-
River forest block to the conservation company PT REKI for implementation 
of the Harapan Rainforest project. A second relevant national-scale authority 
was the REDD+ Agency (Badan Pengelola REDD+) which has recently been 
integrated into the MoEF. The REDD+ Agency was directly accountable to 
the president. Furthermore, the agency appointed Jambi as an official REDD+ 
pilot province. The different district and provincial forest services are involved 
in managing forest reserves and conservation forests. They do not have the 
authority to allocate concessions but they are involved in conflict mediation, 
forest monitoring and law enforcement. At the provincial level, the KOMDA 
REDD+ (Provincial REDD+ commission, Komisi Daerah REDD+) is in 
charge of coordinating REDD+ implementation. However, as the national 
REDD+ agency, KOMDA REDD+ has no regulatory power. KOMDA 
REDD+ is a hybrid institution consisting of state and non-state actors. ZSL, the 
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State actors challenging the implementation of REDD+ and conservation 
projects and the integrity of the state forest are the various sectoral agencies 
of the district governments of Muaro Jambi and Batang Hari. By providing 
support to peasants or by providing public infrastructure they legitimize the 
presence of peasants and indigenous groups in the state forest territory. The 
Transmigration Agency of Muaro Jambi, for instance, has developed trans-
migration settlements within the borders of the Berbak Carbon project (see 
Chapter 5 for more details). The Education Agencies (Dinas Pendidikan) of 
both districts support and run schools within the Harapan Rainforest project. 
The Agricultural Agency of Batang Hari has provided extension services for 
settlers farming within the Harapan Rainforest.
The ZSL and Gita Buana are among the important non-state actors involved 
in the Berbak Carbon project. ZSL identifies itself as an international scientific, 
conservation and educational charity (ZSL, 2015) and is based in the United 
Kingdom (UK). The organization started its Indonesia field program in 2002, 
focusing on ecological research, core area protection and the connectivity of 
conservation areas (CIRAD, 2012). On the island of Sumatra, ZSL’s activities 
focus mainly on tiger conservation. ZSL seeks to develop mechanisms permit-
ting rural development and conservation. Gita Buana is a Jambi-based NGO 
founded in 2001 by students from the Faculty of Agriculture at the University 
of Jambi. Gita Buana is involved in the implementation of FPIC for the Berbak 
Carbon Initiative. Gita Buana’s donors are the Clinton Foundation, Tropical 
Forest Conservation Action (TFCA) and Flora and Fauna International.16
Non-state actors are of key importance in the Harapan Rainforest project. 
PT REKI is owned by three NGOs. Burung Indonesia was founded in 2002 
and focuses mainly on bird and bird habitat conservation. Burung Indonesia 
works mainly in Sumatra, Sumba, Gorontalo, Sangihe Taluad, Tanimbar and 
Buru. Burung Indonesia is a member of Birdlife International. The Royal 
Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), also member of Birdlife Interna-
tional, was founded in 1889 in the UK. The RSPB holds more than 200 bird 
reserves (RSPB, 2015). In the accounting year 2014/2015, the organization had 
a net income of £99 million (ibid.). Birdlife International is the transnational 
umbrella association of 120 bird conservation organizations and claims to be 
the world’s largest conservation initiative and the world’s leader in bird conser-
vation (Birdlife International, 2015).
Peasants and indigenous groups living within the borders of the Harapan 
Rainforest project are supported by a number of non-state actors as well. 
The most relevant are Serikat Petani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasant Union, 
SPI), and the grass roots organizations Yayasan CAPPA and Yayasan Setara. 
SPI is the largest Indonesian Peasant Movement and a member of La Via 
Campesina. La Via Campesina is an umbrella organization uniting 164 local 
and national peasant organizations from 73 countries. La Via Campesina 
claims to represent 200 million farmers from all continents. The main aims 
of the organization are the realization of food sovereignty and the imple-
mentation of agrarian reforms.
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Yayasan CAPPA is a Jambi-based environmental justice organization.17 The 
organization first mainly supported peasants in conflicts with pulp and paper 
companies. Today the organization claims to support the “victims of agrarian 
policies”. Yayasan CAPPA helps peasants defend and access property rights and 
argues for social transformation in order to end agrarian conflicts. Furthermore, 
Yayasan CAPPA is involved in conflict mediation, advocacy work and indig-
enous rights issues. Its main donors are Misereor, the Ford Foundation and 
USAID. Yayasan SETARA is a Jambi-based NGO working on environmental 
justice issues, especially on the consequences of oil palm expansion.18 Yayasan 
SETARA supports small-scale oil palm cultivators and indigenous communities. 
SETARA is a member of the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). 
The organization has a watchdog function within RSPO and strives for the 
acknowledgement of peasant rights. Yayasan SETARA and CAPPA cooperate 
intensively and support Batin Sembilan communities in land conflicts with the 
conservation company PT REKI and with the oil palm company PT Asiatic 
Persada. SETARA receives financial support from Misereor.
The mapping indicates linkages (across scales) between formal state actors 
and linkages among private actors and between state and private actors. Actors 
promoting REDD+ and conservation and actors resisting the expansion of 
conservation have established actor coalitions involving local, national and 
transnational NGOs (see Chapter 5 for more detail).
Privatization and transnationalization of conservation: 
conservation concessions and co-management
As a biodiversity hotspot, Indonesia has long been a key country for the pro-
jects and campaigns of transnational conservation organizations. Transnational 
NGOs initiated activities in Indonesia in the late 1980s (McCarthy, 2006: 183; 
Peluso et al., 2008: 383). In those days, the New Order regime of President 
Suharto took up the emerging sustainability discourse, before and after the first 
Rio Summit, in order to improve its international reputation (Hall et al., 2011: 
68). Conservation NGOs successfully lobbied for new protected areas, national 
parks and environmentally friendly natural resource management regulations, 
and engaged in the co-management of conservation areas and community-
based conservation projects (Peluso et al., 2008; Wells et al., 1999).
In the 1990s, transnational NGOs like World Wildlife Federation (WWF) 
and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) co-managed Integrated Conservation 
and Development Projects (ICDPs) with state authorities and local communi-
ties. The ICDP concept aims to go beyond fortress conservation by actively 
involving local communities and represented the state of the art of conserva-
tion at that time (Wells et al., 1999: 13). In 1992, for example, TNC started to 
support the National Park Authorities of Lore Lindu National Park in Central 
Sulawesi. The NGO negotiated conservation agreements with communities 
and established a stakeholder platform to facilitate dialogue among local com-
munities and the different institutions working within and around the national 
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park (The Nature Conservancy, n.d.; Wells et al., 1999: 26). However, the pro-
ject was not able to deal with the land disputes and land occupations of local 
and indigenous communities inside the national park (Adiwibowo, 2005). In 
Jambi, the WWF lobbied for a ICDP project in the buffer zone of Bukit Tiga 
Belas National Park (Wells et al., 1999: 27). The MoF rejected the plan. Never-
theless, more than 20 years later the WWF was able to realize its plans. Recently, 
the buffer zone became an ecosystem restoration concession managed by the 
conservation company PT Alam Bukit Tigapuluh, which was co-founded by 
the German NGO Zoological Society Frankfurt (ZGF) and WWF Indonesia.
In contrast to Latin American countries, it was relatively difficult for NGOs 
and companies to establish private protected areas in Indonesia until the 2000s 
as the Forest Law did not permit a “non-productive use” of forest concessions. 
In the 2000s, the idea of “governance through markets” (Peet et al., 2011: 7) 
gained further political traction. In line with the neoliberal zeitgeist, deforesta-
tion and biodiversity loss were primarily considered as governance failure and as 
a failure to economically account for ecosystem services in an adequate manner. 
The integration of conservation and ecosystem services into the market system 
would create economic incentives for conservation and would consequently 
almost automatically lead to better protection. In this context, large environ-
mental NGOs became increasingly powerful. Globally, companies and public 
donors transferred millions of dollars to conservation organizations, expect-
ing that privately managed conservation would be more cost-efficient than 
state-managed approaches which were often considered prone to corruption 
(Igoe et al., 2010). Conservation NGOs now command over 50 percent of the 
global funding for conservation (Chapin 2004 cited in Igoe et al., 2010: 491) 
and, in addition to their successful lobbing for new state-managed protected 
areas, have established an increasing number of privately managed protected 
areas. In 2015, Birdlife International and its members, for example, had a joint 
budget of USD 539 million (Birdlife international, 2015). Their 1553 protected 
areas cover 4.3 million hectares, a territory larger than Switzerland.
In 2004, a forest management reform in Indonesia made the country more 
attractive for private investment in conservation. The MoF introduced a new 
concession type (officially: ecosystem restoration concessions), delegating 
for the very first time authority over conservation, forest rehabilitation and 
REDD+ activities within the state forest territory to non-state actors (Walsh 
et al., 2012a: 35). Conservation and ecosystem restoration were integrated into 
Indonesia’s market-oriented land-use planning system (Radjawali et al., 2017), 
and thus they had to compete with other possible land uses, such as logging 
and pulp and paper production. According to Rice (2002), the conservation 
concession concept provides a number of benefits: “Under a conservation con-
cession, conservation becomes a product that can be purchased directly and 
provided according to clearly established criteria. In combination with pay-
ments, the limited term of a conservation concession makes it an attractive 
option for resource owners. At the same time, long-term conservation is pos-
sible because of renewable terms, low opportunity cost, and high willingness 
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and ability to pay” (Rice, 2002: 4). Additional momentum for the conservation 
concession concept and for private conservation actors in Indonesia can be 
traced back to COP 13 in Bali. After the Indonesian COP, the role of non-state 
and state actors in forest conservation changed fundamentally both in Indonesia 
and globally. The hope that global carbon markets might create a reliable fund-
ing source for protected areas or even a source for profit created a short Indo-
nesian “REDD+ rush” (McGregor, 2010). NGOs and corporate actors started 
to search for potential sites for REDD+ projects; they developed rules and 
certification mechanisms and projects (Hein and Garrelts, 2014; Newell and 
Paterson, 2010). Even investment banks like Merril Lynch, the German insurer 
Allianz, and the oil and gas companies Shell and Gazprom started to invest in 
forest conservation (Hein and Garrelts, 2014).
In Indonesia, the formulation and adoption of the conservation concession 
concept was very much the result of strong lobbying by the Indonesian branch 
of BirdLife International (Burung Indonesia) (Hein, 2013b). In 2007, PT REKI 
received the first ecosystem restoration concession for the southern part of the 
Harapan Rainforest project. In 2017, 16 concessions existed all over Indonesia 
covering 623,075 ha of land. The MoEF announced that it plans to allocate an 
additional 100,000 ha per year to conservation companies until 2019 (Ministry 
of Environment and Forestry, 2017). The allocation of a conservation concession 
to a concession holder goes hand in hand with the transfer of additional bundles 
of rights replacing former state functions. Environmental protection, protected 
area management, environmental monitoring and even the allocation of land-use 
permits for communities within the concession area are de facto exercised by the 
concession holder.
However, the plans to allocate conservation concessions are challenged by a 
lack of areas designated for ecosystem restoration, the requirement to obtain a 
letter of recommendation from the local governments, and a lack of guidance 
about what governors should recommend and the role of district governments 
(Walsh et al., 2012: 14). District governments often have little interest in having 
an ecosystem restoration concession within their jurisdiction. An expert from 
the MoF argued, “Ecosystem restoration in the short-term is a sacrifice [. . .] 
for all actors at all levels, including the company”.19 As ecosystem restoration 
concessions contribute less to the district’s economy than other options, some 
districts seek to impede their issuance.
A further push towards privatization and the commodification of conserva-
tion and ecosystem services might be induced by a new regulation on eco-
nomic instruments for conservation (Government Regulation No. 46 of 2017). 
The policy foresees compensation payments for the provision of environmental 
services, including carbon capture and sequestration, and stipulates that pollut-
ers should compensate for ecosystem losses. This might also generate additional 
income sources for actors holding ecosystem restoration concessions.
The private actors involved in the two conservation projects covered by this 
book used two different approaches. PT REKI and the shareholders Burung 
Indonesia, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), actively 
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lobbied for forest management reform and later on received the first conserva-
tion concession. In contrast, the approach of the Zoological Society London 
(ZSL) builds on a more traditional co-management approach.
Lobbying for and accessing conservation concessions20
In the early 2000s, Burung Indonesia and its national and transnational partners 
discussed new conservation and forest rehabilitation concepts, especially for 
areas designated as production forests. The RPSB was searching for areas to 
be used as privately financed and managed conservation areas. A key inform-
ant from Burung Indonesia explained, “At that time, the UK community over 
there, the members of RSPB, they wanted to share, for example, if you give 
money you can conserve 1 hectare”.21 At that time, conservation and forest 
rehabilitation activities were limited to protected areas managed by state actors. 
Burung Indonesia argued that conservation regulations for protected areas were 
too restrictive for private initiatives, and developed a proposal for a new conces-
sion type that would permit private actors to invest in conservation. According 
to a key informant of Burung Indonesia, at first the Ministry of Forestry (MoF) 
was skeptical, but after years of lobbying, it finally agreed: “Our CEO at that 
time, he was very persistent, [. . .] he lobbied here and there, also he wanted 
me to lobby here and there [. . .] I think the third minister finally agreed”.22 In 
2004, the MoF enacted the first regulation on “Ecosystem Restoration in Pro-
duction Forest” (SK 159/Menhut-II/2004) that permitted private conserva-
tion concessions. Three years later, the Indonesian parliament integrated private 
conservation concessions into the Forest Law (Birdlife International, 2008: 21).
An expert from the consulting company Carbon Synthesis, who supported 
the lobbying campaign, argued that Burung Indonesia’s campaign was suc-
cessful because of the reduced demand for logging concessions that resulted 
from the post-Suharto boom in illegal logging.23 The MoF considered the new 
concession type mainly as a mechanism for recovering state forest production 
capacity.24 Burung Indonesia and its national and transnational partners consid-
ered the new concession type a response to the failure of state-led conservation 
policies and an opportunity to finance conservation activities through sustain-
able forest exploitation, ecotourism and carbon trade.25
The Harapan Rainforest
In parallel to Burung Indonesia’s lobbying campaigns, in 2000 the NGO started 
a site selection process with its partners. Biodiversity, urgency, administrative 
and socio-economic criteria were used to study 14 sites across Indonesia (Bird-
life International, 2008: 13). Burung Indonesia conducted the first on-site 
investigations in Jambi and South Sumatra provinces between 2000 and 2004.26 
The Meranti River-Kapuas River forest block27 in Jambi and South Sumatra 
was selected because it represents one of Sumatra’s last patches of intact lowland 
rainforest. The area was also considered to be of great interest to timber and oil 
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palm companies – and consequently at risk (ibid. 13). At that time, the southern 
part of the concession consisted of a retired logging concession formerly used 
by the state-owned company, PT Inhutani V. Although the northern part was 
still owned by PT Asialog, the company had stopped logging in 1999, aban-
doned the concession in 2003, and signed an agreement with Burung Indone-
sia about officially ending logging activities in the concession in 2006 (Birdlife 
International, 2008: 22; Mardiana, 2014: 14). In 2005, the MoF officially classi-
fied the forest block for ecosystem restoration.28
Initially, Jambi’s local governments opposed the permit for the Harapan 
Rainforest project.29 One year later, the NGO consortium won the public 
tender for the southern part of the concession and received letters of support 
from the district heads and governors of Jambi and South Sumatra (Bird-
life International, 2008: 22). The MoF officially revoked PT Asialog’s logging 
concession in 2007 (Mardiana, 2014: 14). In 2008, PT REKI, the company 
founded by the NGO consortium to manage the concession, received the 
southern part and two years later the northern part of the Meranti-River-
Kapuas-River forest block. The concessions are valid for 100 years. The 
permit process for the conservation concession took eight years (Birdlife 
International, 2008: 22).30
The MoF neglected the presence of the settlements (Figure 3.1) of local 
communities and indigenous groups (settlememt formation described in 
Chapter 3) and allocated major parts of the Meranti-River-Kapuas-River for-
est block to the conservation company. In the following years a number of land 
conflicts emerged (some of which continue), challenging project implementa-
tion and the ability of PT REKI to control its territory (Chapter 5).
The Harapan Rainforest is a privately managed project focusing on biodiver-
sity conservation and climate change mitigation (Figure 4.2). Still, large shares 
of the funding for the project come from public sources. The German Inter-
national Climate Initiative (IKI) and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(DANIDA) are probably the most important public donors. IKI provided EUR 
7.5 million from the end of 2009 to 2013. PT REKI has applied for a second 
funding period but a decision was still pending in early 2018. In 2016, staff 
from the German Embassy in Jakarta seemed to be in favor of a second period, 
explaining that not continuing to support the first privately managed conser-
vation project in Indonesia would be a negative political signal. The German 
embassy considers the project a role model for conservation in Indonesia. From 
2011 to 2016 DANIDA provided EUR 9 million through its Special Climate 
Change Fund’s Fast-Start Finance (FSF) (Buergin, 2014: 65). Additional funds 
of DKK 20 million were provided in the framework of the Danish-Indonesian 
Environment Support Program (DANIDA, 2016). The most important private 
donor is Singapore Airlines. The carrier contributed US$ 3 million and became 
the “exclusive airline partner” of the project. The carrier considers the project 
as part of its strategy to improve its overall environmental performance (Singa-
pore Airlines, 2015).
REDD+ in Indonesia 119
Figure 4.2  Picture of destroyed forest and border sign of the Harapan Rainforest
(Source: taken by the author, 2013)
The Indonesian REDD+ Agency listed the Harapan Rainforest as a REDD+ 
demonstration project (Badan Pengelola REDD+, 2014). The current project 
list from the new MoEF no longer lists the project. The question as to whether 
the Harapan Rainforest is a REDD+ project seemed to be an ongoing dispute 
among different shareholders of the conservation company. PT REKI seems to 
dissociate itself more and more from REDD+. In October 2013, a project man-
ager from Burung Indonesia stated that “[. . .] we were from the very beginning 
not a REDD+ project, PT REKI is not REDD [. . .]”.31 But in 2012 a project 
manager based in Jambi argued that the “[. . .] carbon market is a long-term 
funding option, the baseline preparation is in process and we will base a car-
bon consultant in Palembang” (in South Sumatra).32 PT REKI’s main donors 
IKI, DANIDA and Singapore Airlines explicitly name climate mitigation, car-
bon sequestration or REDD+ piloting as the project objectives (DANIDA, 
2012a; Internationale Klimaschutzinitiative, 2015; Singapore Airlines, 2015). PT 
REKI’s recent attempts to disassociate itself from REDD+ might be considered 
as strategy to avoid potential controversies on benefit sharing and the com-
modification of forest carbon or as response to SPI’s climate justice and anti-
REDD+ campaigns (Hein and Faust, 2014: 24). So far PT REKI has not sold 
any carbon credits and has not been certified according to a carbon standard.
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Conservation agreements and benefits of the Harapan Rainforest
The implementation of conservation regulations and community benefits is 
challenged by ongoing conflicts over access to land. According to interviewed 
PT REKI staff, the company initially planned to develop two zones with spe-
cific access rights for peasants and for the Batin Sembilan. The first, called the 
tanaman kehidupan zone, was to provide the Batin Sembilan with opportunities 
to gather non-timber forest products and plant rubber. The second mitra zone 
should provide land for peasant migrants who were living in the concession 
before the Harapan Rainforest project started. Initially, PT REKI only accepted 
the presence of peasant migrants who were living in the settlement before 2010 
(when the project was initiated in Jambi). A staff member of the conservation 
company explicitly stated, “Those that came after have to leave. We want to 
push them out”.33 Migrants living in the concession before 2010 should pay 
rent to PT REKI and have to follow existing regulations for state forest land, 
e.g. implying that oil palm cultivation and shifting cultivation are prohibited. 
PT REKI proposed a maximum plot size of 2–5 ha per migrant household for 
the cultivation of forest crops like rubber.34
In addition, PT REKI negotiated and is still negotiating a number of conser-
vation agreements (Village Resources Management Agreement, VRMA) with 
the indigenous Batin Sembilan, and recently with some peasant migrants. The 
agreements usually allow the communities to use a certain amount of land for 
rubber and fruit tree cultivation and to harvest non-timber forest products, but 
prohibit land trades and additional forest conversion (REKI, 2011b) (see Chap-
ter 5 for additional information on conservation agreements in the context of 
conflict mediation and solution).
As part of the conservation agreements (VRMA) and beyond, PT REKI 
provides a number of direct income-related and non-income-related ben-
efits (Table 4.1). The benefits are intended to provide alternative sources of 
income, stabilize household incomes, and compensate the opportunity costs of 
PT REKI’s intervention. Non-income-related benefits provided by PT REKI 
include elementary school services, free health care, clean water, electricity and 
better sanitation. However, these benefits are de facto only accessible for the 
Batin-Sembilan-dominated settlements of Simpang Macan (Dalam and Luar) 
and the Batin Sembilan living in the mitra settlement.35 Direct income-related 
benefits provided by PT REKI include employment opportunities, agricultural 
extension services, and the joint marketing of non-timber forest products. PT 
REKI provides employment opportunities for local communities living in the 
Harapan Rainforest, the most important is the community nurseries. Commu-
nity nurseries have been established in the Batin-Sembilan-dominated settle-
ments of Simpang Macan (Dalam and Luar, part of Kunangan Jaya I, Bungku), 
in the mitra (part of Kunangan Jaya I, Bungku), and in Sako Suban. Each com-
munity nursery provides employment for approximately seven families. The 
staff of the nurseries are paid for each seedling, for the planting of the seedling 
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provide monthly incomes of between IDR 300,000 and 700,000 per per-
son.36 Community nurseries have not yet been established in the settlements 
described in Chapter 3. Thus, peasant migrants have de facto no access to this 
source of alternative income. Inhabitants of the mitra settlement have the addi-
tional opportunity to earn monthly payments of IDR 500,000 for providing 
information about incidents such as forest fires or for the denunciation of new 
so-called “encroachers”.
PT REKI staff members claimed that if possible, full-time positions would 
be filled with local community members. Nevertheless, in July 2013, only two 
inhabitants of the mitra settlement had permanent jobs – as PT REKI for-
est guards.37 PT REKI’s reforestation efforts provide additional short-term 
employment opportunities. For example, PT REKI pays groups of planters 
up to IDR 1,600,000 per ha.38 Agricultural extension services provided by PT 
REKI consist mainly of the provision of rubber seeds and livestock.
An additional benefit that PT REKI aims to provide especially for Batin 
Sembilan is support for the marketing of forest products. PT REKI already 
organizes the marketing of honey for Batin Sembilan (Wardah, 2013: 19) and 
plans to support the marketing of jelutung and jernang (dragon blood39).
PT REKI has developed new conservation regulations, tree inventories, and 
a preliminary carbon assessment and has started border demarcation. Moreover, 
PT REKI has established a forest guard unit to protect the conservation con-
cession and monitor compliance with the conservation regulations. PT REKI’s 
activities can be considered an active attempt to construct a new scale of mean-
ing – linking local conservation efforts to global environmental problems such 
as biodiversity loss and climate change – and to establish the project area as a 
new scale of regulation. As we will see in Chapter 5, this scale of regulation is 
highly contested.
The Berbak Carbon Initiative and  
ZSL’s co-management approach
The ZSL’s approach to establishing the Berbak Carbon Initiative differs sub-
stantially from that of Burung Indonesia and its partners. The ZSL’s basic idea is 
to harmonize the management of various concessions and protected areas – to 
establish a new scale of regulation for the Berbak landscape. ZSL has not tried 
to gain full ownership or full control over its different land-use categories. ZSL’s 
strategy is to influence the management of existing concessions and protected 
areas through negotiating cooperation agreements with concession owners and 
forest authorities. A key informant working for ZSL argued that applying for 
a private conservation concession is not an option for the NGO because of 
the high upfront costs. He said, “It is too expensive for NGOs with no money. 
Because we have to have a very big investment [. . .] to get the concession 
area. Yeah, that’s also, I think, the obstacle for an NGO who wants to get the 
restoration concession for REDD activity. Big investment [. . .] while to get 
the restoration area required the tax for the first 35 years, plus an extension of 
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60 years: 65 years must be paid in advance”.40 In addition to the financial barri-
ers, only the logging concessions managed by PT Putra Dutra Indahwood and 
PT Persona Belantara Persada would be eligible for reclassification as private 
conservation concessions. State forest that is already classified as a protected 
area, such as the Berbak National Park, is not eligible to become a private con-
servation concession.
The Berbak Carbon Initiative was also listed as a REDD+ demonstration 
project by the Indonesian REDD+ Agency. The project is a collaborative initia-
tive by the Zoological Society of London (ZSL), the Jambi-based NGO Gita 
Buana, the Berbak National Park Agency and the Provincial Forest Service 
(Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi Jambi), and can be considered as the latest attempt 
to establish the Berbak (carbon) landscape as a scale of meaning and regulation. 
The project has to cope with informal forest conversion activities and with 
a transmigration settlement established by the Transmigration Agency of the 
district of Muaro Jambi. The transmigration settlement was constructed within 
the state forest and within the borders of the Berbak Carbon Initiative, violating 
MoF regulations.
The first discussions about establishing a REDD+ project between the ZSL 
and the Berbak National Park Agency started in 2008. The first cooperation 
agreement on establishing a REDD+ project in the Berbak landscape was 
signed with the MoF in May 2011, and with the Berbak National Park Agency 
in October 2011. The agreement with the National Park Agency defines various 
areas of cooperation including the establishment of a measurement, reporting 
and verification system, support of the VCS and CCBS certification processes 
and the development of community benefits (Balai Taman Nasional Berbak and 
Zoological Society London, 2011). The document states that potential income 
from carbon trade will be used to preserve biodiversity and maintain the peat-
swamp forest’s carbon storage capacity (ibid.). In 2013, the ZSL signed a third 
agreement with the Provincial Forest Agency on implementing a REDD+ ini-
tiative in the Sektitar Tanjung forest reserve. The agreement defines, inter alia, 
FPIC implementation, the closure of illegal drainage canals, and the develop-
ment of a benefit-sharing mechanism for carbon trade revenues (Dinas Kehu-
tanan Provinsi Jambi, 2013).
Initial funding of USD 478,883 (The REDD Desk, 2015) for the project 
was provided by the Darwin Initiative of the UK Department for Food, Envi-
ronment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). The carbon credit broker Eco Securities 
announced its interest in purchasing credits from the project in 2008. Yet, to 
date, the project has not been certified and has not sold any carbon credits. 
ZSL is seeking for CCBS and Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) certification for 
the project. The Indonesian-based carbon consultancy company Forest Car-
bon has conducted an “initial field and desktop assessment of carbon emission 
reduction potential for the Berbak Carbon Initiative” (Eickhoff et al., 2010). 
The authors conclude that the initiative could lead to emission reductions of 
approximately 75–82 MtCO2e and is eligible for certification according to the 
VCS standard (ibid. 7). The project is of specific interest since it is planned to 
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be implemented in different forest categories (Berbak National Park, Forest 
Reserve Sekitar Tanjung, limited production forest (logging concessions) and 
conservation forest), permitting different types of land use. However, at the 
time of field research only the Berbak National Park Agency and the Provincial 
Forest Service managing the Forest Reserve had officially agreed to form part 
of the REDD+ initiative. Negotiations with the logging companies PT Putra 
Dutra Indahwood and PT Persona Belantara Persada were not finalized at this 
time. According to the ZSL, the companies were mainly concerned about the 
great uncertainties regarding carbon trade revenues.41 After years of delay, ZSL 
announced in 2015 that the project will be operational in 2018 (ZSL, 2015). 
However, the project is still not listed in the VCS database.
Existing forest regulations are an additional obstacle to harmonizing forest 
management in the landscapes of the Berbak Carbon Initiative. The forest reserve 
and national park had to be registered as separate REDD+ projects since it was 
not possible to register them as a single REDD+ project under current forest 
regulations.42 The ZSL sought to circumvent the regulatory barriers by negoti-
ating different cooperation agreements but has not yet been able to establish a 
coherent new scale of regulation. The various concessions and conservation areas 
are still governed by different authorities. A staff member of the Provincial Forest 
Agency argued that coordination was difficult since no authority wanted to lose 
influence to another.43 Jumping to the transnational scale would still allow for 
the construction of a new conservation scale of regulation for the Berbak area. 
Certification under VCS and CCBS would create a set of rules applicable to all 
land-use categories. So far, the ZSL has only managed to establish REDD+ as 
a new scale of meaning for the landscape. Other actors (e.g. logging companies) 
are challenging the production of a complementary scale of regulation.
Implementing the Berbak Carbon Initiative: conditional  
land tenure and FPIC
Potential benefits for local communities from carbon trade profits were still 
under discussion. An ZSL project manager stated that benefit sharing is planned 
but its design will depend on national legislation.44 A first community-needs 
assessment for designing community benefits was conducted by the NGO 
WALESTRA (Wahana Pelestarian dan Advokasi Hutan Sumatera) and the first 
pilot community reforestation and conditional land-tenure schemes are running 
in Seponjen, Kampung Laut and a few other villages in the Berbak landscape.
In contrast to PT REKI and as requested by the CCBS carbon standard, ZSL 
and the project partners have started to conduct a formalized free prior and 
informed consent (FPIC) process in 32 villages around the Berbak Carbon Ini-
tiative. In 2013, the process was underway in 11 villages, including Seponjen and 
Kampung Laut. However, the first consultation sessions in 2013 only involved 
members of the village elite and were conducted in the office of the sub-district 
head (camat) – not in the villages. In the case of Seponjen, only the village head, 
the imam, the head of the village parliament, and the neighborhood heads partic-
ipated.45 The village population was not officially informed by its representatives 
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about the outcome of the consultation meeting. In Kampung Laut and Sepon-
jen, therefore, knowledge about the Berbak Carbon Initiative and REDD+ in 
general was relatively limited. In Kampung Laut, only three of 17 community 
members interviewed had heard of REDD+. A member of the village govern-
ment argued that he has not disseminated information on REDD+ since he does 
not want to create high expectations in REDD+ as a potential income source.46
A local leader who had participated in the meetings with Gita Buana, the 
NGO conducting the sessions, stated that they were informed about REDD+, 
especially that “the world will buy the carbon that is stored in our region”.47 
In a progress report, Gita Buana noted that the community representatives rec-
ognized the importance of the Berbak ecosystem and agreed to contribute to 
its protection (Gita Buana, 2013). In addition to the FPIC process, a number of 
different community consultation sessions were conducted in the three study 
villages – mostly to provide information about regulations for the protected 
areas and the conditional land tenure and community reforestation program.
Because most forests in the project area have been protected for many years, 
project implementation has led to only limited changes. Furthermore, only a 
few households use agricultural land within the boundaries of the Berbak Car-
bon Initiative. Like the Harapan Rainforest, the Berbak Carbon Initiative has 
de jure not established any additional land-use restrictions, although it may have 
contributed to better enforcement and better acceptance of the existing legal 
framework for forest land. Additional regulations associated with the project 
tend rather to promote community involvement, such as FPIC implementa-
tion, than to further restrict access to land. Important land-use restrictions men-
tioned by key village informants were the prohibitions on oil palm cultivation, 
annual crops, and agricultural activities in the buffer zone (within 500 m of the 
project boundary), logging, and open fires.48
The main benefits provided by the various stakeholders implementing the 
Berbak Carbon Initiative are conditional land-tenure schemes49 (Table 4.1) and 
employment opportunities in the community reforestation programs. Benefits 
for emission reductions are dependent on the planned benefit-sharing regula-
tions for forest carbon projects, which are conditional on selling carbon credits. 
The ZSL and its partners have conducted a community-needs assessment to 
design benefits for the community.50
The conditional land tenure and community reforestation scheme in the forest 
reserve is funded by the MoF’s reforestation fund and through the provincial budget 
and backed by Law No. 5/1990 and Governmental Regulation No. 38/2007 
(Republic Indonesia, 1990, 2007). The scheme aims to allocate land to farming 
groups in eight villages around the Berbak Carbon Initiative and will privilege 
poor households and households that traditionally own land in the project area. The 
allocated land rights are based on memorandums of understanding (MoU) between 
the farming groups and the Provincial Forest Service. In Seponjen, the Provincial 
Forest Service has designated 150 ha of the forest reserve for farming groups. The 
farming groups have up to 25 members and receive 2 ha of land per participant; this 
might be expanded to 5 ha in the future. Trading land is prohibited: the land can 
only be used for jelutung,51 rubber, and rambutan52 cultivation.53
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In September 2013, 20 farming group members in Seponjen received 1 ha 
of land and were paid IDR 120,000 a day to prepare and plant the land. This 
is the first group to be officially registered by the Provincial Forest Service. 
According to a farming group member, not all interested community members 
had received land: many are on a waiting list. He explained that the households 
that are “ready” and those who need land had been selected first, but he added 
that the village government and the forest service had not used clear criteria 
to select participants.54 Another farming group member stated that many com-
munity members were unaware that they could receive land free of charge from 
the forest service.55 The information provided by key informants in Kampung 
Laut was partly contradictive. One key informant stated that land allocation 
had not yet started in Kampung Laut and explained that households interested 
in receiving land should form farming groups and prepare management plan 
proposals.56 A second key informant said that he knew about the program but 
thought that it had not started yet.57 A third key informant who is a member of 
a farming group said that the program was already running: his farming group, 
which already had 37 members and an official permit from the Provincial For-
est Service, had already started to plant jelutung trees.58 A fourth informant 
stated that 50 ha of land would be allocated to farmers in Kampung Laut: the 
mapping and allocation of 2-ha plots had just started.59 When visiting the pro-
ject area in August 2016, most of plots that had been allocated to farmers had 
been destroyed by the devastating peat and forest fires of that year.
The non-transparent dissemination of information on the conditional land-
tenure scheme and knowledge asymmetries between different community 
members permitted elite capture and rent-seeking behavior. An example from 
an area of the forest reserve claimed by both the village of Seponjen and the 
sub-district capital of Tanjung/Suakandis is illustrative. A migrant from Lam-
pung stated that he had bought land that was designated for the conditional 
land-tenure scheme – from a field assistant of the Provincial Forest Service. He 
paid IDR 7,000,000 for 3 ha of land, including a sporadik title issued by the head 
of the Kelurahan Tanjung/Suakandis. In all, 30 ha of land designated for the 
scheme had been sold to ten households.60
Land conflicts associated with the Berbak Carbon Project are not as severe 
and violent as in the Harapan Rainforest project. Forest authorities tolerate 
fishing and jelutung tapping in the National Park. Land conversion within the 
project occurs, e.g. east of Seponjen, and, as mentioned, initiated by the con-
struction of the transmigration settlement in Kampung Laut.
Other private and/or donor-funded REDD+ activities in Jambi
Private actors have gained importance in Jambi as their strong involvement 
in the Harapan Rainforest and Berbak Carbon Initiative illustrate. However, 
these are only two of a number of new private conservation initiatives in the 
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The Bukit Tigapuluh Ecosystem Conservation initiative was devel-
oped by the Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS), the Bukit Tigapuluh National 
Park Agency, WWF, Yayasan Kehati and other NGOs. The NGOs ZGF, WWF 
and Yayasan Kehati have recently founded a conservation company (PT. Alam 
Bukit Tigapuluh) and received a private conservation concession (ERC) in 
2015. The project receives EUR 3.6 million from IKI through KfW to build 
up the project infrastructure (ZGF, 2016). As in other projects, the involved 
NGOs plan community benefit schemes to improve the livelihoods of local 
communities. Initially, ZGF planned to finance future project activities via 
carbon trade and recently conducted a carbon pre-assessment (Hein 2013b: 
14). Parts of the project area are occupied by local indigenous groups and by 
Javanese migrants. Friends of the Earth Jambi (WALHI Jambi) issued a press 
statement in February 2016 in the name of the village community of Pema-
yungan. The community complained that villagers have to stop farming inside 
the concession and that they were not informed prior to project implementa-
tion (WALHI Jambi, 2016).
The Community Forests for Climate, People and Wildlife project is 
an initiative of Flora and Fauna International (FFI) with project sites in Jambi 
and West Kalimantan (Fauna & Flora International, 2012). FFI plans to support 
villages by implementing voluntary market REDD+ projects in their village 
forest concessions. In Jambi FFI collaborated with the village community of 
Durian Rambun in the Merangin district. The village holds a village forest 
concession of 4484 ha (ibid. 4). The project is operational and was validated in 
2015 and registered in 2017 (Plan Vivo, 2018).
The Community Forest Management Project in Jangkat Highland 
is implemented by the NGO Sumatra Sustainable Support Pundi (SSS Pundi 
Sumatra) in the villages of Pematang Pauh, Talang Tembago and Muara Madras 
in the Merangin district (Pundi Sumatera, 2014: 2). The Project Idea Note was 
approved by Plan Vivo in 2014 (Plan Vivo, 2015).
In addition, Jambi is a target area of the Tropical Forest Conservation Action 
(TFCA) for Sumatra. TFCA is a US-Indonesian debt-for-nature swap adminis-
tered by the Indonesian NGO Yayasan Kehati (TFCA-Sumatera, 2014). Its main 
focuses are biodiversity conservation at the landscape level and contributing to 
Indonesia’s emission reduction targets. TFCA currently supports village border 
demarcation in buffer zone villages of the Berbak Carbon Initiative. TFCA also 
provides funding for the Bukit Tigapuluh Ecosystem Conservation Initiative. 
A second major donor initiative linking conservation and mitigation is funded 
through the US Millennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC). MCC supports 
land-use planning and alternative livelihood strategies in 32 villages surround-
ing the Berbak Carbon Initiative (Millennium Challenge Account, 2015: 20).
Summary and preliminary conclusion
REDD+, market-based conservation and general discursive shifts associated 
with neoliberal conservation (Fletcher, 2010) and ideas to sell nature to save it 
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(McAfee, 1999) have changed Indonesia’s conservation landscape. Conservation 
NGOs have become increasingly influential. Until the early 2000s, they were 
mainly involved in lobbying for new protected areas, the co-management of 
protected areas and campaigning for stricter environmental regulations. Today, 
conservation NGOs have established private protected areas and conserva-
tion companies in order to access conservation concessions and to trade with 
ecosystem services. Moreover, they are involved in formulating and enforcing 
socio-ecological safeguards and carbon certification systems. NGOs and con-
servation companies have taken on the former functions of state agencies: they 
develop rules for managing protected areas, trade with ecosystem services and 
have established private security agencies to protect their conservancies.
REDD+ in particular has created a whole new set of (mostly non-binding) 
rules, recommendations and guidelines. The trading of REDD+ credits and 
multilateral or bilateral result-based payments for emission reductions require 
homogenous rules for carbon accounting but also to govern the acknowledge-
ment of community rights and participation processes. The result is an emerg-
ing transnational scale of REDD+ governance. However, REDD+ has not yet 
led to coherent and uniform transnational rules. The current situation is rather 
characterized by a number of fragmented, sometimes competing scales of regu-
lation. This is also reflected at the national and sub-national scales where many 
different forest-based mitigation initiatives exist in parallel to each other, some 
of which even compete or contradict one another. Even more importantly, 
many of the new Indonesian REDD+ regulations, policies, strategies and letters 
of intent have not yet been implemented or have been challenged by other state 
apparatuses, hindering the construction of a coherent national scale of REDD+ 
regulation. Furthermore, many of the MoF REDD+ regulations remain unspe-
cific and seem to be irrelevant at the project scale. Recently, the closing of the 
REDD+ Agency, the lack of reference to REDD+ in Indonesia’s NDC and 
in a recent mid-term development plan, indicate that REDD+ is a contested 
mechanism at the national scale.
The various UNFCCC legal documents, the criteria of transnational carbon 
standards (e.g. CCBS), and the safeguards of donors (e.g. the BMZ human 
rights policy) have at least potentially strengthened the rights of local and 
especially of indigenous communities vis-à-vis national forest agencies, private 
companies, conservation NGOs and donors. In this context, REDD+ may have 
changed the dialectical relationship between structure and agency. Indications 
for this changed relationship are AMAN’s success at the constitutional court, 
the consideration of FPIC in forest carbon standards, the acknowledgements 
of customary land tenure in Indonesia’s national REDD+ strategy, the Cancun 
Safeguards, and probably also the ability of SPI to use the Harapan Rainfor-
est project for SPI’s and La Via Campesina’s transnational campaigns against 
offsetting.
REDD+ and forest carbon offsetting link emitters in the North to land 
conflicts in the Global South, thus contributing to the transnationalization of 
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alleged local land-tenure conflicts. REDD+ provides entry points for trans-
national resistance campaigns tackling questions of global climate justice. The 
following Chapter 5 focuses on this new kind of transnationalized agrarian 
conflict that arises in the context of the implementation of privatized con-
servation and REDD+ initiatives in Indonesia. The simplistic logic of market 
environmentalism meets the complexity of Jambi’s land tenure regime outlined 
in Chapter 3. In this situation, new conflicts and new alliances among actors are 
emerging while old pre-existing conflicts change their meanings.
Notes
 1 Article 72 requests developing country parties “[. . .] when developing and implementing 
their national strategies or action plans, to address, inter alia, the drivers of deforestation 
and forest degradation, land tenure issues, forest governance issues, gender considerations 
and the safeguards identified in paragraph 2 of appendix I to this decision, ensuring the 
full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, inter alia indigenous peoples and 
local communities”.
 2 This meeting was held in Bogota in the context of the German-, Norwegian- and UK-
financed REDD+ early mover program. I had the opportunity to participate.
 3 Interviews with key informants in Bungku, 12.09.2012 and in Tanjung Leber, 21.07.2013 
and with CAPPA activists in Jambi, 18.07.2013 and based on an unpublished KfW 
document.
 4 Interviews with a staff member of the Ministry of Finance, Jakarta, 19.07.2012 and with 
a staff member of CIFOR, Bogor, 26.07.2012.
 5 Interview with a staff member of ZSL, Bogor, 27.08.2012.
 6 Interview with a staff member of the Norwegian Forest and Climate Initiative, via tel-
ephone, 11.12.2012.
 7 Interview with a staff member of CIFOR, Bogor, 26.07.2012 and with a staff member 
of the Ministry for Finance, Jakarta, 19.07.2012.
 8 Interview with a staff member of the Ministry of Forestry, Jakarta, 23.07.2012.
 9 Interview with a staff member of CIFOR, Bogor, 26.07.2012.
 10 Interview with a staff member of Sajogyo Institute, Bogor, 13.08.2013.
 11 Interview with an AMAN activist, Jakarta, 27.07.2012.
 12 Interview with a staff member of CIFOR, Bogor, 26.07.2012.
 13 Interview with a member of the KOMDA REDD+, Jambi, 15.08.2013.
 14 Interview with a staff member of the sub-district administration of Kumpeh, Tanjung/
Suakandis, 02.09.2013, and with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 25.07.2013.
 15 Here, I do not describe all actors mentioned in Figure 4.1 in detail. I only describe the 
role of the most relevant actors; others were introduced earlier or will be introduced in 
Chapter 5.
 16 Interview with activists of Gita Buana, 22.08.2013, Jambi.
 17 Interview with activists of CAPPA, 18.07.2013, Jambi.
 18 Interview with activists of SETARA, 18.07.2013, Jambi.
 19 Interview with a staff member of the Ministry of Forestry, Jakarta, 23.07.2012.
 20 The terms ecosystem restoration concession and private conservation concession are 
used as synonyms.
 21 Interview with a staff member of Burung Indonesia, Bogor, 11.10.2012.
 22 Interview with a staff member of Burung Indonesia, Bogor, 11.10.2012.
 23 Interview with a staff member of Carbon Synthesis, Jakarta, 11.10.2012.
 24 Interview with a staff member of the Ministry of Forestry, Jakarta 19.07.2012 and 
23.07.2012.
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 25 Interview with a staff member of Carbon Synthesis, Jakarta, 11.10.2012.
 26 Interview with a staff member of Burung Indonesia, Bogor, 11.10.2013.
 27 Official name used by the Ministry of Forestry for the production forest block located 
on both sides of the border region of Jambi and South Sumatra.
 28 Decree of the Minister of Forestry No. SK.83/Menhut-II/2005, dated April 1, 2005.
 29 Interview with a staff member of Burung Indonesia, Bogor, 11.10.2012.
 30 Interview with a staff member of Burung Indonesia, Bogor, 11.10.2012.
 31 Interview with a staff member of Burung Indonesia, 11.10.2013, Bogor.
 32 Interview with a staff member of PT REKI, 02.09.2012, Jambi.
 33 Interview with a PT REKI staff member in Bungku, 30.07.2013.
 34 Interviews with a PT REKI staff member in Jambi, 02.09.2012 and with a PT REKI 
staff member in Bungku, 23.09.2012, 30.07.2013 and 31.07.2013.
 35 The mitra settlement is a resettlement initiative for Batin Sembilan of the conservation 
company PT REKI. The participating families lived before scattered over the concession 
area.
 36 Interviews with a PT REKI staff member in Jambi, 02.09.2012 and with a PT REKI 
staff member in Bungku, 31.07.2013.
 37 Interview with a PT REKI staff member in Bungku, 31.07.2013.
 38 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 12.09.2012.
 39 Dragon blood, Daemonorops draco, is a specific rattan species that produces a red resin.
 40 Interview with an ZSL staff member, Bogor, 27.08.2012.
 41 Interviews with an ZSL staff member, Bogor, 27.08.2012 and staff of the Berbak 
National Park Agency, Jambi, 19.08.2013.
 42 Interview with an ZSL staff member, Bogor, 27.08.2012.
 43 Interview with a staff member of Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi Jambi, 27.08.2013.
 44 Interview with an ZSL staff member, Bogor, 27.08.2012.
 45 Interviews with key informants in Seponjen, 10.09.2013 and 11.09.2013.
 46 Interview with a key informant, Kampung Laut, 30.08.2013.
 47 Interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 30.08.2013.
 48 Interview with key informants in Seponjen, 08.09.2013, 12.09.2013 and 13.09.2013 
and in Kampung Laut, 29.08.2012 and 04.09.2013.
 49 Various actors run the different community involvement programs, the most advanced 
of which is the community reforestation and conditional land-tenure program run by 
Jambi’s provincial forest service.
 50 Interview with a staff member of the ZSL in Bogor, 27.08.2012.
 51 Dyera costulata, syn. D. laxiflora
 52 Nephelium lappaceum
 53 Interview with a staff member of Dinas Kehutanan Jambi in Jambi, 27.08.2013.
 54 Interview with a key informant in Seponjen, 09.09. 2013.
 55 Interview with a key informant in Seponjen, 10.09.2013.
 56 Interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 30.09.2013.
 57 Interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 01.09.2013.
 58 Interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 29.08.2013.
 59 Interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 28.08.2013.
 60 Interview with a key informant in Seponjen, 12.09.2013.
 61 Interviews with a project manager of ZGF, Jambi, 31.08.2012, with staff of PT REKI, 
Jambi, 02.09.2012 and with a staff member of Burung Indonesia, 11.10.2013.
5  Transnationalized agrarian 
conflicts in the REDD+
This chapter focuses on the transnational dimensions of agrarian conflicts and 
peasant resistance. It investigates the different resistance strategies of peasants 
and indigenous groups vis-à-vis conservation NGOs and apparatuses of the 
state. It provides successful examples of peasant resistance challenging the com-
modification of forest carbon and disentangles conflicts between development 
and conservation-oriented apparatuses of the state.
Access to and control of Sumatra’s forests have been subject to contestation, 
especially after the regime change of the late 1990s. As outlined in Chapter 3, 
peasants and indigenous communities supported by sub-national governments 
were able to challenge centralized authority over the state forest territory and 
started to regain control of former customary land. However, the state forest 
territory remained under the de jure control of the Ministry of Forestry, leading 
to highly complex and ambiguous land and forest tenure and to sometimes vio-
lent conflict involving peasants, indigenous groups, various state agencies and 
corporate actors. Conflicts among peasants and oil palm and timber plantation 
companies were notably violent. However, they also fostered the formation of 
local resistance movements and provided the opportunity for peasants to estab-
lish alliances with the transnational and national peasant and indigenous rights 
organizations that emerged across the archipelago after the regime change.
This dynamic and contested political landscape provides context for REDD+ 
and market-based conservation interventions and peasant resistance on the island 
of Sumatra. In particular, REDD+ and the increasing influence of private actors 
described in Chapter 4 have not only changed Indonesia’s conservation landscape, 
they have also changed the meanings and the spatial extent of apparently local con-
flicts about access to and control over forests. REDD+ has strong implications for 
environmental and climate justice. It links actors with emission-intensive lifestyles 
in the Global North and in urban centers with peasants and indigenous groups 
living at the forest margins, leadings to new transnational alliances and new trans-
national conflicts. Apparently local conflicts about Jambi’s forests became conflicts 
about the ability to define a forest as a “carbon toilet for the rich countries” or as 
a resource for regional development, swidden farming and agricultural expansion.
REDD+ and the emergence of the indigenous rights discourse changed the 
dialectical relationships between structure and agency. The acknowledgement 
of indigenous rights in international law as well as in the emerging REDD+ 
governance framework provided additional legitimacy for ethnicity-based land 
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claims and entry points for transnational NGOs. REDD+ has increased inter-
national attention towards structural inequality in national forest governance 
in the tropics and has fostered the diffusion of international norms such as 
FPIC, strengthening the position of peasants and indigenous groups vis-à-vis 
forest authorities, companies and conservation project developers. While the 
debates on REDD+ have widened the room for maneuver for some peasants 
and indigenous communities, the simultaneous expansion of conservation areas 
and large-scale agricultural estates has limited land-use opportunities for most 
peasants and indigenous communities significantly (Hall, Hirsch and Li, 2011 
Hein and Faust, 2014; Hein and Garrelts, 2014; Kijazi, 2015; Osborne, 2011).
The conflicts that occurred in the context of the implementation of the Hara-
pan Rainforest and the Berbak Carbon Initiative involve peasants, indigenous 
groups, different state agencies and – in the case of the Harapan Rainforest – the 
conservation company PT REKI. The cases illustrate a transnationalization of 
agrarian conflicts. Moreover, the conflicts described in this chapter can be con-
sidered as attempts by peasants and indigenous groups (and also by sub-national 
governments) to defend the access to and control over forest and resources 
they had at least partially gained in the turbulent early post-Suharto period 
(described in Chapter 3). The various village-scale settlements located within 
the state forest territory described in Chapter 3 are now challenged by REDD+ 
and conservation interventions (Figure 5.1). Not all state agencies involved in 
Figure 5.1  Picture of entrance portal to a settlement of Kunangan Jaya I located inside the 
Harapan Rainforest
(Source: taken by the author, 2013)
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local contestations over land act in line with national policies, some have actively 
supported peasants in conflicts, some sub-national state agencies have engaged 
in open resistance against centralized control of the state forest territory.
This chapter provides, first, an introduction to the indigenous rights move-
ment and agrarian movements and their attempts to challenge centralized con-
trol of state forest territory and to lobby for agrarian reform and indigenous 
rights. Second, it gives a short overview of conflicts among peasants, indigenous 
groups and oil palm companies, and of the implications of these conflicts for 
land struggles in the context of REDD+. Third, it provides in-depth analysis 
of specific multi-scalar and transnational land conflicts characterized by differ-
ent conflict histories, scalar arrangements and actor constellations. Peasants and 
indigenous groups employ multiple strategies to legitimize and maintain their 
presence within the state forest territory and within areas designated for forest 
conservation and REDD+.
The formation of resistance movements and alternative 
scales of meaning and regulation
Public invasion of the state forest territory in Jambi and other parts of  Indonesia 
was actively supported by peasant and indigenous rights organizations, in par-
ticular after the fall of Suharto, but invasions also took place in the context of 
earlier regime changes (e.g. in the early post-colonial period). After the fall of 
Suharto, peasants and indigenous groups started to establish initial factions in 
order to fight against historically contingent structural marginalization and 
violence (Peluso et al., 2008: 379). Today, indigenous rights and peasant organ-
izations are powerful mass organizations with well-established transnational 
support networks. The most important organizations are probably Aliansi 
Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN, Indigenous Rights Movement of the 
Archipelago) and the Serikat Petani Indonesia (SPI, Indonesian Peasant Union). 
Whereas SPI is directly involved in the struggles over access to and control of 
the Harapan Rainforest, AMAN is rather indirectly involved through lobbying 
for indigenous rights to land and self-determination. Other important national 
peasant and indigenous rights organizations involved in agrarian conflicts in 
Jambi are Serikat Tani Nasional (STN, National Peasant Union) and Alliansi 
Gerakan Reforma Agraria (AGRA, Alliance Movement for Agrarian Reform). 
In addition, a number of local organizations and advocacy groups exist in 
Jambi. Many of them were founded in the context of ongoing land conflicts 
with oil palm and pulp and paper companies. Organizations involved in the 
conflicts described in this chapter include the community-based organization 
SAD 113 (indigenous groups of the three villages) and advocacy NGOs such 
as CAPPA and SETARA (c.f. chapter 4).
Indigenous rights organizations and peasant organizations cooperate, but their 
narratives and frames are based on fundamentally different ideological founda-
tions. AMAN, as the largest group of the indigenous rights movement, clearly 
links land rights to ethnic identity. Agrarian organizations such as SPI link land 
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rights to citizenship, to the Indonesian constitution and to rights guaranteed in 
the Basic Agrarian Law (Peluso et al., 2008: 387; Rachman, 2011: 104; Tuong, 
2009: 183). Consequently, both movements refer to different scales, narratives 
and regulations. AMAN seeks to reestablish different local and ethnic-specific 
scales of cultural meaning and scales of land tenure regulation based on pre- 
existing ethnic territories. Agrarian organizations fight for a more socially and 
environmentally just national scale of regulation. In practice, despite the ideo-
logical differences, the two movements cooperate. For instance, AMAN and SPI 
jointly called on members to vote for President Jokowi in the 2014 presidential 
elections (Alliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN) Bengkulu, 2014).
The reemergence of adat and the foundation of AMAN
Indigenous communities in Indonesia, in general known as adat (customary) 
communities, regained influence during the Reformasi era. Adat communities 
and their leaders increasingly started to claim land based on pre-existing ances-
tral lands and pre-existing larger adat territories (e.g. Wilayah Adat) (Barr et al., 
2006: 2; McCarthy, 2005: 57). Members of the indigenous Batin Sembilan liv-
ing within and adjacent to the Harapan Rainforest project, for instance, claim 
that almost the entire project area used to be part of their former customary 
land. Pre-existing adat territories and customary law were also used by district 
governments to legitimate the allocation of small-scale timber and forest con-
version concessions (Barr et al., 2006: 12; Rhee, 2009: 46). In many areas, a 
parallel village administration based on customary law appeared. Furthermore, 
ethnicity became a relevant category for the legitimation of political authority 
(Rhee, 2009: 46). Categories such as putra daerah (literally, child of the region) 
became relevant and conflicts spread over the archipelago, especially between 
migrant groups and the indigenous population (Acciaioli, 2001: 87; Rhee, 2009: 
46). In Jambi, interviewed villagers reported only smaller ethnic disputes, and 
interethnic marriages are common.
Especially the occupation of state forest or regaining access to state forest 
was a means to overcome the historical structural injustice and political mar-
ginalization that started with the Dutch conquest and was aggravated during 
the New Order era (Barr et al., 2006: 2; Peluso et al., 2008: 386; Steinebach, 
2013b: 65). Furthermore, decentralization and shifting boundaries caused by 
jurisdictional reforms revealed the way in which the scales of regulation estab-
lished by the Dutch colonial government and the Suharto government did not 
necessarily fit with pre-existing settlement patterns, traditional authority and 
customary territories.
The reemergence of adat or, in broader terms, of ethnicity as a means to 
claim natural resources was not accidental. Decentralization laws such as Law 
22/1999 explicitly permitted more diverse local administration that considered 
local customs (Moeliono and Dermawan, 2006: 115). In 2001, the Indonesian 
parliament decided that land tenure and natural resource management laws 
have to “[. . .] recognize, respect and protect the rights of adat law communities” 
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(Indonesian Supreme Parliament (MPR), cited in McCarthy, 2005: 58). Further-
more, the strong transnational indigenous rights movement, as well as interna-
tional agreements and conventions such as Convention 169 of the International 
Labor Organization (ILO), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, provided additional 
agency and significantly enhanced the political context of adat groups in Indo-
nesia (Bedner and Van Huis, 2008: 168–169). Indonesia has not signed the ILO 
Convention 169 but the convention has become increasingly influential since 
many donor agencies (such as DANIDA) stipulate free and prior informed 
consent (FPIC) (ibid. 169).
In this dynamic context, indigenous groups started to organize and form asso-
ciations. Customary communities that had been displaced or dispossessed initi-
ated resistance activities, identifying themselves as indigenous people (Peluso 
et al., 2008: 386). In 1999, approximately 500 indigenous people from different 
parts of the archipelago met in Jakarta and founded the nationwide indigenous 
rights organization AMAN. During their initial congress in the same year, they 
postulated the slogan: “We will not recognize the Nation, if the Nation does not 
recognize us” (Li, 2001: 645). Today, the organization is well integrated in trans-
national networks and supported by international donors (Hauser-Schäublin, 
2013: 10). The organization claims to represent all indigenous communities of 
the archipelago (Bedner and Van Huis, 2008: 167).
REDD+ further strengthens the influence of the organization. AMAN is 
present at UNFCCC climate change conferences, is regularly involved in side 
events, and their representatives are regular guests at high-level panel discussions 
that take place at the margins of UNFCCC conferences. AMAN has success-
fully utilized the current focus on forests and the dominant public discourse 
that frames indigenous groups as forest stewards (Sammukri, 2013: 121–123). 
With the support of the Norwegian government and the REDD+ Taskforce, 
AMAN has been involved in a nationwide mapping of indigenous territories 
and participated in the transnational indigenous rights campaign “No Rights 
No REDD” (c.f. Hein and Garrelts, 2014: 345).1
In 2013, the organization achieved a major success. To further recognition 
of indigenous rights to land within the state forest territory, AMAN and part-
ner organizations forced a decision by the Indonesian Constitutional Court 
Keputusan MK 35/PUU-X-2012) on whether the MoF has the legitimacy 
to control adat forest (Makamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, 2012). The 
court strengthened the rights of adat communities vis-à-vis the MoF sig-
nificantly, declaring that adat forest is no longer under the authority of the 
MoF (Rachman, 2013). The court ruling acknowledges adat communities “as 
right bearing subjects” (Rachman and Siscawati, 2017: 224), in other words 
as actors that have “the right to have rights”, including rights to land and 
natural resources (ibid.). This decision is far reaching and has the potential to 
end the criminalization of customary communities, but it may also increase 
the probability of ethnic conflicts. At the time of writing, the decision has not 
been fully implemented.
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AMAN successfully shifted political struggle on the recognition of indig-
enous territories from the local scale to the national scale and to the scale of 
global climate policy – the UNFCCC climate change conferences. But despite 
AMAN’s claim to represent customary communities across the archipelago and 
its commitment to self-identification, the organization uses criteria and a veri-
fication mechanism to govern its acceptance of members. An AMAN activist 
responded to a question about whether any community that identifies itself as 
indigenous could be a member as follows: “Yes, but they have to get a recom-
mendation from other communities which know them and we [AMAN] have 
our own criteria and verification mechanism, before we accept new mem-
bers”.2 For instance, AMAN does not fully recognize the territorial claims of 
the Batin Sembilan in the landscapes of the Harapan Rainforest.3
Indigeneity is not a self-evident resource in Indonesia (Rachman and Sis-
cawati, 2017: 237). Indigenous groups have to engage actively in indigeneity 
politics, and in many cases they need to establish links to NGOs, peasant organ-
izations or AMAN in order to benefit from the indigenous rights discourse 
(ibid.). Not all groups and not all members of indigenous groups are able to 
do so.
The reemergence of agrarian movements
Contemporary agrarian organizations in Indonesia have their historical roots 
in various left-wing organizations formed after independence. The Indonesian 
Peasant Front (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI), for instance, was formed in 1945 
and was involved in land occupations on Java, Bali and Sumatra after independ-
ence (Peluso et al., 2008: 381; Tuong, 2009: 181). During the New Order era, 
any resistance against national land allocation policies was suppressed by police 
and military force. About a 100,000 BTI activists and members of Indonesia’s 
Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia) were killed in the massacres of 
the 1960s. Consequently, any open peasant resistance came to an end (Peluso 
et al., 2008: 382).
The first new underground movements emerged in the early 1990s (Peluso 
et al., 2008: 387). Some cooperated with the environmental justice movement 
WALHI (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia) and with the Indonesian Legal 
Aid Foundation. Both organizations had been tolerated by the Suharto Regime 
and were able to start initial multi-scalar campaigns by supporting local farm-
ers and criticizing the lack of implementation of the Basic Agrarian Law (ibid. 
384–387). Directly after Suharto’s fall, landless people and peasants occupied 
state forest territory and plantation estates (Peluso et al., 2008: 388; Tuong, 2009: 
182). The first explicit peasant and agrarian reform organizations reemerged 
in the late 1990s. Probably the most influential are Serikat Petani Indonesia 
(SPI, Indonesian Peasant Union) and Konsortium Pembaruan Agraria (KPA, 
Consortium for Agrarian Reform). Both organizations share the same political 
views but KPA is rather urban-based and SPI has a stronger rural basis (Tuong, 
2009: 183). Other relevant peasant organizations are STN and AGRA. STN was 
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founded in 1993 in Yogyakarta. The organization aims to support the economic, 
political and socio-cultural development of peasants, to increase knowledge 
about “agrarian problems triggered by imperialism and neoliberalism” and to 
lobby for an agrarian reform that provides access to land, capital and technology 
for peasants (STN, 2018). AGRA is a rather young agrarian organization estab-
lished in 2004. The organization considers itself a union for peasants, for ethnic 
minorities and adat communities struggling for agrarian reform (AGRA, 2015). 
AGRA is a member of the Asian Peasant Coalition and of the International 
League of Peoples’ Struggles (ILPS). All three rural-based peasant organiza-
tions (SPI, STN and AGRA) campaign for agrarian reform and all three seem 
to be relatively close in ideological terms. In an interview, an AGRA activist 
explained that from his perspective AGRA and SPI both fight for land reform, 
adding that for AGRA reform is just one of many targets.
SPI was formed in North Sumatra by peasant activists who started to organ-
ize in the late 1990s. Since 2003, SPI has been a member of the global peasant 
organization La Via Campesina. In early years, SPI was mainly involved in advo-
cacy work for peasant farmers, landless peasants and peasants negatively affected 
by the activities of agribusinesses and state agencies (Purwanto, 2013: 1). From 
the very beginning, the organization used the Basic Agrarian Law as the legal 
basis for its campaigns (ibid. 2). SPI considers the law “[. . .] as a progressive law 
aiming to redress the unfair distribution of agrarian and economic resources 
[. . .]” (Purwanto, 2013: 2).
SPI considers itself as a community-based anti-capitalistic organization work-
ing for socially inclusive land, natural resource and trade policy (Tuong, 2009: 
182). At the global level the organization – together with La Via  Campesina – 
campaigns for fair north–south relations, food sovereignty and climate justice 
(Hein and Faust, 2014: 23; Purwanto, 2013: 2; Tuong, 2009: 185). To reach its 
goals, SPI organizes mass protests against state agencies and companies and con-
ducts land occupations (Purwanto, 2013: 2). SPI not only campaigns for agrar-
ian reform, by allocating occupied land to landless farmers they also to some 
extent conduct their own informal agrarian reform. At the global scale SPI is 
represented by La Via Campesina in most cases. Both organizations organize 
protests against forest carbon offsetting and REDD+ in the context of interna-
tional climate change conferences (Hein and Faust, 2014: 25).
In Jambi, the organization has currently 15,000–20,000 members and operates 
in eight districts.4 In the Harapan Rainforest, SPI members are involved in land 
occupations. SPI also supports farmers in a land conflict in the Kerinci National 
Park, where 3200 farmers are involved in forest conversion and land occupation 
within the park boundaries (Serikat Petani Indonesia, 2012; Tambunan, 2015).
Concluding remarks on peasant and indigenous rights movements
AMAN and SPI have been quite successful in challenging the state and its 
apparatuses. They benefitted from the regime change at the end of the 1990s – 
indeed their informal predecessors probably contributed to the regime change, 
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but that is beyond the scope of this book. Political turmoil and regime change 
reduced the power of the central state over sub-national public authorities, 
peasants and indigenous groups. AMAN, SPI and other peasant and indige-
nous rights organizations were able to develop counter-narratives which were 
able to challenge the development narratives of the New Order era. In Lukes’ 
and Gaventa’s terms, they were able to challenge invisible power. Further-
more, they were able to mobilize communities across the archipelago. In 2012, 
1992 indigenous communities were members of AMAN (Alliansi Masyarakat 
Adat Nusantara (AMAN), 2015). SPI is now present in 14 Indonesian prov-
inces.5 Hence, both organizations have developed remarkable organizational 
strength and are able to challenge the visible power of state apparatuses such as 
the MoEF. Furthermore, they have proved their ability to jump scales and to 
expand political struggle from the individual household scale of their members 
to the national (e.g. constitutional court) and the global scale (e.g. the no rights 
no REDD+ campaign) (Alliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN), 2015; 
Purwanto, 2013).
Agro-industrial expansion, land concentration and 
violence at Jambi’s oil palm frontier
Oil palm companies control vast areas of the villages of Seponjen, Kampung 
Laut, Bungku and Tanjung Lebar (Table 5.1). Peasants are increasingly stuck 
between large agro-industrial estates and green enclosures. In many cases, the 
local population claim parts of the corporate concessions, and complain about 
unfair compensation and unjust benefit-sharing arrangements. Moreover, the 
Table 5.1  Land allocated to companies, total village territory, and land used by farmers in 
the study villages in 2014
Village “Official” village 
territory (ha)
Land allocated to 
companies (ha)
Land used by farmers (ha)
Air Hitam Laut No data No companies No data
Seponjen 16,000 20001 16002
Kampung Laut 12,0003 3004 825.45
Bungku ~150,0006 105,2057 No data
Tanjung Lebar 65008 3000 15009
(Source: compiled by the author)
1 Based on interview with key informants in Seponjen, 09.09.2013, 11.09.2013 and 13.09.2013.
2 Based on village government documents, Seponjen (2013: 6).
3 Based on information provided by village government.
4 Based on an interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 02.09.2013.
5 Based on information provided by village government, Kampung Laut (2012).
6 Based on Zainuddin.
7 Ibid. and Mardiana (2014: 16).
8 Based on Polsek Sungai Bahar (2011).
9 Based on Polsek Sungai Bahar (2011).
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land conflicts over access to and control of the Harapan Rainforest are deeply 
entangled in conflicts with the various oil palm companies surrounding the 
conservation concession and local communities. The conflicts involve the same 
actor groups, and the oil palm company PT Asiatic Persada has pushed the 
Batin Sembilan and other smallholders into the remaining forest patches of the 
Harapan Rainforest (Beckert et al., 2014: 86; Colchester et al., 2011: 15; Hein 
et al., 2016). The conflict with PT Asiatic Persada is one of the longest ongo-
ing land disputes in Jambi, involving one of the most controversial plantation 
developments in the province. The conflict has led to a number of injuries, to 
at least one casualty, and to the destruction of a number of the farmsteads, old 
graveyards and forest gardens of the indigenous Batin Sembilan.
The previous concession owner PT Bangun Desa Utama (PT BDU) received 
a 20,000 ha concession in 1984 that overlapped with land claimed by the vil-
lage communities of Bungku, Tanjung Lebar, Markanding and Pompa Air (the 
latter two were not included in the villages visited for this study). It is very 
likely that the Batin Sembilan and the populations of the affected hamlets had 
no say regarding the issuance of the plantation concession (Hak Guna Usaha); 
according to a key informant in Bungku, they were not consulted prior to 
the plantation’s implementation.6 The same informant stated that the company 
destroyed rubber plots and fruit gardens: “[. . .] originally this was all commu-
nity land. We had rubber, durian, and jernang7 (dragon blood). It was land of 
the people but the company destroyed it with bulldozers”. A Batin Sembilan 
elder explained that the plantation estate was constructed with support from 
the military and the police: resistance was impossible.8 A significant part of the 
Batin Sembilan population now living in the Harapan Rainforest once lived in 
areas now used by PT Asiatic Persada.
Although the conflict with PT Asiatic Persada has not yet been resolved, 
rescaling processes and scale jumping to the transnational scale facilitated by 
the NGO SETARA has strengthened the position of local communities vis-à-
vis the company. SETARA’s transnational partners, such as the NGOs Robin 
Wood and Rettet den Regenwald, organized protests in Germany against the 
company and its customer Unilever (Beckert and Keck, 2015; Robin Wood, 
2011, 2014). PT Asiatic Persada’s former owner, the Singapore-based agrobusi-
ness group, Wilmar International, recently sold the company to avoid losing 
its certification from the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)9 (c.f. 
Beckert et al., 2014; Steinebach, 2013b). At the time of my field research, mem-
bers of the local activists group SAD 113 had occupied and managed approxi-
mately 241 ha of the plantation. The activists claim that they descend from 
three pre-colonial hamlets (Tanah Menang, Pinang Tinggi and Padang Salak).
In more recent smaller corporate plantation developments in the villages 
of Tanjung Lebar, Seponjen and Kampung Laut, local public authorities were 
directly involved in the permit process – although conflicts and disputes also 
occurred. In Tanjung Lebar, for instance, PT Bahar Pasifik received a permit 
from the Lembaga Adat of Tanjung Lebar, which managed customary land that 
the Batin Sembilan community had received from the provincial government 
Transnationalized agrarian conflicts in REDD+ 141
in the early 2000s.10 The Lembaga Adat’s permit required the company to set 
aside land for a smallholder scheme but once the company received the HGU 
from the district government, it refused to allocate land to smallholders.11 Some 
of the displaced smallholders then moved into the Harapan Rainforest. In this 
case, the company applied scale jumping to the district scale of regulation to 
avoid the costs of running a smallholder scheme. Key informants have reported 
a similar case in Seponjen at the margins of the Berbak Carbon Initiative.
Peasant resistance against the companies occurred in both hidden and in 
open ways. In the case of PT Asiatic Persada, peasants openly occupy parts of 
the concession and have marked the occupied areas with flags and boundary 
stones. In other conflicts, peasants rather relied on hidden resistance strate-
gies, such as sabotage. In Seponjen, for instance, peasants stole the keys of land 
machinery to hinder land conversion for a new plantation estate.
Corporate oil palm plantations are powerful actors in the landscapes adjacent 
to the Harapan Rainforest and the Berbak Carbon Initiative. They hold large 
oil palm concessions which in many cases overlap with land claimed as custom-
ary land by peasants and indigenous groups (Beckert, 2017; Beckert et al., 2014, 
Beckert and Keck, 2015; Steinebach, 2013b;). Many villagers were displaced 
in the context of the plantation developments while others lost their land and 
then started to work for the companies. The village of Bungku, which inhab-
itants call the Village of 1001 Problems has been in a situation of permanent 
conflict and emergency for more than 20 years. Peasant and indigenous rights 
to land and livelihood strategies are permanently at risk. In this conflictive 
political context, peasants and indigenous groups engaged in collective learn-
ing about how to deal with the permanent threat of losing access to their land, 
formed local resistance movements and established links with political parties 
and local and transnational NGOs. The established networks and social capital 
again became relevant in the context of the implementation of the Berbak 
Carbon Initiative and the Harapan Rainforest. The new conservation initiatives 
challenge the ongoing agricultural expansion driven by peasant migrants allied 
with indigenous leaders and village governments. Peasants met in Bungku, for 
example, complain that they first lost their land to oil palm companies, and now 
their livelihood is threatened by attempts to protect the “lungs of the earth”.
Conservation vs. agrarian reform: conflict between  
SPI and the Harapan Rainforest
The first of the four transnationalized agrarian conflicts about access to and 
control of the “lungs of the earth”, described in this chapter, is probably the 
most intense and violent conservation conflict in Jambi. The conflict involves 
members of Serikat Petani Indonesia (SPI) allied with the transnational partner 
La Via Campesina, the conservation company PT REKI and various state appa-
ratuses (the Ministry of Forestry, police and military). Despite PT REKI’s pres-
ence, peasants affiliated to SPI have been able to expand forest conversion and 
settlement formation (Figure 3.1). Peasant farmers in Sungai Jerad occupy and 
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use land for agricultural purposes that the MoF has allocated to the conservation 
company PT REKI. Accordingly, SPI members openly challenge the hegemony 
of the MoF. SPI considers the occupation of state forest as a legitimate response 
to colonial and post-colonial policies of dispossession (Hein et al., 2016). SPI 
members lobby for the release of the claimed area from PT REKI’s conservation 
concession and for a reclassification of the area to non-forest land.
Peasant resistance in the context of the Harapan Rainforest project is a spa-
tial and territorial practice that challenges the scales of meaning and regulation 
constructed by PT REKI and by the MoF (Moore, 1998; Turner and Caouette, 
2009; Towers, 2000). Territorial, in the sense that SPI and PT REKI have estab-
lished specific regulations and border demarcations for the spatial units they 
control. The conservation company has formulated conservation regulations 
(explained in Chapter 4) and SPI the three T rules (explained in Chapter 3). The 
conservation territory and territory controlled by SPI are marked with signs, 
turnpikes and flags that represent power relations inscribed in the landscape.
Peasant resistance facilitated by SPI not only challenges implementation of 
the Harapan Rainforest project, but SPI’s resistance can also be considered as 
being part of a larger and multi-scalar resistance campaign. At the village scale, 
SPI seeks to tackle the local impact of national land allocation policies through 
land occupations. At the national scale, SPI seeks to change the national legal 
framework by organizing protest in urban centers. At the global scale, SPI seeks 
to challenge the implementation of transnational forest carbon offsets (c.f. Hein 
and Faust, 2014; Hein et al., 2016).
Conflict history
According to SPI members, the conflict started in 2008 and intensified in 2010. 
SPI members reported that in 2010 the forest police and staff of PT REKI 
started patrolling in the settlements and announced that the land is now part of 
the concession of the conservation company.12 SPI leaders argued that the con-
servation company has not conducted FPIC and has denunciated SPI members 
as encroachers and illegal loggers.13 In contrast, PT REKI argues that SPI mem-
bers were not willing to participate in any consultations.14 The conflict escalated 
in 2012. Both parties accuse each other of kidnappings and the destruction of 
property. In particular, SPI members accuse the forest police, BRIMOB, the 
military and private informal security forces of having destroyed farmsteads 
(Lang, 2012a; Usman, 2012; Wirasapeotra and Octavian, 2012).15 Furthermore, 
SPI members complain that the raids of BRIMOB, the army and forest police 
only targeted smallholders and not the larger plantation estates held by elites 
and politicians within the concession.16 Since 2013, the conflict has calmed 
somewhat but is not yet resolved, and both parties accuse each other of not 
being willing to participate in conflict mediation. According to SPI activists 
and the staff of Burung Indonesia who I met in August 2016, the situation has 
not changed. However, PT REKI argues that SPI has lost control over its ter-
ritory and that increasingly it is land speculators who are benefitting from the 
situation (Suprapto, 2016).
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The extent to which specific actors are involved in organized forest crimes 
and in human rights violations is hard to assess and goes beyond the scope 
of this book. Nevertheless, PT REKI accuses SPI members in particular of 
being paid by logging companies to cut valuable timber in the conservation 
concession.17 SPI accuses PT REKI of paying informal security staff who have 
been involved in human rights violations.18 According to a local newspaper, the 
Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights (Komisi Nasional Hak 
Asasi Manusia, KOMNAS HAM) has found indications of the occurrence of 
human rights violations in the context of the conflict (Ferdiyal, 2013).
Actor mapping
The main actors in the conflict apart from PT REKI and SPI (Figure 5.2) 
are the MoEF, sub-national forest agencies, various security apparatuses (e.g. 





























Rounded rectangle: SPI and partners, oval: other NGOs, diamond: state actors, hexagon: PT REKI and partners, 
rectangle: donors, circle: Batin Sembilan elites, dark oval: illegal actors and informal security staff (Source: own 
draft, based on interviews with involved stakeholders). 
Figure 5.2  Actor mapping of the conflict between SPI and PT REKI on access and control 
of the Harapan Rainforest concession.
(Source: compiled by the author)
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La Via Campesina as SPI’s transnational partner, the transnational shareholders 
of PT REKI (Burung Indonesia, RSPB and Birdlife International) and PT 
REKI’s foreign donors (e.g. DANIDA and KfW).
Actors such as Singapore Airlines, DANIDA and KfW are of course not 
directly involved in the local confrontations. Nevertheless, KfW as the imple-
menting organization of the German International Climate Initiative (IKI) has 
not only funded the project, but has also articulated verbal and written support 
for PT REKI in public debates on the conflict (c.f. Lang, 2012a).19 Especially 
on the online platform REDD-Monitor, a debate between SPI and supporters 
of PT REKI was ongoing between 2008 and 2012 (Lang, 2015). KfW has par-
ticipated in these debates, supporting PT REKI. In a joint response formulated 
by KfW, IKI and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conserva-
tion and Nuclear Safety (BMUB), the German donors consider the activities of 
SPI members “[. . .] illegal land-grabs” (Lang, 2012a).
It is also important to consider that, as mentioned in Chapter 4, IKI neither 
had strict social safeguards in place nor stipulated FPIC. DANIDA, in contrast, 
explicitly states that “[. . .] when designing and implementing environment 
and climate initiatives, the principles of free, prior and informed consent must 
be adhered to” (DANIDA, 2004). AGRA, however, complains that PT REKI 
had not conducted FPIC in the area of Pangkalan Ranjau prior to DANIDA’s 
recent grant (AGRA, 2017). In 2015, PT REKI announced its new human 
rights-based approach, including its commitment to FPIC. However, the extent 
to which FPIC could be implemented adequately when the project had already 
been running for more than five years remains questionable (REKI, 2015). The 
implementation of FPIC and social safeguards would have probably helped to 
mediate the ongoing conflict in the first place.
DANIDA did not participate in the public debates on REDD-Monitor. 
However, DANIDA, as the German donors, actively reproduced the social con-
struction of peasant migrants as illegal actors by using the term “encroachers” 
in annual reports of its Environmental Support Programme (DANIDA, 2015, 
2016). In 2015, DANIDA wrote: “However, serious threats to the success of 
Hutan Harapan are still present. Most importantly, the continued encroachment 
by in-migrants in the northern and eastern part of the concession” (DANIDA, 
2015: 8). Directly referring to the area occupied by SPI, DANIDA wrote in 
2016 that the lack of law enforcement “[. . .] could endanger further Danish 
support” (DANIDA, 2016: 25). In addition, a number of statements found in the 
report indicate that the Danish agency supports a rather militarized conserva-
tion approach. The 2016 report highlights that new forest posts and GPS-based 
monitoring have been established and that twice a month PT REKI conducts 
joint patrols involving the police, army and district forest agency (DANIDA, 
2016: 23).
Singapore Airlines has contributed to a trust fund of the Harapan Rainfor-
est project and labels itself as the “[. . .] exclusive airline partner for the Hara-
pan Rainforest Initiative [. . .]” (Singapore Airlines, 2015). The carrier does 
not receive carbon credits in return but considers its support as being part of 
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a commitment to improve environmental performance (ibid.). Following this 
argument, Singapore Airlines’ contribution to the trust fund can be considered 
as being at least an indirect and unquantified environmental offset. An expert 
from KfW described the financial contributions to the trust fund as “virtual 
certificates” which do not lead to the production of regular carbon credits.20 In 
the carrier’s sustainability report, the Harapan Rainforest is presented as a suc-
cess case, thus concealing the complexity of the ongoing local conflicts.
Even though not directly involved in project implementation and manage-
ment, the support of these main donors goes beyond just financial contribu-
tions. Especially KfW and DANIDA reproduce existing power asymmetries 
among the conservation company, the MoEF and peasants by further delegiti-
mizing the presence of peasant migrants in the state forest territory through use 
of the term “encroachers” and by calling for stricter law enforcement to “solve” 
the problems related to in-migration (DANIDA, 2015, 2016). Moreover, in one 
way or another, their involvement constitutes the transnational and multi-scalar 
dimension of this conflict. These multi-scalar and transnational aspects of the 
conflict have a dialectical character, they provide additional agency for transna-
tional protest but at the same time additional resources for stricter law enforce-
ment and militarized conservation approaches. The additional agency was used 
by SPI and facilitated by La Via Campesina. SPI jumped to the UN scale to raise 
concerns about REDD+ and the Harapan Rainforest project at the global scale, 
in this specific case at the conference of the parties at the UNFCCC in Poznan 
in 2008 (La Via Campesina, 2008).
After the initial clashes in 2012 and 2013, state actors seemed to have reduced 
their presence in the area controlled by SPI. In a recent DANIDA report, the 
donor complained that the MoEF does not have the financial means to conduct 
law enforcement in the area occupied by SPI (DANIDA, 2016: 25). During 
a workshop in Jambi that I organized with partners of the Agricultural Uni-
versity Bogor and the University of Jambi in August 2016, actors involved in 
the conflict also argued that the weak presence of the state is a major cause of 
PT REKI’s “problems”. Others highlighted that the local communities require 
legalization by the national government.
Other relevant actors in the conflict arena are the NGOs Yayasan CAPPA and 
AGRA and PT REKI’s transnational shareholders Burung Indonesia, RSPB and 
Birdlife International. The NGO Yayasan CAPPA supports migrants and Batin 
Sembilan in land conflicts in Bungku and regularly coordinates campaigns with 
SPI. AGRA also closely collaborates with CAPPA and supports Batin Sembilan 
groups. In September 2013, the peasant organization AGRA started to map the 
territorial claims of Batin Sembilan in the area of Pangkalan Ranjau within the 
Harapan Rainforest. AGRA highlighted that the Batin Sembilan had become 
a minority in the Sungai Jerad area and that they needed support in the nego-
tiations with PT REKI and SPI.21 The Batin Sembilan groups living close to 
the SPI settlements (B9 in Figure 5.2) are not directly involved in the conflict. 
However, as described in Chapter 3, Batin Sembilan elites granted access to 
land to SPI members in the first place. Though, many non-elites were not able 
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to benefit from the land transactions and some complained about the rapid 
expansion of SPI settlements. Recently, observers reported tensions between 
the Batin Sembilan group supported by AGRA in the hamlet of Pangkalan 
Ranjau and SPI. The leader of the Batin Sembilan group in the hamlet argues 
that SPI is occupying land within the customary land of his group without hav-
ing permission to do so (Suprapto, 2016). PT REKI’s shareholders have slightly 
different positions in the conflict. From the very beginning the RSPB was in 
favor of a strict fortress conservation approach and aimed to relocate or evict all 
settlers living in the concession.22 Burung Indonesia, in contrast, was more in 
favor of a mediation-based solution to the conflict (Silalahi and Erwin, 2013).23
A multi-scalar conflict over meanings, access to and control of  
the Harapan Rainforest
Although the main cause of the conflict is the overlapping land rights legitimized 
by different public authorities and competing interests in mutually exclusive 
land-use practices (e.g. farming vs. conservation), the transnational linkages and 
the strategies employed by the various conflict parties make the case even more 
complex. Both parties seek to situate their activities within broader scales of 
meaning and refer to competing scales of regulation. SPI attempts to construct 
explicit linkages between the confrontations in the Harapan Rainforest and 
national agrarian and global climate justice debates. SPI stands in the tradition 
of the socialist zeitgeist of the President Soekarno era, and is struggling for the 
reconstruction of national scales of meaning and regulation based on the key 
role that land plays in achieving welfare and social justice in rural areas (Hein 
and Faust, 2014). Interviewed SPI members settling in the Harapan Rainforest 
argued that the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) and the constitution provides legiti-
macy for their land claims: “[. . .] the BAL from 1960, no. 5 clarifies the right of 
the people to land [. . .] we did not have a formal permit for the land here but 
we have a strong law on our side”.24
The settlements within the Harapan Rainforest provide land for SPI mem-
bers, hence they strengthen the attractiveness of the SPI and the potential for 
political mobilization for national campaigns (Hein et al., 2016). At the trans-
national scale, SPI and its ally La Via Campesina use the settlements and the 
associated land conflicts with PT REKI to underpin transnational campaigns 
against carbon offsetting and REDD+ (Hein and Faust, 2014; Hein et al., 2016; 
La Via Campesina, 2012). SPI rejects the commodification of nature in the 
name of the “green economy”, conservation and REDD+. Furthermore, SPI – 
in line with La Via Campesina – argues that developed countries should reduce 
emissions domestically and not through the enclosure of large forest areas in 
the Global South.25 The head of SPI Jambi stated in simple terms, “Traditional 
agriculture creates a healthy environment but instead displacements of farm-
ers and [. . .] detention of farmers occur, thus REDD is equivalent to the 
displacement of farmers”.26 SPI members settling in the Harapan Rainforest 
have argued, “PT REKI takes care of the lungs of the earth by re-greening, but 
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who takes care of the lungs of the people?”27 And, “I have just one question the 
carbon goes overseas, what is more important the carbon or the community 
living here? [. . .] When we have carbon we do not have people here, who is 
the carbon for then?”.28
PT REKI and partners especially stress the global and local relevance of 
the Harapan Rainforest project. Birdlife International (2008: 4), as one of PT 
REKI shareholders, stress in a project report that “[. . .] the lowland rainforests 
of Sumatra are of particular importance and rival the Amazon in terms of spe-
cies” (ibid). Furthermore, the report highlights the “carbon value” of the project 
(ibid. 6). A former lobbyist of Burung Indonesia highlighted the singularity of 
the ecosystem and the presence of large mammals and asked, “How can we 
commodify conservation to increase protection?”.29 For DANIDA the green-
house-gas reduction component seems to be of specific importance. A specific 
goal of DANIDA’s environmental support program is to reach a carbon storage 
target of 130–150 tons per ha in the Harapan Rainforest (DANIDA, 2015: 41). 
Officially, PT REKI has disassociated itself from REDD+ and has not pursued 
initial ideas to sell credits on the voluntary carbon markets. This decision was 
probably taken to avoid controversies on benefit sharing and to wear down 
SPI’s anti-REDD+ campaigns. The management of PT REKI (as described 
in Chapter 4) had no consistent position on financing the project directly via 
carbon markets. In 2013, a project manager stated that currently the company 
has other problems than engaging in carbon trade.
In the direct stand-off with SPI the conservation company PT REKI 
employs rather a legalistic approach, highlighting that SPI’s activities and pres-
ence violates the Forest Law. A staff member of PT REKI for instance argued, 
“[. . .] SPI are bad guys, they are involved in illegal logging and land trade, they 
are criminals”, adding that, “fortress conservation is the only way to conserve 
this forest”.30 Moreover, PT REKI stressed that the ecosystem restoration con-
cession allocated by the MoF is the only property right in place issued by a 
national-scale authority. Thus, PT REKI challenges property rights issued by 
other public authorities (e.g. village-scale land titles) and reproduces the state 
forest territory and its concession system as scales of regulation.
In spite of all their differences, both parties strategically employ indigeneity 
politics and both parties argue that they contribute to forest conservation. PT 
REKI and partners argue that the project is locally relevant especially for the 
Batin Sembilan. The project area can be considered as a last resort for the Batin 
Sembilan providing “[. . .] them with the option of continuing to reside in a 
forest environment” (Birdlife International, 2008: 5). Singapore Airlines argues, 
“Harapan also plays a significant role in terms of engaging the local indigenous 
community. Around 800 people from the Batin Sembilan indigenous group 
depend on the forest for their livelihood” (Singapore Airlines, 2010). The Ger-
man NABU (Naturschutzbund Deutschland), a member of Birdlife Interna-
tional, argues that the survival of the Batin Sembilan depends on the protection 
of the Harapan Rainforest (NABU, 2010). In contrast, a field officer of PT 
REKI considers migrants “as a major challenge for conservation”. PT REKI 
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considers the land claims of the Batin Sembilan as more legitimate than those of 
migrants.31 In addition, PT REKI uses the presence of the Batin Sembilan and 
their alleged role as “forest-dependent people” (Birdlife International, 2008: 5) 
to legitimize forest conservation. SPI, as described in Chapter 3, claims to have 
received a permit from the hamlet head of Mangkubangan/Pangkalan Ranjau 
and from Batin Sembilan leaders. SPI argues, as the conservation company 
does, that their activities contribute to conservation. In this sense, the three “T” 
rule and the oil palm ban can be considered as being part of SPI’s strategy to 
increase the legitimacy of their activities. SPI members have argued that the 
forests of Sungai Jerad and Bukit Sinyal were destroyed by the logging company 
PT Asialog. Following this argument, rubber agroforestry systems planted by 
the SPI settlers are contributing to forest rehabilitation. Furthermore, the head 
of an SPI basis argued that the area was lahan tidur (which is a term describing 
degraded unproductive land) before SPI came to the area. SPI brings the land 
back to productivity, he suggested.32 The conservation company rejects these 
arguments and refers to Landsat and Rapid Eye images that indicate ongoing 
forest conversion and oil palm cultivation (Lang, 2012b).33
The conflict about Kunangan Jaya I:  
defending village expansion
The conflict about the hamlet of Kunangan Jaya I is again caused by overlap-
ping property rights legitimized by different authorities. Even more impor-
tantly, the conflicts concerning Kunangan Jaya illustrate power shifts and the 
new fragile scalar structure of the post-Suharto period. The emergence of a vil-
lage scale of land tenure regulation and of attempts by Batin Sembilan groups to 
reestablish their customary territories after Suharto’s fall has been challenged by 
the MoF, who allocated the Meranti-River-Kapuas-River forest block to the 
conservation company PT REKI, thus neglecting the presence of local com-
munities and pre-existing access and property relations (cf. Hein et al., 2016, 
and Chapter 3).
The hamlet of Kunangan Jaya I has more than 1200 inhabitants and consists 
of many dispersed settlements mainly located within the concessions of PT 
REKI and PT Asiatic Persada (Wirasapeotra and Octavian, 2012: 7). Each set-
tlement has its distinct history. I will only focus on conflicts involving the TSM 
settler community (introduced in Chapter 3) and different Batin Sembilan 
groups settling in the northernmost part of the Harapan Rainforest concession. 
The conflict over Kunangan Jaya I has multiple dimensions and multiple strands. 
Depending on the perspective assumed, the conflict can be framed as a conflict 
between different apparatuses of the state (e.g. involving village governments, 
MoEF and sectoral agencies), as a transnational conflict over indigenous rights, 
and as a conflict between local communities interested in maintaining access 
to agricultural land and actors interested in conservation and climate change 
mitigation. Moreover, the different local communities involved in the project 
are very heterogeneous. Different community members and community leaders 
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have different abilities, material resources and interests, and thus follow different 
strategies in the conflict with PT REKI. The TSM community and some of 
the Batin Sembilan communities seek the release of their settlement out of the 
state forest (enklave). Others have accepted conditional land tenure agreements 
with PT REKI.
Conflict history
The first land conflicts over access to and control of the landscapes of Kunan-
gan Jaya I date back to the period when the area was managed by the log-
ging company PT Asialog. In the 1970s, in the course of the implementation 
of the logging concessions, the first Batin Sembilan families of Kunangan 
Jaya who practiced shifting cultivation were forced to leave the concession. 
The more recent conflicts related to the designation of the Meranti-River-
Kapuas-River forest block for ecosystem restoration and to the allocation 
of the forest block to PT REKI started in 2007. In 2007, the District For-
est Agency and the forest police started a first attempt to relocate the TSM 
community. After initial negotiations, the district forest agency tentatively 
accepted their presence and informed settlers that they should plant rub-
ber instead of oil palms.34 A key informant reported that the conservation 
company started to intimidate peasants in the area even before the company 
received its concession.
In 2010, after the conservation company officially received its concession, 
the company supported by the heavily armed mobile police brigade (BRI-
MOB) and the forest police entered the community, urging people to leave 
the concession and to abandon their farmsteads and plantations within two 
months.35 In other parts of Kunangan Jaya I (e.g. the area around Sungai Kan-
dang and Simpang Macan), key informants complained that forest rangers of 
PT REKI destroyed their oil palm plantings and farmsteads.36 A few settlers in 
Kunangan Jaya I reported that PT REKI offered compensation to those peas-
ants that leave the area “voluntarily”. Some accepted the compensation and left 
the area; others accepted the payments, left and moved back later. In almost 
all the settlements, community members complained that PT REKI failed to 
conduct FPIC. The members of the different communities in Kunangan Jaya 
I reported that they were only informed in the course of the police interven-
tions that agriculture and settlement is prohibited within the state forest.37 After 
the police intervention, a farming group from Kunangan Jaya I (PERTAMA, 
Persatuan Tani Mandiri) supported by the NGO Yayasan CAPPA organized 
demonstrations in front of the Governor’s Palace and in front of the provincial 
parliament in Jambi city. Only after the demonstrations in Jambi city did PT 
REKI and the forest authorities conduct the first community consultations 
(socialisasi) in the TSM settlement.38 After 2013, the conflict calmed down, but 
various negotiations and conflict mediation aiming to find a solution among 
the different communities, PT REKI and forest agency have continued until 
the present day.

































An important feature of the conflict over Kunangan Jaya I is the fragmented 
character of the community (Figure 5.3). The community of Kunangan Jaya 
I consists of different factions following different interests and strategies. Con-
flicts occur not only between community members and the conservation com-
pany PT REKI and state actors. Conflicts also occur between different factions 
of the community of Kunangan Jaya I. The TSM settlement, for instance, consists 
of at least two opposing factions: members of the farming group PERTAMA 
and peasants associated with Pak Kumis. Members of the farming group PER-
TAMA and a number of peasants led by a neighborhood head (Kepala RT) felt 
betrayed by Pak Kumis and the other organizers of the settlement. PERTAMA 
members argued that they were not aware that the TSM settlement is located 
within the state forest, thus within the Harapan Rainforest. Some settlers 
accused Pak Kumis of being involved in illegal logging and reported that he 
made high profits from land trade instead of building functional infrastructure 
Rounded rectangle: peasant groups, oval: NGOs supporting local communities, diamond: state actors, 
hexagon: PT REKI and partners, rectangle: donors, circle: Batin Sembilan groups, (Source: own draft, 
based on interviews with involved stakeholders)
Figure 5.3  Actor mapping of the conflict about Kunangan Jaya I
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and houses for Batin Sembilan families.39 A Batin Sembilan elder complained 
that his family lost large parts of their customary land (Wilayah Adat) to Java-
nese, Sundanese and Minangkabau migrants because of the formation of the 
TSM settlement. What is left over, he argues, is too small to provide a safe liveli-
hood for future generations.40
PERTAMA receives support from the NGOs Yayasan CAPPA and Yayasan 
SETARA. PERTAMA members also participate in the conflict mediation 
meetings with PT REKI. Their most important concern is to get their land 
released out of the conservation concession. A member of PERTAMA pointed 
out: “[. . .] we reject the community development program (program kemitraan), 
[. . .] we just want to maintain our land”.41
Pak Kumis and peasants associated with him have no clear position in the 
negotiations with the conservation company. When interviewed in 2012, Pak 
Kumis argued that the conflict has to be solved by the government according 
to the existing legal framework. He argues that mediation is not necessary since 
the issuance of the conservation concession by the MoF was a failure because 
the ministry ignored the presence of the TSM settlement. His group has rejected 
the support of NGOs but some members have participated in the mediation 
process. His group supports PT REKI’s community development zone.42
A third faction of TSM settlers consists of those households that do not feel 
represented by Pak Kumis’s group or by PERTAMA, or are not participating in 
the mediation process. A recently arrived Javanese household head, for instance, 
stated that he has no knowledge about PT REKI and the conflict at all.43
The NGO Yayasan CAPPA has an important role in the conflict about 
Kunangan Jaya I. First, the NGO has supported the TSM community in the 
mediation process. Second, the NGO has conducted workshops on REDD+ 
(socialization) in Kunangan Jaya I and II. Third, the NGO has acted as an up- 
and downward translator (Pasgaard, 2015: 113). The organization has translated 
global policies (e.g. REDD+) to local spaces and has aligned local concerns 
(e.g. risk of displacements) with transnational debates on the rights of local and 
indigenous communities (e.g. FPIC) (c.f. Mannell, 2014: 2; Pasgaard, 2015: 113). 
Through organizing demonstrations, posting letters of complaint from Batin 
Sembilan on REDD-Monitor, and contacting PT REKI’s donors, CAPPA 
shifted the land conflict about Kunangan Jaya I to the provincial, national and 
transnational scale. Yayasan CAPPA receives funding from the Ford Foundation 
to mediate and solve land conflicts, and from Misereor to explain REDD+ to 
local communities. In an allusion to Yayasan CAPPA’s funding sources, a staff 
member of PT REKI argued that the NGO is creating and exaggerating con-
flicts in order to access funding.44
Yayasan SETARA is the second NGO supporting the community of Kunan-
gan Jaya I. SETARA, as a member of the transnational Roundtable on Sustain-
able Palm Oil (RSPO), mainly supports Batin Sembilan in the conflict with PT 
Asiatic Persada. SETARA especially criticizes PT REKI’s criminalizing of the 
settlers as illegal encroachers.45 SETARA cooperates intensively with CAPPA.
Burung Indonesia, as one of PT REKI’s shareholders, has conducted addi-
tional meetings with community members in Kunangan Jaya I. The KfW is, of 
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course, not directly involved in the conflict. However, in contrast to the state-
ments KfW made about SPI members, staff of KfW argued that the develop-
ment bank has advocated the exclusion of the hamlets of Kunangan Jaya I and 
II from the conservation concession from the very beginning and wants the 
area to be reclassified as non-forest land.46
The conflict about Kunangan Jaya I is not only a transnationalized land con-
flict between peasants and the conservation company PT REKI. The conflict 
can also be considered as a conflict between different apparatuses of the state. 
Different settlement projects within the borders of the Harapan Rainforest (e.g. 
TSM in Kunangan Jaya I, Camp Gunung in Kunangan Jaya II, and Tanjung 
Mandiri in the village of Tanjung Lebar) have been actively supported by dif-
ferent state agencies. The formation of the settlements has been supported by 
village governments and by the agricultural agencies of Batang Hari and Muaro 
Jambi, and by the education agency of both districts. The allocation of corn 
and soy seeds to farming groups in Kunangan Jaya I by the Agricultural Agency 
of Batang Hari provided legitimacy for the settlers, supplying them with in-
kind start-up funding, but this violated Forest Law 41/1999. The allocation 
of village-scale land titles by the village government of Bungku facilitated the 
transaction of land claimed by the MoEF, but again violates existing de jure 
regulations for forest land. Conflicts have also occurred within the forestry 
apparatus. The District Forest Agency of Batang Hari, for instance, tolerated the 
TSM settlement after negotiations with settlers in 2007. Only a few years later, 
after PT REKI received the conservation concession, the forest police and the 
mobile police brigade sought to evict the settlers.
Conflict mediation and collaboration agreements
In 2011, pre-negotiations for conflict mediation started and a participatory land 
tenure mapping was conducted. The mapping involved community representa-
tives, the District Forest Agency of Batang Hari, the Provincial Forest Agency 
of Jambi, activists of Yayasan CAPPA and staff of the conservation company PT 
REKI. Official mediation started in 2012 after PT REKI and representatives 
from Kunangan Jaya I agreed on 20 rules as a basis for mediation. The agreed 
rules included, inter alia, the prohibition of land transactions, commercial log-
ging, and land clearance outside the area identified in the participatory map-
ping conducted by PT REKI, the settlers, and the forest service (Kesepakatan 
Terhadap Prasyarat Mediasi Antara PT. REKI Dengan Warga RT 11 2012). 
The agreement permitted settlers to maintain their land but prohibited further 
agricultural expansion (ibid.). The agreement and the participatory land tenure 
mapping can be considered as an unofficial conditional land tenure scheme 
since it provides tenure security if peasants accept the negotiated rules.
At the same time, the Provincial Forest Agency received a request from com-
munity members of Kunangan Jaya I and II asking that the area be released 
out of the conservation concession and out of the state forest. The request was 
rejected. A staff member argued that the social and biophysical criteria47 were 
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not met. He stated explicitly that the multi-ethnic character of the settlement 
and the presence of non-indigenous communities was an important factor for 
the rejection. “[. . .] Most of the people in the area were not SAD,48 they are 
from Medan, they have Batak49 names, why do they ask for an enclave, they are 
outsiders, the area is still covered by forest, it’s not their land”.50
In 2012, two options were suggested by the MoF to solve the conflict with 
the TSM community of Kunangan Jaya I. In the first option, the TSM set-
tlement would remain within PT REKI’s conservation concession. The area 
would be designated as a community development zone (mitra zone). Settlers 
would receive conditional land tenure. The allocation of land rights of up to 5 
ha were under discussion. In the second option, the TSM settlement would be 
released out of the conservation concession but would remain part of the state 
forest. Settlers would receive smallholder forest concessions of 2 ha per house-
hold (HTR, Hutan Tanaman Rakyat). Later on, the MoF itself rejected the 
second option arguing that HTR schemes within a limited production forest 
(Hutan Produksi Terbatas) would violate Forest Law; hence, they urged PT REKI 
to implement the first option.51
The Batin Sembilan dominated settlements of Simpang Macan Luar and 
Dalam were not targeted by the interventions of the forest police and mobile 
police brigade. As outlined in the section on the conflict with SPI, PT REKI 
considers the land claims of Batin Sembilan communities as more legitimate 
than those of non-local ethnic groups. A staff member of PT REKI stated, 
“REKI has never refused Batin Sembilan communities”.52 The conflicts 
between PT REKI and Batin Sembilan have a much lower intensity than those 
with non-local ethnic groups. PT REKI has already negotiated conservation 
agreements with the community in Simpang Macan Dalam. Negotiations with 
the community of Simpang Macan Luar were still ongoing in 2013 (Buletin 
Batin Sembilan, 2013: 26). Parts of the Batin Sembilan community of KM 
35,53 located close to PT REKI’s main camp, reject negotiations with the con-
servation company arguing, “[. . .] I do not want to participate in PT REKI’s 
program, frankly speaking I do not participate, I might lose out, and I have 
customary rights to this land”.54 Peasant migrants and some Batin Sembilan 
criticized the conditional land tenure and conservation agreements. A Batin 
Sembilan elder said that he refused to be resettled and also refused the con-
servation agreements because he has rights based on customary law (adat).55 
A settler told me that he did not want to sign any agreements with PT REKI, 
he just want to keep his land.
In 2013, some community leaders complained that the negotiations with 
PT REKI were broken off by the company without them being informed. 
Negotiations resumed in 2015, and in 2016 PT REKI was able to negotiate 
collaboration agreements. PT REKI has signed agreements with approximately 
50 percent of the households of Pak Kumis’ group (DANIDA, 2016; PT REKI, 
2018). The agreement permits them to use 153 ha of land for rubber cultivation. 
In addition, an agreement was reached with groups represented by a neighbor-
hood head and with a number of the Batin Sembilan groups of Kunangan Jaya 
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I. The agreement made with the Batin Sembilan includes 1465 ha of land for 
390 persons and permits agroforestry, horticulture and the cultivation of annual 
food crops (REDDplusid, 2016).
The various agreements have solved most of the land conflicts in the area of 
Kunangan Jaya I. Through negotiating and signing the agreements, the different 
peasant and indigenous groups have accepted PT REKI’s authority over land 
allocation and land use in the landscapes of the Harapan Rainforest. The agree-
ments challenge the territorial claims of village governments and indigenous 
leaders from Bungku as well as the village-scale forest conversion and settle-
ment schemes and associated village-scale land titles. Peasants and indigenous 
groups were not successful in lobbying for the reclassification of state forest 
territory. They did not receive land rights legitimized by the National Land 
Agency or smallholder concessions (HTR) from the MoEF. Nevertheless, some 
peasant migrants who have not been able to claim land rights based on ancestry 
and kinship have at least received rights to land legitimized by the conservation 
company.
Competing scales of regulation, conflicts between state  
apparatuses and indigeneity politics
The village government of Bungku expanded its competencies formally and 
spatially by facilitating settlement formation within the state forest and issuing 
village-scale land titles for the settlers. Migrants, the village government and 
Batin Sembilan elites constructed alternative scales of meaning based on the 
reconstruction of the development narratives of the President Suharto era and 
on the idea of re-establishing pre-colonial ethnic territories. Arriving migrants 
actively reproduced the authority of the village government and of the village 
scale of regulation by requesting land and land titles.
PT REKI’s conservation concession is located within the state forest terri-
tory and was issued by the MoF. At the same time, the concession is located 
within the ethnic territory of the Batin Sembilan. By requesting the conces-
sion, PT REKI contributed to the reproduction of the state forest as a national 
scale of meaning and regulation controlled by the MoF, one that challenges 
the alternative scales constructed by other actors (e.g. Batin Sembilan elites). 
This conflictive scalar arrangement was the starting point of the struggles over 
Kunangan Jaya. The struggles between the various actors involved in the con-
flict induced further scalar restructuring, e.g. up-scaling through shifting the 
conflict to the emerging global scale of forest governance.
Moreover, the conflict highlights the relevance of transnational and multi- 
scalar resistance in the context of REDD+. The active use of global norms and 
regulations by different actors to solve land conflicts contributes to the con-
struction of a global scale of regulation for governing the world’s forests. In the 
context of an emerging global scale of forest governance, global norms such 
as FPIC are becoming increasingly relevant in local land conflicts. The NGO 
Yayasan CAPPA plays a key role since the NGO has knowledge on relevant 
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international debates, speaks the international development jargon, and is able 
to communicate directly with donors. Consequently, Yayasan CAPPA is able to 
link local concerns to global norms such as FPIC, to the emerging debates on 
national and transnational safeguards for REDD+, to donor safeguards and to 
human rights. The need for FPIC for all natural resource concessions is stipu-
lated in Indonesia’s REDD+ strategy. In addition, the recent constitutional court 
decision (Keputusan MK 35/PUU-X-2012) may further strengthen the rights 
of local and indigenous communities. DANIDA and the “Human Rights-Based 
Approach in German Development Policy” acknowledge the UN Declaration 
for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the right to FPIC (DANIDA, 2011: 
2–3; Schielmann et al., 2013: 26). Peasants in Kunangan Jaya I explicitly stated 
that PT REKI failed to consult them adequately. This has been confirmed by 
other sources (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, 2012; Wirasapeotra and Octa-
vian, 2012) and by activists of Yayasan CAPPA.56
PT REKI’s failure to conduct FPIC in the settlements of Kunangan Jaya 
I provided an entry point for multi-scalar campaigns against the conservation 
company. With the support of CAPPA, peasants were able to lift the conflict 
to the provincial scale (e.g. the demonstration in front of the provincial par-
liament) and to the transnational scale (e.g. posting letters of complaint on 
REDD-Monitor, contacting PT REKI’s donors). Multi-scalar resistance prob-
ably contributed to the at least partial acceptance of the land claims of the 
community of Kunangan Jaya I. In 2015, five years after the conservation com-
pany received its concession in Jambi, a new human-rights-based approach was 
announced by PT REKI. The new policy (Human Rights, Social and Com-
munity Engagement Commitment, HARSCEC) makes explicit reference to 
the right to FPIC for indigenous and local communities and stipulates social 
impact assessments (REKI, 2015). However, as mentioned above, announcing 
a commitment of five years after project implementation contradicts the very 
idea of FPIC, which is to provide sufficient information and allow communities 
to reject interventions. The extent to which these intended goals of the ILO 
169 convention can be met in the context of a running project remains, at the 
least, questionable.
Social identity is an important factor in the conflict over Kunangan Jaya I. 
Global norms such as FPIC, the Cancun Safeguards and the decision of the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court have further increased the relevance of social 
identity and contributed to the construction of ethnicity as a powerful means 
to claim natural resources. The Provincial Forest Services, for example, have 
rejected the reclassification of Kunangan Jaya I to non-forest land, arguing that 
most of the settlers are not members of local ethnic groups and consequently 
do not have customary rights to the land. PT REKI’s new HARSCEC policy, 
for instance, refers to FPIC for local and indigenous communities, not for peas-
ant migrants. Ethnicity is a very dynamic category in the Harapan landscape. 
Interethnic marriages between Batin Sembilan and migrants are common and 
most of the migrants claim to have received land from local ethnic groups 
(Hein, 2013b; Hein et al., 2015; Hein and Faust, 2014). For the conflict between 
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peasants and the oil palm company of PT Asiatic Persada, Steinebach (2013b: 
73–74) has shown that becoming Batin Sembilan, e.g. through interethnic mar-
riage but also by just claiming to be Batin Sembilan, is part of a set of strategies 
to reclaim land appropriated by the company (ibid.). Becoming Batin Sembilan 
seems to be a relatively inclusive and conflict-free process in the landscapes 
around the Harapan Rainforest. Migrants and Batin Sembilan actively cooper-
ate, as the history of the formation of the settlements TSM and Tanjung Man-
diri has shown (described in Chapter 3).
Finally, the conflict concerning Kunangan Jaya I confirms that local commu-
nities are heterogeneous. There is not a one and only “local community” that 
should be involved in conservation and development projects. This is not new 
information, especially not for human geographers and anthropologists, but it 
seems that many conservationists and development practitioners still neglect the 
complexity of social relations at the so-called “local or project level”. Different 
actors e.g. peasants associated with Pak Kumis and the members of PERTAMA 
or the Batin Sembilan groups of Simpan Macan Dalam and Luar have different 
interests and are part of different networks. It is important to consider that not 
all community members were involved in conflict mediation. Ten community 
members were elected to represent the community in the initial negotiations. 
All community members were invited to regular meetings on the mediation 
process, stated a key informant.57 However, while decisions were based on a 
majority vote of all community members not all villagers followed or were able 
to follow the process. The large distance between the dispersed settlements of 
Kunangan Jaya I and the lack of roads made it very complicated for community 
members to participate in community meetings.
We are here to stay: the conflicts in Camp Gunung and 
Tanjung Mandiri
The village-scale settlement initiatives Camp Gunung and Tanjung Mandiri 
were not spared from conflicts with the conservation company. In both settle-
ments, indigeneity politics played a crucial role during settlement formation as 
well. As outlined in Chapter 3, both settlements were legitimized by the Batin 
Sembilan authorities and village governments (see also Mardiana, 2017: 73). 
A former member of the village government of Tanjung Lebar argued that the 
settlers in Tanjung Mandiri did not want to sign any agreements with PT REKI 
because the Batin Sembilan who owned the land had invited them to settle in 
the area, thus there was no need for a permit from PT REKI.58 Additionally, 
he stated that the conservation and collaboration agreements with PT REKI 
would only provide access to land for a limited period. He further argued that 
this is not attractive for the settlers since they claim to have rights granted by 
the Batin Sembilan.
The conflict between the settlers of Tanjung Mandiri and PT REKI has not 
yet been resolved, negotiations on a potential collaboration agreement were 
unsuccessful. AMAN was initially involved in mapping indigenous land claims 
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and facilitating negotiations between the community and PT REKI. Accord-
ing to a member of the village government in Bungku the agreement proposed 
by AMAN implied that settlers would have to stop oil palm cultivation, addi-
tional agricultural expansion, slash-and-burn agriculture and logging. This was 
rejected by the settlers. An AMAN activist in Jambi explained that some com-
munity members had doubts about the neutrality of AMAN. Consequently, 
AMAN stopped the mediation process. The activist also explained that the 
conditions for conflict mediation were very difficult because many different 
actors had competing interests. Some Batin Sembilan leaders were very heavily 
involved in land trade; some settlers and Batin Sembilan were rather poor peas-
ants while other settlers resembled mafia-like speculators rather than peasants, 
thus “[. . .] it was difficult to find ‘the right’ people to negotiate with. Because 
we cannot talk with 200 people”, the AMAN activist explained.59
According to a PT REKI project manager, a second mediation attempt 
facilitated by a number of state agencies failed after the Ramadan of 2013. 
The project manager argued that the negotiations failed because community 
representatives involved in the negotiations did not communicate intermediate 
agreements to all community members. The village government of Tanjung 
Lebar confirmed the view of AMAN that different community members had 
contrary opinions on how to deal with the conflict.
Settlers who I interviewed in 2013 described the situation as relatively calm: 
“We do not have an open or violent conflict with REKI”. However, the situ-
ation changed in late summer 2013 when peasants destroyed cars belonging 
to the conservation company after rumors that the conservation company 
had destroyed oil palm plantings. The peasants in Tanjung Mandiri, in contrast 
to those in other settlements, were not interested in receiving support from 
NGOs. A settler explained, “We do not want NGOs involved, we do not want 
anarchy!”60
Especially in the Tanjung Mandiri area, rumors circulated that land conver-
sion was not only driven by peasants but also by urban-based land speculators. 
PT REKI has argued that some of the ongoing land conversion was caused by 
urban residents from Bogor, Jakarta and Bandung. According to PT REKI, they 
are paying local peasants to convert land and to plant oil palms. These activities 
were difficult to verify and beyond the scope of this study. However, some Batin 
Sembilan complained that a number of actors have converted larger forest areas 
without requesting their permission. SPI members also complained about the 
presence of large land holdings within PT REKI’s concession which have not 
been subject to prosecution under the forest policy. Land investments by urban-
based citizens are relatively common in Jambi. Peasants and also urban residents 
met in Jambi city reported that higher-level civil servants frequently invest in 
rubber and oil plantations in the countryside, often in their regions of origin.
The conflict between the settlers of Camp Gunung and PT REKI intensi-
fied in 2010, after PT REKI and the armed BRIMOB police moved in and 
destroyed settlers’ shacks. Settlers of Camp Gunung reported, as did their fellows 
in other parts of the conservation concession, that the conservation company 
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did not conduct any appropriate form of community consultation before the 
destruction and eviction attempts took place. Some community members left 
the area during PT REKI’s and BRIMOP operations and moved back later.
In 2011, after pre-negotiations, a participatory land tenure assessment was 
conducted and in 2012, as in the case of Kunangan Jaya I, the MoF offered 
small-scale forest concessions to the settlers. However, also as in Kunangan Jaya 
I, the MoF stepped back and called for a collaboration agreement between PT 
REKI and the settlers. In 2012, a few community members supported by the 
peasant organization STN organized a “long march to Jakarta” and protested 
in front of the MoF to attract additional attention to their situation. In 2013, 
during field research in the area, the settlers described the situation as rather 
calm and explained that PT REKI accepts their presence now. Finally, in 2017, 
representatives of Kunangan Jaya II and PT REKI signed an agreement permit-
ting 30 households to use 135.31 ha of land (PT REKI, 2017).61
Peasants, migrants and the state: conflicts among state 
apparatuses concerning access to and control of the 
Berbak Carbon Initiative
The conflict about the transmigration site within the Berbak Carbon Initiative 
shows that different apparatuses of the state act in contradictive ways, reflecting 
different views and interests in society. The divergent interests of different actors 
within the state become visible in the forest reserve Sektitar Tanjung. Ongoing 
tensions between the state apparatuses aiming to facilitate rural development 
by promoting agricultural expansion and those aiming to foster conservation 
are inscribed in Berbak’s forest frontier. The forest reserve Sektitar Tanjung is 
located approximately 4 km east of the main hamlet of the village of Kam-
pung Laut (District of Muaro Jambi). In 2008, the Zoological Society London, 
the Jambi-based NGO Gita Buana, the Berbak National Park Agency and the 
Provincial Forest Agency agreed to use the political momentum after the Bali 
Climate Change Conference (COP 13) to expand protected areas in the sur-
roundings of Berbak National Park. In the same year, the District Government 
of Muaro Jambi together with Javanese district governments started to establish 
a district-to-district transmigration program. One of the transmigration settle-
ments was established east of Kampung Laut within the borders of the forest 
reserve Sekitar Tanjung, challenging the authority of the MoF and the integrity 
of the Berbak Carbon Initiative (Figure 5.4).
Conflict history and the formation of  
the transmigration settlement
In 2006, the district head of Muaro Jambi announced its interest in resettling 
Javanese farmers to Muaro Jambi to promote rural development. Two years 
later, the Transmigration Agency of Muaro Jambi (Dinas Sosial, Tenaga Kerja dan 
Transmigrasi Kabupaten Muaro Jambi) conducted an initial survey in Kampung 
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Laut. By the end of 2008 the first houses of the settlements had been set up 
(see Figure 3.2 for the location of the settlement). Only then did the district 
head of Muaro Jambi (Bupati H. Burhanuddin) request a formal permit from 
the Governor of Jambi for the conversion of state forest and for the estab-
lishment of a transmigration settlement (Surat 522/776/KANHUT Tanggal 10 
Desember 2008) (WALHI Jambi, 2009). However, according to the existing legal 
framework, neither the district government nor the provincial government has 
the authority to permit the conversion of state forest; only the MoF has the 
authority to do so. In 2009, without having received any de jure permit from 
the forest authorities, the district head of Muaro Jambi announced that 150 
transmigrants from Java would be resettled to Muaro Jambi in 2009 (Republika 
Online, 2009). The agreement between the district of Muaro Jambi and three 
East Javanese districts (Madiun, Lamongan and Blitar) permitted the relocation 
of 225 households (ibid.). Of the first 150 transmigrant households, 75 would 
be relocated to the village of Kampung Laut and 75 to the neighboring village 
of Gedong Karya, as stated by the district head in a local newspaper (ibid.). 
In Kampung Laut, peasants told me that one of the objectives of the settle-
ment was to provide shelter for refugees displaced by the 2006 eruption of the 
Figure 5.4  Picture of abandoned houses of the transmigration settlement of Kampung Laut 
inside the Berbak Carbon Initiative
(Source: taken by the author, 2013)
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Sidoarjo mud volcano in East Java.62 The eruption was probably caused by oil 
and gas drilling activities. The mudflows destroyed more than a dozen villages 
and agricultural land in the district of Sidoarjo (Mohsin, 2018). However, the 
three Javanese districts involved in the agreement were not affected by the 
mudflows and, when interviewed, staff of state agencies in Jambi were not aware 
of any link between the disaster and the district-to-district transmigration ini-
tiative. Nevertheless, this story was told among villagers. According to offi-
cial district policies, the settlement in Kampung Laut was planned to provide 
land for settlers from East Java and for young, poor and landless Malay families 
from Kampung Laut. It was planned that each participant should receive 2 ha 
of agricultural land and 0.75 ha for a house and house garden. Furthermore, 
participants were told that they would receive further agricultural extension 
services.63
In 2009, the Provincial Forest Agency stopped the finalization of the settle-
ment project, claiming that the project was being illegally conducted within 
the Forest Reserve Sekitar Tanjung, thus violating Forest Law 1999/41.64 A few 
months earlier, the first local settlers from Kampung Laut had moved into their 
new houses in the transmigration settlement. After the intervention of the Pro-
vincial Forest Agency rumors emerged that the settlement had to be abolished. 
Consequently, most of the Malay households from Kampung Laut that had 
received land in the settlement sold their land to spontaneous migrants, mainly 
to second-generation transmigrants from the Batang Hari delta region. The 
Provincial Forest Agency only stopped the formal settlement formation process. 
The agency did not try to evict the remaining Malay settlers and did not try to 
stop the influx of spontaneous migrants. Staff of the Provincial Forest Agency 
argued that eviction by force would have exacerbated the situation and have 
led to chaos.65
Mediation between the different state actors involved in the process and 
community representatives from Kampung Laut has been long lasting. In 
2013, after negotiations facilitated by the Governor of Jambi, it was announced 
that the conflict was solved. According to the community representatives, the 
MoF decided to release 150 ha of state forest land which had been mapped 
by representatives of the provincial parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Dae-
rah, DPRD).66 This was confirmed by staff of the Provincial Forest Agency.67 
It was also announced by governmental officials (interviewed community 
members did not know which governmental agency made the announce-
ment) that the first Javanese transmigrants would be relocated to Kampung 
Laut in 2014.68 However, critical voices within the community argued that 
the Provincial Forest Service had not made a final decision on the settle-
ment yet and that the negotiations with the central government in Jakarta 
continued.
In 2013, at least two contradictive conflict-solving processes were ongo-
ing. The first foresaw the release of the settlement from forest land and the 
formation of a new and independent village. This approach was favored by 
the District Government of Muaro Jambi. At the same time, the Provincial 
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Forest Agency started to implement a conditional land tenure scheme, also 
involving the transmigrant community. The conditional land tenure scheme 
includes the allocation of forest land for the cultivation of jelutung and other 
forest species, aiming to rehabilitate the forest cover of the Forest Reserve 
(Figure 5.5).
In 2016, the development-oriented actors within the district and the vil-
lage government seemed to have won the battle over the swamps of Kampung 
Laut. According to representatives of the village government, the transmigra-
tion settlement and 150 ha of agricultural land was officially released from the 
state forest territory.69 A map of the National Land Agency (Figure 3.2D) from 
2016 identifies the settlement as a “planned transmigration site” outside the 
state forest (Hein et al., 2018a). During a short visit I made in August 2016, the 
district agency of public works (Dinas Pekerjaan Umum) was constructing a 
new drainage channel and a dyke system to protect the settlement from annual 
flooding during the rainy season. In addition, the responsible neighborhood 
head told me that governmental agencies have promised that all houses and 
infrastructure of the settlement will be refitted, that all settlers will receive 1 ha 
of agricultural land, and that an oil palm company might invest in a new planta-
tion estate involving the settlers.70
Figure 5.5  Degraded peat swamp inside the Berbak Carbon Initiative
(Source: taken by the author, 2013)
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Development narratives, rent-seeking and new property
The establishment of the transmigration settlement of Kampung Laut not only 
challenged the MoF, but it also provided rent-seeking opportunities for village-
scale and district-scale actors. The district head sought to legitimize and jus-
tify his initiative by referring to two well-known policy narratives of the new 
order era. He argued that Javanese transmigrants would act as model farmers, 
augmenting the agrarian potential of the region. Secondly, he referred to rural 
development and economic growth to justify forest conversion. Muaro Jambi’s 
long-term development plan (RPJPD, Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang 
Daerah 2006–2025) highlights the relevance of the transmigration program for 
developing intensive agricultural systems (Pemerintah Kabupaten Muaro Jambi, 
2012: (2) 157).
Detailed information on the intentions of the district government in estab-
lishing the settlement beyond the references to rural development and eco-
nomic growth was not available. However, it is worthwhile mentioning that 
the circumstances of the establishment of the transmigration settlement were 
investigated by the Jambi police following accusations of corruption against 
staff members of the district’s transmigration agency and the construction com-
pany involved (JambiekspressNews, 2014).71 Furthermore, the formation of the 
settlement and the allocation of land to local famers probably provided political 
rents (e.g. popularity and votes in district elections for the district head and 
his allies). Interviewed community members in Kampung Laut described the 
district head, H. Burhanuddin, as very supportive of the village community. 
He visited the village three times and talked directly to community members. 
Moreover, during one of his visits he permitted the first local transmigrants to 
move into the transmigration settlement prior to the official finalization of the 
settlement. In addition, it is important to consider that H. Burhaniddin seems 
to be an active advocate for the land rights of peasants within the state forest. 
As described in Chapter 3, he also supported the community of the settlement 
of Tanjung Mandiri in the Harapan Rainforest. He legitimized their presence 
within the PT REKI’s conservation concession by celebrating the annual rice 
harvest ceremony (Panen Raya) in the settlement and promised that the Tanjung 
Mandiri would be released out of the Harapan Rainforest Project (without 
having the de jure competency to do this).
The transmigration settlement provided significant benefits for the village 
government of Kampung Laut as well, in particular, because the village govern-
ment, especially the neighborhood heads (Ketua Rukun Tetangga (Ketua RT)), 
were in charge of selecting the local participants. In interviews project par-
ticipants mentioned that only poor, landless and married couples were able 
to participate. However, in informal conversations key informants stated that 
villagers who did not fit into these categories also received land within the 
settlement. Consequently, the formation of the settlement provided room for 
rent-seeking at the village scale. The authority of the village government to 
select local participants to allocate land within the state forest thus provided 
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significant benefits for the village elite. Moreover, the conflict transformed the 
transmigration settlement in two different ways: first, from a district-backed 
initiative intended to provide land for Javanese migrants and local households 
to a destination for spontaneous migrants; second, local project participants 
transformed themselves into land traders in order to cope with the conflictive 
situation. In 2013, 38 households lived in the settlement, only five of them were 
initial local project participants from Kampung Laut. All other local participants 
have sold their land. Official transmigrants from East Java never arrived in the 
settlement according to key informants in Kampung Laut.72
The conflict over access to and control of the forest reserve altered access and 
property relations. The conflict provided local Malay elites with the ability to 
expand their village territory and thus to create additional income through sell-
ing land to spontaneous migrants. The spontaneous migrants became new land-
owners holding property rights legitimized by the local Malay and indirectly 
by the district head of Muaro Jambi. At the same time new types of properties 
have emerged. The conditional land-tenure schemes introduced as a conflict-
solving mechanism by the Provincial Forest Agency, for instance, provide land-
use rights bound to conservation regulations.
Competing state apparatuses and implications for REDD+
Settlers and the village community of Kampung Laut experienced the conflict 
mostly as a conflict between different state apparatuses. Key informants stated, 
for instance, that the Transmigration Agency was not aware of the boundaries 
of the Forest Reserve and complained that the Provincial Forest Agency inter-
vened only after construction of the settlement started.73 Staff members of the 
Provincial Forest Agency challenge the legitimacy of the scheme and argue that 
the transmigration settlement as such is not an “official scheme”.74 Gita Buana, 
the local NGO involved in the Berbak Carbon Initiative highlighted that the 
settlement further increases the risk of disturbance in the National Park. Staff of 
Gita Buana wondered about the contradictive policies of different state appa-
ratuses.75 Here, the implementation of the Berbak Carbon Initiative has added 
an additional conflict layer; this has also been recognized by some community 
members, as indicated by statements such as, “[. . .] the forest reserve is owned 
by the world”.76
The agreement between the Zoological Society of London (ZSL) and the 
Provincial Forest Agency states that the forest reserve could supply carbon 
credits with a value of more than 200 million USD within 30 years (Dinas 
Kehutanan Provinsi Jambi, 2013). The exact value would, of course, depend on 
carbon prices on the voluntary market or on future binding carbon markets. 
Even more importantly, the production of carbon credits requires the integrity 
of the project boundaries and especially the effective avoidance of deforestation, 
forest fires and further peat conversion. However, precisely these objectives are 
those challenged by the district government through the implementation of the 
transmigration settlement (Hein et al., 2018a). The case shows that apparently 
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local conflicts between different state actors at Berbak’s forest frontier might 
challenge the production of forest carbon credits and the permanence of 
avoided greenhouse gas emissions. Consequently, they become globally rele-
vant. To produce carbon credits the seller (e.g. the project developer, in this case 
ZSL and partners) has to guarantee that the forest remains intact – at least for a 
certain period. The buyer of the carbon credits uses the credits to compensate 
for greenhouse gases that have already been emitted (in other words, to offset). 
If conflict between different state apparatuses challenges the permanence of the 
avoided greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. because of forest conversion), the offset-
ting would be undermined and this could create conflicts between the local 
sellers and the transnational buyer of carbon credits.
Summary and preliminary conclusion
REDD+ and the idea of forest carbon offsetting have transnationalized appar-
ently local agrarian conflicts in at least three different ways. First, the UNFCCC 
REDD+ governance framework, international conventions and declarations 
on the rights of indigenous people, and transnational REDD+ safeguards pro-
vide transnational norms and soft laws that peasants and indigenous groups 
increasingly use to campaign for and to defend access to natural resources and 
land. Second, the contestations involve transnational actor coalitions and con-
flicts occur on multiple scales. Conservation and REDD+ projects are often 
implemented by a wide network of transnational actors including state agen-
cies, donors, private companies and environmental organizations. Protest and 
resistance against green enclosures, as the conflicts described in this chapter 
show, have an increasingly transnational character, linking peasants with global 
peasant organizations, advocacy NGOs and the private donors, such as Mis-
ereor and the Ford Foundation, who support these groups financially. Third, the 
very idea of offsetting changes the meanings of agrarian conflicts. Forest carbon 
offsetting transfers responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from 
global centers to the periphery and in most cases to regions that have contrib-
uted much less to global warming than the urban centers in the Global North. 
Peasants raised concerns that green enclosures challenge their livelihood strate-
gies, asking whether their lives are not more important than reducing green-
house gas emissions. In this regard, the struggles in Jambi are also struggles for 
climate justice. The idea that REDD+ could support a sustainable transition in 
rural areas (e.g. Murdiyarso et al., 2012: 680) did not gain much traction in the 
landscapes around the Berbak Carbon Initiative and the Harapan Rainforest. 
For many peasants, as well as for conservationists, trade-off thinking dominated: 
conservation versus rural development. Only recently, in the context of con-
flict mediation, has it seemed possible that conditional land tenure for rubber 
agroforestry might gain traction as a policy to align mitigation objectives with 
local development.
The conflicts about access to and control of the Harapan Rainforest cases 
show that peasants supported by NGOs were able to defend their land claims 
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and have challenged the commodification of forest carbon. Successful peas-
ant resistance relied on scale jumping and on the construction of scales of 
meaning and regulation. Scales shape resistance opportunities, permitting, for 
instance, scale jumping to pre-existing higher scales and alliances with actors 
that are able to raise protests at higher scales. At the same time resistance 
activities can also change existing scales (e.g. expansion of village scale of 
regulation) or produce new scales (e.g. SPI territory). The conflicts about the 
Berbak Carbon Initiative case (and, to a lesser extent, the Harapan Rainforest 
case, as well) show that different apparatuses of the state follow different inter-
ests reflecting different interest groups within society. The conflicts in both 
projects indicate that the rescaling of access and property relations, in other 
words the spatial expansion or reduction of regulation and authority, is not a 
conflict-free process. Scales of regulation reflect power relations between dif-
ferent authorities, they are maintained and reproduced by actors requesting 
land titles and they are challenged by other actors requesting land titles from 
a competing authority. The scales of tenure regulations in place represent a 
fragile stand-off or compromise between different public authorities, includ-
ing customary leaders and various state apparatuses.
Furthermore, the illustrated cases show that rescaling has provided extra lee-
way for successful peasant resistance. Especially REDD+ attracted attention to 
structural inequality at the forest margins. International norms such as FPIC 
and the Cancun Safeguards strengthened the position of peasants and especially 
of indigenous groups. As the Harapan Rainforest case illustrates, the failure to 
conduct FPIC provided entry points for transnational resistance campaigns. 
Peasants used different multi-scalar resistance strategies. They built alliances 
with customary leaders, village governments and with NGOs and transnational 
peasant organizations, such as La Via Campesina. Especially those peasants affili-
ated with SPI were able to raise concerns about the Harapan Rainforest project 
at the global scale. Peasants supported by CAPPA were able to send protest 
notes to donors and to organize protest at the provincial scale. Nevertheless, it 
was not only scale relations that proved relevant for successful resistance (Hein 
et al., 2016: 387); network relations, e.g. linking up with indigenous groups or 
cooperation among local NGOs, were shown also to be of particular impor-
tance for successful peasant resistance (ibid.).
The ability to resist against PT REKI’s land claims, or – from PT REKI’s 
perspective – their defense of the integrity of the Harapan Rainforest, is also a 
matter of power. According to Gaventa (1982: 23), rebellion or the challenge 
of power “[. . .] may develop if there is a shift in the power relationships – 
either owing to loss in power of A or gain in power of B”. In the first place, 
the changed power relations after the fall of Suharto provided the opportunity 
to organize and transform hidden resistance into larger, open resistance that 
actively challenged hegemony. Following Gaventa (2006: 31), I have argued that 
strategic alliances and multi-scalar strategies paved the way for successful land 
occupations and later on for the successful resistance of the peasants of Kunan-
gan Jaya I and of SPI. The ability to form alliances with actors on different scales 
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and to construct political campaigns tailored for different scales (e.g. land distri-
bution at the local scale, agrarian reform at the national scale, and anti-REDD+ 
at the global scale) contributed to their success. Peasant organizations became 
a relevant force in Jambi. SPI, for instance, has developed visible power. The 
organization has 15,000–20,000 members in Jambi and financial resources from 
membership fees.77 Yayasan CAPPA, as the main NGO supporting peasants in 
Kunangan Jaya I, relies on a transnational network and has received significant 
support from donors (e.g. Misereor and the Ford Foundation). Yayasan CAPPA 
has the capacity to organize protest and to act as an up- and downward transla-
tor. The organizational strength of SPI and the capacities of Yayasan CAPPA 
have contributed to the ability of the different peasant groups to resist PT 
REKI, the MoF and the mobile police brigades.
Notes
 1 Interview with an AMAN activist, Jakarta, 27.07.2012.
 2 Interview with an AMAN activist, Jakarta, 27.07.2012.
 3 Interview with an AMAN activist, Jambi, 02.08.2013.
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the lower levels.
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12.07.2013.
 6 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 13.09.2012.
 7 Dragon blood, Daemonorops draco, is a specific rattan species that produces a red resin.
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 10 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 11 Interview with key informants in Tanjung Lebar, 25.07.2013.
 12 Interviews with key informants in Tanjung Lebar, 21.07.2013.
 13 Interview with an SPI activist in Jambi, 12.07.2013.
 14 Interview with a staff member of Burung Indonesia, 11.10.2013.
 15 Interviews with key informants in Tanjung Lebar, 21.07.2013, 22.07. 2013, with an 
SPI activist in Jambi, 12.07.2013, and with KfW staff members in Frankfurt am Main, 
04.02.2014.
 16 Interview with an SPI activist in Jakarta, 20.06.2013.
 17 Interview with a staff member of PT REKI in Bungku, 30.07.2013 and with staff mem-
bers of KfW, Frankfurt am Main, 04.02.2014.
 18 Interview with an SPI activist in Jambi, 12.07.2013 and with KfW staff in Frankfurt am 
Main, 04.02.2014.
 19 Interview with KfW staff members in Frankfurt am Main, 04.02.2014.
 20 Interview with a KfW staff member in Frankfurt am Main, 19.04.2012.
 21 Interview with an activist of AGRA, Jambi, 18.09.2013.
 22 Interview with staff members of KfW, Frankfurt am Main, 04.02.2014.
 23 Interview with staff members of KfW, Frankfurt am Main, 04.02.2014.
 24 Interview with key informants in Tanjung Lebar, 22.07.2013.
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 25 Interview with an SPI activist in Jakarta, 20.06.2013.
 26 Interview with an SPI activist in Jambi, 12.07.2013.
 27 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 21.07.2013.
 28 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 22.07.2013.
 29 Interview with a staff member of Carbon Synthesis, 11.10.2012.
 30 Interview with a staff member of PT REKI in Bungku, 30.07.2013.
 31 Interview with a staff member of PT REKI in Bungku, 30.07.2013.
 32 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 21.07.2013.
 33 Interview with a staff member of PT REKI, Bogor, 11.10.2013.
 34 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 23.08.2013.
 35 Interview with key informants in Bungku, 10.07.2013 and 25.08.2013.
 36 Interview with key informants in Bungku, 12.09.2012.
 37 Interview with key informants in Bungku, 12.09. 2012 and 10.07.2012.
 38 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 23.08.2013.
 39 Interviews with key informants in Bungku, 10.07.2013, 23.08.2013 and 24.08.2013
 40 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 24.08.2013.
 41 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 10.07.2013.
 42 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 25.08.2013.
 43 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 23.08.2013.
 44 Interview with a staff member of PT REKI in Bungku, 30.07.2013.
 45 Interview with an SETARA activist in Jambi, 18.07.2013.
 46 Interview with staff of KfW in Frankfurt am Main, 04.02.2014.
 47 For the reclassification of forest land to non-forest land, specific criteria have to be met. 
The criteria formulated by the General Director of Forest Planning in 1994 consist of 
biophysical criteria (e.g. soil type and altitude) and socio-economic criteria (e.g. land 
use, ethnicity of settlers, proof of land ownership).
 48 The term refers to Suku Anak Dalam, a post-colonial and deprecatory term for indig-
enous communities, in this case  the term refers to the Batin Sembilan.
 49 Batak is an ethnic group from the Province of North Sumatra; Medan is the capital of 
North Sumatra.
 50 Interview with a staff member of Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi Jambi, Jambi, 19.09.2012.
 51 Interview with a staff member of PT REKI in Bungku, 30.07.2013.
 52 Interview with a staff member of PT REKI in Bungku, 30.07.2013.
 53 KM 35 is a small settlement of Kunangan Jaya I located on a former logging road 
between Simpang Macan Luar and the airfield of PT REKI.
 54 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 12.09.2012.
 55 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 12.09.2012.
 56 Interviews with a CAPPA activist in Jambi, 18.07.2013.
 57 Interview with a key informant in Bungku, 25.08.2013.
 58 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 26.07.2013.
 59 Interview with an AMAN activist in Jambi, 02.08.2013.
 60 Interview with a key informant in Tanjung Lebar, 27.07.2013.
 61 Interview with key informants in Bungku, 09.07.2013.
 62 Interview with key informants in Kampung Laut, 30.08 2013 and 09.08.2016.
 63 Interviews with key informants in Kampung Laut, 29.08.2013 and 30.08.2013.
 64 Interview with a staff member of the sub-district administration (Kecamatan) of 
Kumpeh in SuaKandis, 02.09.2013. Interviews with key informants in Kampung Laut, 
29.08.2013 and 30.08.2013 and with a staff member of the Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi of 
Jambi in Jambi, 27.08.2013.
 65 Interview with a staff member of Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi of Jambi in Jambi, 
27.08.2013.
 66 Interviews with key informants in Kampung Laut, 29.08.2013 and 30.08.2013.
 67 Interview with a staff member of the Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi of Jambi in Jambi, 
27.08.2013.
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 68 Interviews with key informants in Kampung Laut, 29.08.2013 and 30.08.2013.
 69 Interview with key informants in Kampung Laut, 09.08.2016.
 70 Interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 09.08.2016.
 71 Interview with a staff member of Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi of Jambi in Jambi, 
27.08.2013.
 72 Interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 29.08.2013.
 73 Interview with key informants in Kampung Laut, 29.08.2013 and 30.08.2013.
 74 Interview with a staff member of the Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi, 27.08.2013.
 75 Interview with a staff member of Gita Buana, 22.08.2013.
 76 Interview with a key informant in Kampung Laut, 29.08.2013.
 77 Interviews with SPI activists in Jakarta, 20.06.2013 and Jambi, 12.07.2013 and with key 
informants in Tanjung Lebar, 22.07.2013.
6  Conclusion
Towards a political ecology of 
transnational agrarian conflicts
This book has provided a comprehensive analysis of agrarian conflicts in the 
context of REDD+ implementation, forest carbon offsetting and privatized 
conservation. The incidents in Jambi illustrate that transnational conservation 
initiatives do not act in a social and political vacuum. They show that the ability 
to define “nature” as a space for shifting cultivators, as oil palm plantation estates 
or as forest carbon offset is linked to power relations. My first step towards 
drawing conclusions is to sum up a number of key arguments and key results. 
Using the agrarian conflicts in Jambi as a point of departure, I then propose 
elements for a political ecology of transnational agrarian conflicts that explicitly 
considers the role of socio-spatial relations and of power and property for future 
research in Indonesia and beyond.
At the beginning of the book, I raised two arguments which help to explain 
the complexity of the socially differentiated impacts of REDD+. First, I argued 
that REDD+ can be many different things at different political scales and for 
different actors and their respective storylines and discourses. Conservation-
ists and economists have conceptualized REDD+ as a win-win mechanism. 
However, conflicts in Jambi and in other parts of the world (e.g. for Africa: 
Leach and Scoones, 2015) show that instead of providing win-win outcomes, 
the mechanism has rather maintained and reproduced existing inequalities and 
power asymmetries. REDD+, as most other conservation instruments, restricts 
access to land and land use. In Sumatra, as in other world regions, state terri-
torialization projects have allocated large amounts of land to corporate actors 
for the sake of development and neglected indigenous and peasant rights to 
land. REDD+ has thus created additional threats for local livelihoods instead of 
facilitating a just transition to sustainability as intended by some (Grieg-Gran 
et al., 2015; Holmgren, 2013).
REDD+ in Jambi, as outlined in Chapter 4, is neither a single policy nor 
a coherent set of conservation interventions. REDD+ in Jambi takes many 
different forms. The whole province is a REDD+ pilot with a detailed prov-
ince-wide action plan for reducing deforestation, including policies to solve 
existing land tenure conflicts. However, most of the proposed policies have 
remained on paper and exceed the formal competencies of the provincial gov-
ernment. In parallel, a number of independent, often non-state actor-driven 
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and donor-financed forest conservation initiatives have been implemented. 
Some of them aim to sell carbon credits on voluntary carbon markets, others 
form part of voluntary commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
support biodiversity conservation by bilateral and private donors such as Ger-
many, Denmark, the UK and Singapore Airlines. The population affected by 
these conservation initiatives calls them “lungs of the earth” or “carbon toilet” 
and asks rather critically, “Why did the rich countries buy the oxygen in our 
forest?” Last but not least, REDD+ has facilitated the diffusion of international 
norms such as free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). The explicit acknowl-
edgement of indigenous and local communities in UNFCCC decisions on 
REDD+ has provided additional legitimacy for ethnicity-based land claims. 
Yet, the new norms have not been translated into new de-jure rights and have 
not been acknowledged by all conservationists, as the Harapan Rainforest case 
shows. However, they provide entry points for organizing transnational resist-
ance and they attract additional attention towards structural inequality at the 
forest margins.
Second, and probably more fundamentally, I drew on work by Fairhead and 
colleagues (2012) to argue that, in the context of forest carbon offsetting and 
market-based conservation, “[. . .] the basic questions of the agrarian political 
economy are as relevant as ever [. . .]”. Land is at the heart of the agrarian ques-
tion. The agrarian conflict and peasant resistance described in Chapters 3 and 5 
of this book are first and foremost conflicts about access to and control of land, 
which is the most important means of production in landscapes dominated by 
agriculture. Most of the conflicts about access to and control of land in Jambi 
are older than the recent conservation interventions. They are rather caused by 
historically contingent structural inequality and by the non-recognition of cus-
tomary rights than by conservation interventions as such (c.f. Hein and Faust, 
2014: 25). However, the historical conditions that facilitate the implementation 
of new conservation areas and REDD+ are neither primordial nor unchange-
able. They were established by the colonial and post-colonial state to strengthen 
territorial control and to facilitate the extraction of nature resources and the 
expansion of large-scale agricultural estates. Today, exactly these conditions are 
used and reproduced by conservation actors for the production of a new com-
modity, namely forest carbon, but also for rather fictitious commodities referred 
to as the “currencies of conservation spectacle” by Igoe and colleagues (2010: 
494), namely new “successful” protected areas and spectacular images of flag-
ship species such as the Sumatran Tiger and Sumatran Elephant.
The access and property relations in landscapes discussed in this book are 
complex, conflictive and highly dynamic, challenging the expansion of pro-
tected areas. They are the outcome of competing property rights that have 
evolved across time and that are regulated on different scales and issued by 
competing authorities. I argue that property rights, the notion of a state and 
especially scales of regulation are inseparably linked. Colonial scales of mean-
ing and regulation facilitated access to land and natural resources to extract 
benefits for Dutch colonial authorities and corporate actors, challenging the 
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pre-existing scalar arrangements of customary communities. The autocratic 
Suharto regime established a national scale of meaning based on moderniza-
tion and development narratives; and implemented a complementary national 
scale of regulation facilitating access to land for timber and oil palm companies. 
In the late 1990s, political struggle induced far-reaching scalar restructuring 
and changing dialectical relationships between structure and agency, further 
supported by the objective of reallocating land and natural resources. Decen-
tralization and changed power constellations have significantly widened the 
opportunities for local actors to access land, as the informal settlements within 
the Harapan Rainforest indicate. The diffusion of international norms and 
transnational carbon standards in the context of REDD+ can be considered as 
the most recent, still ongoing rescaling process. Peasant organizations such as La 
Via Campesina and SPI organized protests at UN conferences. Consequently, 
successful peasant resistance further reproduced the emerging global scale of 
REDD+ governance.
Elements for a political ecology of transnational  
agrarian conflict
In the following section different explanations and interpretations of the main 
results of this study will be outlined as a starting point for a political ecology of 
transnational agrarian conflict, thus for future empirical research. Explanations 
and interpretations will be mainly based on the core analytical categories out-
lined in Chapter 2, namely scale, power, territory and property.
Socio-spatial relations and conflictive modes of production
The different ways land is used influences scalar arrangements and property rela-
tions (Zulu, 2009: 690). I consider conservation including REDD+, corporate 
oil palm cultivation, smallholder oil palm and rubber cultivation, and shifting 
cultivation as mutually exclusive modes of production which create different 
socio-spatial arrangements and competing access and property relations.
Shifting cultivation, hunting and gathering practices were important modes 
of production in Jambi until the 1980s. Today, they have become less relevant 
in Jambi as well as in other frontier landscapes in the Global South (Hall et al., 
2011: 106; Li, 2002: 421; Mertz, 2009). Shifting cultivation within and around 
the Harapan Rainforest is deeply entangled with a pre-existing watershed- and 
lineage-based socio-spatial organization. Shifting cultivation and also hunting 
and gathering practices require vast areas of land controlled by lineage and 
sub-lineage leaders. The corporate and smallholder expansion of oil palm and 
rubber cultivation and the expansion of conservation areas have significantly 
limited the land available for shifting cultivators. At the same time and conse-
quently, modes of production access, property relations, and entangled scalar 
arrangements have changed. Watershed and lineage scales have been replaced 
by village, district, national and transnational scales that particularly facilitate oil 
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palm cultivation and conservation as new modes of production. However, these 
changes – as outlined in the previous chapters – were highly conflictive.
The introduction of rubber by Dutch colonial authorities, the promotion of 
oil palm cultivation by the Indonesian government, and the reputation of oil 
palm as a modern crop (Hein et al., 2016; Locher-Scholten, 2004; Schwarze 
et al., 2015) incentivized peasant farmers to convert former swiddens to per-
manent rubber and oil palm plantations1 (Schwarze et al., 2015: 1). Local com-
munities cultivate oil palm even within the Harapan Rainforest and, to a lesser 
extent, within the Berbak Carbon Initiative. In many cases, the expansion of 
smallholder oil palm and rubber plantations has been promoted by customary, 
village and district authorities. As in other parts of Indonesia, they consider the 
conversion of state forest as a legitimate response to colonial and post-colonial 
dispossessions (Lukas, 2014; Peluso et al., 2008; Tuong, 2009). Land allocation 
and forest conversion has been facilitated by village governments and custom-
ary leaders. To provide a minimum of tenure security for peasants cultivating 
oil palm and to permit land trade, village governments started to issue different 
types of land titles, thus establishing a village scale of land tenure regulation. By 
requesting village-scale land titles, peasants reproduced and maintained the new 
scale of regulation. Moreover, I argue that the new village scale of land tenure 
regulation reflects and supports the requirements of a specific mode of produc-
tion: smallholder oil palm cultivation. Village-scale land titles have facilitated the 
expansion of smallholder oil palm plantings, the commodification of former 
family or lineage-based property and the formation of a land market within the 
conservation areas studied.
Corporate oil palm cultivation has transformed rural Indonesia significantly 
in recent years. More than 10 million hectares of land are used for oil palm 
cultivation in Indonesia, approximately two-thirds by large-scale corporate oil 
palm plantation estates. Since decentralization, access to plantation concessions 
(HGU) has been mainly regulated at the district scale. Commercial oil palm 
plantations require large land holdings, full land control and labor (Hall et al., 
2011: 92). Oil palm companies are usually well-positioned in regard to the 
three power dimensions developed by Lukes (2005) and Gaventa (1982). In 
consequence, they have been quite successful in accessing land rights for vast 
areas. Especially around the Harapan Rainforest, oil palm concessions overlap 
with land claimed by local and indigenous communities. Previous modes of 
production, such as logging, still permitted the co-existence of hunting and 
gathering and, in some cases, even of shifting cultivation. In contrast, com-
mercial large-scale oil palm cultivation requires full land control and does not 
permit any co-existing land-use practices. In consequence, the introduction of 
commercial large-scale oil palm cultivation led to displacements and to con-
flicts with other right holders involved in other modes of production.
Another mode of production that requires large land resources is conserva-
tion and REDD+. The extent to which conservation and REDD+ can be fully 
considered as modes of production is the subject of heated debates. Political 
ecologists in particular consider them as being intrinsically linked to specific 
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modes and relations of production related to the commodification of ecosystem 
services (Brockington and Scholfield, 2011; Castree, 2003; Corbera and Brown, 
2010; Escobar, 1996; Fairhead et al., 2012; Garland, 2008; Kelly, 2011; McAfee, 
1999; Zimmerer, 2000). In contrast, some conservationists consider their inter-
ventions rather as a counter movement aiming to protect the non-commodity 
status of wildness and to hinder the commodification of forest products such as 
timber (Li, 2008: 125). More market-oriented conservationists believe that only 
the full commodification of nature would help to protect increasingly shrink-
ing habitats for non-human species (Igoe et al., 2010).
PT REKI and actors involved in the Berbak Carbon Initiative both support 
specific so-called biodiversity-friendly and low-carbon land use practices. But, 
like many other conservation initiatives, they also produce (or plan to produce) 
specific “fictitious commodities” (Nevins and Peluso, 2008: 19) as well as spe-
cific tradable commodities, such as sustainable products, ecotourism and forest 
carbon credits. Fictitious commodities, in other words symbolic commodities, 
produced by the conservation company PT REKI in the Harapan Rainforest 
include biodiversity hotspots, the last remaining patches of lowland rainforests 
of global importance, and a refuge for the indigenous Batin Sembilan. Trad-
able commodities produced by PT REKI include ecotourism and sustainably 
produced non-timber forest products (REKI 2014). As other economic actors, 
conservation NGOs and companies have to show success and highlight the 
economic advantages of their activities (Igoe et al., 2010: 496) vis-à-vis poten-
tial competitors. The RSPB and the ZSL advertise their projects with pic-
tures of the endangered Sumatran tigers to illustrate that donations would help 
to save these species. Both projects, despite all the conflicts and controversies, 
merchandise their projects as success cases. ZSL (2015), for instance, has just 
changed the time line of the project in its most recent brochure on the Berbak 
Carbon Initiative, concealing that the project has made only limited progress 
since 2013. The NABU (2014), one of PT REKI’s German partners, presents 
the Harapan Rainforest project as a success case and failed to even mention the 
ongoing conflicts in an article on their webpage.
Processes of the (fictitious) commodification of nature and new “green” 
modes of production, such as offsetting, are elements of the ecological phase of 
capitalism (Escobar, 1996: 326), shaping nature and society (Brockington et al., 
2008: 5). In the landscapes around the Harapan Rainforest and Berbak Car-
bon Initiative, they encounter pre-existing and competing modes of produc-
tion (especially smallholder and corporate oil palm cultivation) associated with 
different scalar arrangements or, in the terms used by Karl S. Zimmerer and 
Thomas J. Bassett (2003b: 288), with different geographies of resource access. 
The establishment of conservation projects involves the containing of space, 
thus the construction of conservation territories that fix social relations of con-
flict and cooperation (Zimmerer, 2000: 360). The formation of the Harapan 
Rainforest and Berbak Carbon conservation scales has changed the meaning 
of the contained space and has transformed them to objects of environmen-
tal governance (Cohen and McCarthy, 2014: 2). They have been produced by 
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rescaling to a physical space for which no direct state authority or jurisdiction 
existed a priori (ibid.).
It is important to highlight that the state and its different apparatuses have a 
key role in the aforementioned socio-spatial processes. A number of subsequent 
state interventions have facilitated the expansion of capitalist modes of produc-
tion which have changed access and property relations (Beckert et al., 2014; 
Brad et al., 2015; Fold and Hirsch, 2009; Faust, 2007;Hein et al., 2016; Nevins 
and Peluso, 2008). The formation of the specific scalar arrangements facilitating 
privatized conservation, corporate oil palm and smallholder oil palm cultivation 
have been actively promoted by state actors responding to discourses of market 
environmentalism and development. Conflictive access and property relations 
and conflictive scalar arrangements, as discussed above, can also be considered 
as conflicts between different apparatuses of the state over societal relationships 
with nature. The promotion of settlement and agricultural production within 
the Harapan Rainforest by village and district governments is one example. The 
transmigration settlement as a means to promote rural development within the 
Berbak Carbon Initiative is an even more astonishing case. Both cases indicate 
that conflicts between different state apparatuses, especially between conserva-
tion and development agencies (Brand et al., 2011: 150; Hein et al., 2018a), are 
additional explanations for conflictive access and property relations.
Rescaling
As described throughout the book, rescaling caused by state transformation 
is another relevant explanation for changing and conflictive access and prop-
erty relations. Following Reed and Bruyneel (2010), I have identified three 
relevant scalar processes caused by state transformation processes, namely up-
scaling towards transnational or international state apparatuses, down-scaling 
towards sub-national state apparatuses, and scaling-out towards non-state actors 
(e.g. conservation companies). State transformation from the colonial state, via 
the interventionist development state to the decentralized national competi-
tion state is a main cause of scalar restructuring and rescaling in Indonesia. In 
other words, up-, down- and out-scaling have been caused by regime change 
and policy shifts.
Up-scaling is taking place in the context of REDD+. The trading of REDD+ 
credits and multilateral or bilateral result-based payments for emission reduc-
tions require homogenous rules governing carbon accounting but also govern-
ing the acknowledgement of community rights and the design of participation 
processes. REDD+ has not yet led to a coherent scale of global forest gov-
ernance. The so-called Cancun Safeguards of the UNFCCC and transnational 
carbon standards such as the Climate, Change, Community and Biodiversity 
Standard (CCBS) indicate that specific rights for local and indigenous com-
munities have been up-scaled to the emerging global scale of forest govern-
ance. Yet the application of global norms governing community involvement 
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(such as free, prior and informed consent) is still contested in many countries 
implementing REDD+ policies (Delgado-Pugley, 2013; Díaz, 2014; McCarthy, 
2012). Many local and indigenous communities living within or adjacent to 
REDD+ pilot projects have not been involved in project planning, have not 
been informed about REDD+ and have not been asked to give their consent 
(Hein and Garrelts, 2014: 326; Mcculloch, 2010; Zelli et al., 2014: 104–106).
The down-scaling of land and natural resource governance in Indonesia 
has mainly taken place as a result of decentralization after the fall of Suharto. 
Indonesia’s big bang decentralization can be considered a response to chang-
ing power relations and as a process that then further changed power relations. 
The decision to decentralize Indonesia was taken in the context of a relatively 
weak central state and of reappearing separatist tendencies (Hofman and Kaiser, 
2002: 2). As explained in Chapter 3, the decentralization policies have only led 
to limited permanent de jure change of Indonesia’s forest governance; how-
ever de facto changes have been significant as the informal settlements within 
the Harapan Rainforest, village-scale land titles and numerous studies on land 
tenure and conflict across the Archipelago indicate (Adiwibowo, 2005; Galudra 
et al., 2011; Lukas, 2014; Peluso et al., 2008). Down-scaling has increased the 
power of local state apparatuses and local and customary elites at the expense 
of national apparatuses. Within and around the Harapan Rainforest and the 
Berbak Carbon Initiative, power gains (e.g. mainly visible power) have been 
mainly absorbed by local elites, indicating that more decentralized or custom-
ary forms of environmental governance arrangements are not necessarily more 
favorable for social equality than more centralized ones. Studies focusing on the 
impacts of decentralization on access to land and forest resources on Indonesia 
and beyond indicate similar patterns of elite capture (McCarthy, 2004; Resosu-
darmo, 2004; Larson and Soto, 2008).
Scaling-out refers to the delegation of former state functions to non-state 
actors (Cohen and McCarthy, 2014: 13–14; Reed and Bruyneel, 2010: 648). 
Especially in the Americas, non-state actors have played a greater role in con-
servation since the 1990s through their involvement in payment for ecosystem 
service schemes (PES) and conservation concessions (Ellison, 2003; Langholz 
et al., 2000; Wolman, 2004). Indonesia started relatively late to privatize con-
servation and implement PES (Heyde et al., 2012: 1). It was the 2000s before 
the Indonesian government introduced privately managed ecosystem restora-
tion concessions after successful lobbying by PT REKI’s shareholder Burung 
Indonesia. For the very first time the concession delegated protected-area man-
agement within the state forest to non-state actors. Holding an ecosystem res-
toration concession provided PT REKI with the de facto authority to take over 
other state functions such as law enforcement and the legitimation of property 
rights. By scaling-out the management of the Meranti-River-Kapuas-River 
forest block to PT REKI, the Indonesian MoF delegated a whole bundle of 
rights to the conservation company, including the right to exclude other land 
users, in particular peasant migrants.
176 Conclusion
Agency, power and the production of scale
Neil Smith and other scholars noted that the production of scale is not only 
the outcome of modes of production and state interventions but also of human 
agency and social and cultural practices (Marston, 2000; Smith, 1992). The con-
flicts in Jambi confirm especially the relevance of agency for scale production. 
Peasant and indigenous rights movements used the extended room for maneu-
ver of the Reformasi era to organize multi-scalar resistance campaigns against 
the land and forest allocation policies of various state apparatuses. In addition, 
they constructed alternative scales of meaning and regulations to legitimize 
forest conversion and land allocation, as shown by the different settlement and 
forest conversion projects organized by specific individuals supported by vil-
lage governments and peasant movements. SPI and AMAN have challenged 
existing scalar arrangements through up-scaling resistance to the national and 
transnational scales.
Political scales are spatial delimitations of political power, argues James 
Meadowcroft (2002: 170). In consequence, changing power relations are an 
important explanation for rescaling. The above-mentioned resistance activi-
ties challenged power relations and scalar structures. Initially regime change, 
democratic freedom and subsequent decentralization decreased the power of 
the central state, providing the opportunity to transform hidden resistance into 
open resistance and actively challenging hegemonic actors such as the MoF. 
Gaventa (1982: 24) argues that in order to change power constellations in a 
specific arena, “the powerless” have to challenge all three dimensions of power. 
Taking again the example of the Harapan Rainforest, actors such as SPI were 
able to challenge invisible power by formulating political aims (e.g. implemen-
tation of an agrarian reform based on the Basic Agrarian Law, environmental 
justice), hidden power by mobilizing peasants and political allies (e.g. migrants in 
search for land and customary leaders), and visible power by developing material 
resources and organizational strength (e.g. land resources and members). Visible 
power permitted SPI to engage in open conflict with PT REKI and the MoF. 
SPI challenged the MoF and PT REKI on different scales and constructed and 
successfully defended their settlements within the Harapan Rainforest as a new 
scale of meaning and regulation.
PT REKI’s success in accessing its ecosystem restoration concession in the 
first place indicates that the conservation company is also well-positioned with 
regard to the three power dimensions as well. Visible powers, especially the 
conservation company’s material resources such as the ability to pay taxes in 
advance, were necessary to access the concession and establish the Harapan 
Rainforest project. Furthermore, PT REKI was able to change the rules of the 
game (hidden power). The conservation company’s active lobbying led to the 
MoF reforming forest management, including introducing ecosystem restora-
tion concessions that permit access to land in the first place. PT REKI also 
benefitted from its position with regard to the invisible dimension of power. 
First, PT REKI and partners were able to frame a former logging concession 
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as one of the last remaining patches of “dry low land rainforest” and as one of 
the last remaining habitats for flagship species and for the indigenous Batin 
Sembilan. PT REKI strategically uses the presence of the Batin Sembilan and 
their alleged role as “forest-dependent people” to further legitimize forest con-
servation (Birdlife International, 2008: 5; Hein and Kunz, 2018: 160). Second, 
market-oriented conservation concepts such as private conservation conces-
sions and REDD+ and the neoliberal consensus of privatization (Ellison, 2003; 
Harvey, 2005; Jenkins et al., 2004; McAfee, 1999, 2012a; Ong, 2006; Rodríguez 
de Francisco, 2013) laid the ground for PT REKI’s successful lobbying activi-
ties. Moreover, the efforts of PT REKI and other conservation NGOs to con-
struct a global scale of meaning to legitimize local conservation efforts has been 
internalized by some of the peasants interviewed in the study villages. Villagers, 
for instance, explained that “[. . .] the forest reserve is owned by the world”2 and 
“[. . .] this forest is the lung of the earth”,3 accepting the designation of conser-
vation areas for storing and capturing of greenhouse gases.
Territorialization
Territorialization is first of all a process of inclusion and exclusion of people. 
Territories are power relations written on land (Peluso and Lund, 2011) and a 
source of visible power. Territorialization as a process of claiming, naming and 
rule making is often considered as a precondition for accumulation. In Jambi, 
but also in other places, colonial and post-colonial state territorialization was an 
initial step in facilitating the exploitation of forests by private and state-owned 
companies. The formation of the Indonesian state forest territory separated 
people from land and other income sources and freed-up labor for the expand-
ing agrobusiness. However, processes of primitive accumulation did not only 
occur in the context of the formation of the state forest, but they also occurred 
more recently in the context of the formation of protected areas. The Harapan 
Rainforest, for instance, restricts access to land but offers “green jobs” explicitly 
for the local population.
At Jambi’s forest frontier, and also in other frontier areas, different territoriali-
zation processes compete, producing “contested spaces of sovereignty” (Agnew 
and Oslender, 2013: 124) characterized by often highly contested access and 
property relations. In Jambi, first of all, large amounts of forest are part of the 
state forest territory. The MoF allocated chunks of the state forest to timber 
companies and then recently to conservation companies. Still, parts of the state 
forest are simultaneously claimed by local and indigenous communities, vil-
lage and district governments, and peasant organizations. Local and indigenous 
groups claim that these areas are part of their customary or ethnic territory. 
Many village governments expanded their village territories towards the state 
forest and thus facilitated the expansion of smallholder oil palm plantations. The 
peasant organization SPI considers its territory within the Harapan Rainforest 
as an alternative territory where land allocation is based on the social function 
of land outlined in the Basic Agrarian Law. The rules for land access developed 
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by the different public authorities for these territories, as described in Chap-
ter 3, are fundamentally different from those developed by the Ministry of For-
estry for the state forest territory.
The nexus between property, authority and legitimacy
Access to natural resources including land is shaped by socio-spatial relations 
(Swyngedouw, 2010). But non-spatial social relations are also relevant for 
understanding the nexus between property, authority and legitimacy. Property, 
as outlined in the conceptual chapter, is a contested concept. The different 
meanings of property encountered in the landscapes of the Berbak Carbon 
Initiative and the Harapan Rainforest illustrate how changing ideologies and 
in particular a Western understanding of property have transformed property 
rights over time. Lineage-based property has been gradually replaced by indi-
vidual forms of property that facilitate market exchange. Recently, new intan-
gible types of property such as forest carbon have been introduced.
Conflictive or overlapping property rights can also be explained by unrave-
ling conflicts over the “organizing ideology” of a society (Alagappa, 1995: 
18; von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann, 1999: 30). Organiz-
ing ideology can be defined as the shared norms and truths of a society. In 
the case-study regions and in other parts of Indonesia, the organizing ide-
ology is contested. In particular, adat ideology and different interpretations 
of Indonesia’s state ideology clash in rural Jambi. Actors seek to legitimize 
property rights by referring to different elements of the competing ideolo-
gies. The social practices of Batin Sembilan, for instance, have been, and to 
a lesser extent still are, structured by adat ideologies. K. Benda-Beckmann 
and F. von Benda-Beckmann (1999: 30) argue that in many adat ideologies 
property rights over land should support and balance the livelihood of a com-
munity across generations. These elements are also reflected in the norms 
and beliefs of the Batin Sembilan. The property rights of the Batin Sembilan 
were attached to lineages and sub-lineages, providing access for all lineage 
members. To legitimize recent attempts to reestablish their former customary 
land (wilayah adat) the Batin Sembilan refer to adat and to powerful ancestors 
of the different lineages. In contrast, members of the peasant movement SPI, 
various apparatuses of the state (e.g. MoF, district and village governments) 
and the conservation company PT REKI base their arguments for legitimiz-
ing land claims on different interpretations of Indonesia’s state ideology and 
on related laws and discourses. The peasant movement stresses the social func-
tion of land stated in the Basic Agrarian Law. The MoF stresses rather state 
ownership of forest land and the importance of forests to promote economic 
growth. The district head of Muaro Jambi highlighted the importance of Java-
nese “model farmers” promoting rural development in order to legitimize the 
formation of a transmigration settlement within the Berbak Carbon Initiative. 
He relates the allocation of land to nation building and to a development 
model dominated by a belief in the superiority of Javanese land-use practices. 
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The conservation company PT REKI refers to market environmentalism, in 
particular to the belief that state-based conservation approaches have failed. 
Therefore, it is argued, conservation needs to be privatized to maintain the 
carbon and biodiversity value of the Harapan Rainforest. The different legiti-
mation strategies and entangled ideologies illustrate different meanings and 
functions of property: customary property as a source of community wealth, 
property as a means to promote socially inclusive rural development, property 
for promoting growth, and property as a way to protect ecosystems and trade 
ecosystem services.
In spite of the contested organizing ideology – or indeed because of it – the 
state or reference to the state is an important source of legitimacy, as Lund (2006: 
690) has shown for Ghana and Niger. This is also the case in the study villages 
and in other parts of Sumatra (Kunz et al., 2016). To legitimize land claims as 
property, many actors refer to apparatuses of the state, symbols of the state, and 
language used by the state including laws, regulations and policies formulated 
by the state or its apparatuses. National regulation structures local agency. Local 
elites pick and choose certain state regulations that support their interests, e.g. 
the Basic Agrarian Law or Governmental Regulation 24/1997. The relevance 
of a certain land tenure regulation depends on the power structure in the arena. 
For example, in the area occupied by SPI, regulations formulated by the peasant 
movement are more relevant than the state regulations of the MoF.
Property is the enforceable right to objects of value. In consequence, prop-
erty can only be considered as such if a legitimate public authority is able to 
sanction it. An important source of legitimacy for public authorities is again 
the state. At the village scale, the state is represented by a number of actors: 
by the elected village head, by hamlet heads, neighborhood heads and other 
members of the village government (apparat desa). Other important sources of 
legitimacy are state regulations, and also customary law, social identity and kin-
ship. As Lund has shown for Ghana (Lund, 2008: 8), boundaries between the 
state and non-state actors are blurred. The village head in Bungku, for instance, 
claims to represent the state and to be a customary leader since he has kinship 
ties to a former lineage leader of the Batin Sembilan. The conservation com-
pany PT REKI enforces the Forest Law, has formulated additional conserva-
tion regulation, and issues de-facto land titles; the company has thus taken on a 
number of state functions. The legitimacy of property depends on acceptance 
of the authority issuing property rights. The acceptance of village-scale land 
titles across the study villages and the acceptance of village-scale land titles as 
collateral for accessing bank loans and as documents for accessing national-scale 
de-jure land titles indicate the legitimacy of the authority of village heads over 
land, irrespective of opposing laws and regulations.
Finally, an important source of legitimacy for public authorities is scale 
(Lund, 2006: 693). A number of different actors in both landscapes made refer-
ence to more powerful authorities at higher scales to legitimize property or 
their authority to issue property rights. In some cases, this again refers to the 
state and its various apparatuses, laws and regulations. In other cases, reference 
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was made to “higher” customary authorities and even to international organi-
zations and international law.
Networks of conservationists and of peasant resistance
Network relations also proved especially relevant for explaining land conflicts 
in the context of REDD+. Conservationists and peasants rely on transnational 
networks, as illustrated by the actor mappings in Chapter 5. Conservationists in 
particular have a distinct legacy of network building (Brockington et al., 2008: 9). 
Conservation projects often rely on private support and consequently often 
build on powerful alliances between corporate actors and conservationists (ibid. 
7). The invention of the REDD+ mechanisms can be at least partly explained 
by such an alliance. One of the leading forest carbon standards, CCBS, for 
instance, has been supported from the very beginning by large companies such 
as BP and Intel. The Harapan Rainforest project as such was formed by an 
NGO network with three core members, Burung Indonesia, the Royal Soci-
ety of Birds and Birdlife International, and other supporting members such as 
the German NABU (Naturschutzbund Deutschland), and has received support 
from a number of private companies. The network of actors involved in the 
implementation of the Berbak Carbon Initiative consists of NGOs, e.g. ZSL, 
Gita Buana, and state actors such as the Berbak National Park Agency and the 
Provincial Forest Agency of Jambi.
However, not only conservationists rely on transnational support networks. 
Peasants and indigenous groups have also received substantial support from 
transnational actors. For instance, La Via Campesina facilitated scale jumping 
for SPI, the NGOs CAPPA and SETARA support one another’s lobbying 
activities, and alliances of village governments and customary leaders have 
raised the legitimacy of forest conversion activities. Private foundations, such 
as the Clinton and Ford Foundations, have also provided funding for advocacy 
groups which supported peasants and indigenous groups in conflicts with PT 
REKI.
Both conservationists and networks of peasants have close connections to 
state actors, again indicating the key role of the state in agrarian conflicts and 
in the privatization of conservation. As mentioned previously, only close con-
nections to the Ministry of Forestry provided the opportunity for PT REKI 
and partners and also for ZSL to establish the conservation initiatives in the 
first place. In addition, both conservation networks relied on the support of 
public donors. Peasants mainly relied on alliances with village governments and 
specific sectoral state agencies.
Summing up
I have argued throughout this book that an explicit conceptualization of socio-
spatial relations and of power and property is beneficial for political ecology. 
The different elements of a political ecology of transnational agrarian conflicts 
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I outlined above provide different entry points and perspectives into this rather 
new empirical phenomenon. A socio-spatial perspective helps to unravel the 
historical and spatial aspects of new rural enclosures such as conservation con-
cessions, REDD+ projects and new agro-industrial estates. Different land-use 
practices and modes of production produce a specific spatial configuration 
which is often deeply entangled with access and property relations. A socio-
spatial perspective helps to identify the specific historical geographies of social 
relations of conflict and cooperation that characterize transnational agrarian 
conflicts.
Investigating rescaling as one specific socio-spatial process helps to demar-
cate the arenas of socio-political struggle and regulation. Actors might produce 
additional scales or shift political struggles to a specific scale of regulation or 
political forum to pursue their interests (Hein et al., 2018a; Smith, 2008: 232; 
Towers, 2000; von Benda-Beckmann, 1981). New political scales are always the 
outcome of social practices. A new transnational scale of forest governance is 
a precondition for carbon trade and result-based payments and other forms of 
carbon finance. This new scale is currently under construction by actors inter-
ested in homogenous rules for carbon finance but also by indigenous groups 
seeking for international recognition. New protected areas are a specific type 
of territory and at the same time they introduce a new sub-national conserva-
tion scale, often controlled by NGOs and public conservation agencies, which 
also constitutes a new arena where social conflict between conservationists and 
opponents takes place.
A socio-spatial perspective considers dialectical relationships between struc-
ture and agency, an understanding of which is highly relevant. A spatial expan-
sion of protest in the context of REDD+ attracted attention to structural 
inequality at the forest frontier, thus providing additional agency for indig-
enous communities. However, new green enclosures have also reduced agency 
significantly. An actor-centric approach, for example, is unlikely to grasp that 
socio-spatial structures impose significant (but changeable) limits on agency 
and resistance.
An explicit conceptualization of power helps reveal why socio-spatial rela-
tions may change. A three-dimensional view of power provides the means to 
uncover the conditions under which peasant resistance takes place in a hidden 
or open way. Rescaling and interrelated shifts in power relations, for instance 
in the context of decentralization, can explain why peasant resistance fails or 
succeeds.
Finally, I argue that different socio-spatial and non-spatial relations of trans-
national agrarian conflicts are characterized by at least three different dialectical 
relationships:
• Between scalar structure and agency
• Between power and scalar structure
• Between de jure and de-facto land and forest tenure regulations and their 
spatial dimensions.
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Final remarks: implications for REDD+, uneven 
development and future directions of research for  
political ecology
This book has discussed the complexity of agrarian conflicts in the context of 
REDD+. But what does all this mean for the mechanism as such? First, clear 
land tenure is often mentioned as a precondition for the successful implemen-
tation of the mechanisms by scholars and practitioners (Galudra et al., 2014; 
Larson et al., 2013; Naughton-Treves and Wendland, 2014; Resosudarmo 
et al., 2014). Land is at the heart of the agrarian conflicts described in this 
book. But what exactly is meant by “clear” land and forest tenure? Indonesia’s 
national REDD+ strategy refers to land tenure reform and to the “[. . .] con-
stitutional rights to certainty over boundaries and management rights for natu-
ral resources” (Indonesian REDD+ Task Force, 2012: 18). At the village-scale, 
clear tenure might have different meaning than at the district or national scale. 
A land tenure reform would formalize certain customary rights but certainly 
not those of all right holders. Consequently, land tenure reform creates winners 
and losers. Second, a major success of the indigenous rights movement is their 
strong involvement in global debates on REDD+. Transnational safeguards 
for REDD+ projects acknowledge the rights of indigenous people and local 
communities, but the rights of non-local ethnic groups are frequently ignored. 
Conservation and REDD+ initiatives, such as the Harapan Rainforest, that 
judge the land rights of migrants as less legitimate may foster ethnic tensions. 
Third, it is argued that clear rights are relevant for selling forest carbon credits 
since the seller of carbon credits has to guarantee that the forest cover will 
remain for an agreed period (e.g. 30 years). If other actors claim the same forest 
area for other purposes, this could undermine the permanence of the avoided 
greenhouse gas emissions. Ongoing land conflicts about access to and control of 
the Harapan Rainforest and the Berbak Carbon Initiative as well as experiences 
from other countries implementing REDD+, such as Peru (Zelli et al., 2014), 
indicate that forest carbon offsetting is a very risky strategy to mitigate climate 
change. Instead of avoiding emissions, forest carbon offsetting could lead to 
additional greenhouse gas emissions if conflictive access and property relations 
undermine the integrity of forest areas designated for carbon offsetting.
Debates on the implementation of REDD+ as part of the Paris climate 
agreement are linked to questions of rural development and climate justice. 
REDD+ transfers part of the responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions to rural areas of the Global South. The expansion of forest conservation 
may limit the development opportunities of those actors who have emitted 
the least fossil-fuel-based greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. see Irfany and Klasen, 
2015 for emissions at household level in Indonesia). REDD+ and forest car-
bon offsetting are considered cheap mitigation options. However, the main 
reason why they are considered cheap are the lower opportunity costs of cli-
mate protection measures (such as REDD+) in the Global South (Hein, 2014: 
510; McAfee, 2012b: 30). Thus, the success of REDD+ as an idea is based on 
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uneven development and could even contribute to the persistence of uneven 
development.
Many political ecologists have conducted studies on the vulnerability of local 
populations in the context of climate change, climate variability and environ-
mental change (Binternagel, 2011; Bohle et al., 1994; Bohle, 2011; Cutter et al., 
2003; Few, 2003). However, the number of studies focusing on the impacts of 
climate mitigation policies on rural development and on the vulnerability of 
local populations is still limited and a rather new, and so far neglected, field 
of research (Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010; Horstmann and Hein, 2017). 
REDD+ and other climate protection policies should not increase the vulner-
ability to external shocks of the worst-off members of society. Many climate 
adaptation and mitigation measures are built on the assumption that develop-
ment, e.g. transformation to a low-carbon economy, is a dirigible technical 
process and one that creates benefits for all actors. It is assumed that policy 
interventions such as investments in REDD+ lead to an anticipated outcome, 
e.g. to reduced deforestation rates, often omitting the fact that any policy shift 
creates winners and losers. The critical engagement of human geographers and 
political ecologists with climate protection instruments and with scalar dimen-
sions of global climate governance could open up a relevant new frontier for 
geographical research. Political ecology could help to unravel the interests of 
actors investing in climate protection, power asymmetries between actors, and 
the legitimacy of private actors taking over former state functions. This could 
help support the design of policies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
reduce the vulnerability of the worst-off members of society.
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